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I. I  n  t  r  o  d  u  c  t  i  o  n
The landscape of preservation is undeniably changing. Religious historic sites with 
active congregations have gained access to federal funding for preservation projects. The 
legal framework for preserving religious buildings is evolving and in an attempt to define the 
new boundaries, I have endeavored to research the jurisprudence within which the current 
framework has been conceived. Historic Preservation:  First Amendment Considerations
exhaustively details significant cases that have defined the First Amendment Religion Clause 
morphology. The awareness of this legal framework is indispensable if preservationists 
intend to maintain the recent Save America’s Treasures triumph.  
The land use regulation and historic preservation nexus is tumultuous and inherently 
polemical in nature. This is evidenced by inconsistent case law that has evolved from the 
struggle for continuity while facing larger issues and inevitable change. The framework for 
the historic preservation of religious sites is deceptively sturdy, seemingly resolved but the 
concept belies the tortuous issues including resistance to landmarking by religious 
institutions, the constitutionality of federal grants for religious sites, the tax exempt status of 
religious organizations, religious land use zoning, and emergency assistance to disaster 
stricken religious sites. The interplay between the underlying issues is compounded when 
proponents for religious freedom and proponents for historic preservation further frustrate 
the delicate tug of war between the competing interests. The two forces of personal religious 
freedom and necessary government protection of historic properties collide in any such 
preservation battle and works to significantly complicate the issues. The rights of religious 
entities, however, are set apart in the U.S. Constitution. The Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution were intended to prevent Congress from 
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making a law that effects the establishment of religion or hinders the free exercise thereof. 
The sense of balance the intended guidance was created to establish was never achieved. 
Currently the debates continue, and beneath them writhe zealous sentiments on both sides.  
The historic preservation of religious sites is a consummate legal balancing act. The 
scales of justice have balanced the interests of the parties based on judicial interpretation of 
the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. These interpretations dictate the rights of 
religious institutions to resist control as well as the need for local, state, and federal 
governments to uphold their responsibilities to the citizens. The analysis of Religion Clauses 
jurisprudence is significant to preservationists even if only a handful of the cases deal directly 
with preservation. The historical trends and the nuances on which cases either differentiate 
from previous precedent or create new precedent are imperative for preservationists to 
appreciate. This Thesis treads on soft ground, impressed with the wandering steps of 
inconsistent courts and a heterogeneous society still divided over the ever-changing role of 
religion in society. The ultimate goal was to understand the constitutionality of federal grants 
to religious properties by tracing the development of the First Amendment Religion Clauses 
from Supreme Court’s early interpretations of them to today’s interpretation which allows 
the funding for the historic preservation of active houses of worship. 
The historic preservation of religious properties begins with an understanding of the 
legal basis for preservation. The need for a structured and systemized land use arose from an 
increasingly complicated and rapid expansion of growth. “As society shifted from a rural to 
an urban society, public land regulation became important especially to city governments 
trying to control industry, commerce, and housing within its boundaries.”1 This culminated 
1 Legal Information Institute, “Land Use Law: An Overview.” Found at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/land_use.html.  
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in an explosion of sophisticated techniques of preserving the country’s cultural capital. In 
1966, Congress passed the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) of 1966.2 In 
response to the growing concern about the future of historically and culturally significant 
buildings and landscapes, the objectives the NHPA were outlined as follows: 
Congress finds and declares that -- (1) the spirit and direction 
of the Nation are founded upon and reflected in its historic 
heritage; (2) the historical and cultural foundations of the 
Nation should be preserved as a living part of our community 
life and development in order to give a sense of orientation to 
the American people; (3) historic properties significant to the 
Nation's heritage are being lost or substantially altered, often 
inadvertently, with increasing frequency; (4) the preservation of 
this irreplaceable heritage is in the public interest so that its 
vital legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, 
economic, and energy benefits will be maintained and enriched 
for future generations of Americans.…3
The NHPA subsequently established the National Register to promote protection of 
nominated historic and cultural resources.4  The Register was not empowered to regulate the 
use and care of the nominated resources, but a listing on it is one of the prerequisites for tax 
benefits to those structures that comply with the Secretary of Interior Standards. Sections 
106 and 110 of the NHPA requires federal departments to consider the possible effects of 
their actions on properties that are either on or are eligible for the National Register.
The NHPA stimulated the enactment of a multitude of city based historic 
preservation ordinances, beginning in the 1970’s, and provided the necessary guidance for 
state enacted legislation. State level legislation was developed with a similar structure and 
intention to that of the national level, but also had the additional power of enacting local 
enabling laws. These enabling laws granted the necessary police power to regulate historic 
preservation through preservation ordinances.  Review boards or commissions review any 
2 National Historic Preservation Act. 16 U.S.C. 461 et seq. 
3 Ibid., Sec. 1(b). 
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private actions under the preservation ordinance in either an advisory or a binding capacity.  
Though governments at all levels may control growth, the majority of issues and ultimate 
cases that pertain to historic preservation evolve from local concerns. “Three typical 
situations involving…private entities and the court system are: suits brought by one 
neighbor against another; suits brought by a public official against a neighboring landowner 
on behalf of the public; and suits involving individuals who share ownership of a particular 
parcel of land.”5  The constitutionality of historic preservation ordinances under the First 
Amendment becomes an issue when a plaintiff brings suit claiming that a government action 
infringed on his or her Free Exercise rights or violated the Establishment Clause.  
The Courts have increasingly recognized the legitimacy of historic preservation. The 
battle to preserve structures of significance began with a few cases that served to legalize 
government authorization of historic preservation. In Berman v. Parker6, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld the right of the Washington, D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency to 
condemn property and transfer it, intact. “The acquisition and the assembly of real property 
and the leasing or sale thereof for redevelopment pursuant to a project area redevelopment 
plan…is hereby declared to be a public use.”7 Justice Douglas, delivering the opinion of the 
Court, explained that:
owing to technological and sociological changes, obsolete lay-
out, and other factors, conditions existing in the District of 
Columbia with respect to substandard housing and blighted 
areas, including the use of buildings in alleys as dwellings for 
human habitation, are injurious to the public health, safety, 
morals, and welfare; and it is hereby declared to be the policy 
of the United States to protect and promote the welfare of 
the inhabitants of the seat of the Government by eliminating 
4 Ibid., Sec.a(a)(1)(A) 
5 Id., “Land Use Law: An Overview.” 
6 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
7 Ibid. 
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all such injurious conditions by employing all means 
necessary and appropriate for the purpose. 8
This ruling gave great impetus to preservationists who believed that aesthetic reasons 
justified their efforts to preserve.  The District Court addressed the issue of using the power 
of eminent domain to acquire a non-blighted building and transferring it to another. Slum 
razing was distinct from taking “a man’s property merely to develop a better balanced, more 
attractive community.”9 This distinction saved the Act by “construing it to mean that the 
Agency could condemn property only for the reasonable necessities of slum clearance and 
prevention, its concept of ‘slum’ being the existence of conditions ‘injurious to the public 
health, safety, morals and welfare.’”10 Public welfare was interpreted broadly:
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not 
desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive….The 
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as 
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the 
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, 
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. 11
This broad interpretation including physical, aesthetic, and economic values allowed for 
decisions based on health as well as beauty. “If those who govern the District of Columbia 
decide that the Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the 
Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.”12
The significance of Berman lies in legitimizing the field of preservation by increasing 
the government’s reach to regulate based on preservation interests alone. Similarly, the other 
major case that addressed historic preservation interests was Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 117 F. Supp. 705, 724-725. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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City of New York13 which sustained the constitutionality of the restrictions that designated 
landmark buildings. In 1978, the owners of Grand Central Terminal were denied permission 
to construct a fifty-story office tower because the New York City Landmarks Preservation 
Committee had designated it as a landmark. The owners filed suit claiming that the denial 
constituted a taking without just compensation. Justice Brennan explained that the recent 
surge in historic preservation was spurred by the rush of blanket renewal programs, 
especially in the inner cities, that were inconsiderate of historic structures. He explained that 
“large numbers of historic structures, landmarks, and areas have been destroyed without 
adequate consideration of either the values represented therein or the possibility of 
preserving the destroyed properties for use in economically productive ways.”14 Local 
governments enacted ordinances because of their increasing belief that historic structures 
enhanced the quality of life. Brennan explained that “structures with special historic, cultural, 
or architectural significance enhance the quality of life for all.”15 The Court concluded that 
the New York City Landmarks Preservation Committee’s intention was to promote the 
general welfare and that the landmarks law, as applied to the Grand Central Terminal, was 
not a taking.  The decision was monumental for the field of preservation. It legitimized the 
efforts of preservationists and confirmed that police powers exercised in furtherance of 
historic preservation objectives benefited the general welfare.  
Advocates of historic landmark and historic district ordinances face a much greater 
challenge and more uncertainty when the building to be preserved is a religious edifice. 
Freedom to exercise one’s religion is fundamental and the built in conflict between the two 
religion clauses of the First Amendment raises difficult complexities based on countervailing 
13 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
7
considerations. Recently enacted legislation has tried to address the plight of religious 
organizations. For example, the Religious Land Use Institutionalized Persons Act was 
enacted in 2000 to provide greater protection of religious institutions from unfair treatment. 
The free exercise rights of these groups were endorsed by providing an exemption for 
religious land uses from otherwise constitutional zoning and landmarking legislation.  
The solution to the mêlée between the Clauses has been a continuous tinkering that 
operates to balance the competing goals. This balancing act began in the 18th century but was 
only put to the test during the 19th and 20th centuries.  The sixteen words of the First 
Amendment Religion Clauses forbid Congress from making a law respecting an 
establishment or prohibiting the free exercise of religion. As ratified in 1791, the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, states that: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or of the right to 
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.16
The Framers of the Constitution applied the First Amendment to Congress and the federal 
government. This Clause was further strengthened when the Supreme Court incorporated it 
in the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment post-Civil War which ensured 
that the Clause was applicable to the States. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, as ratified in 1868, states that: 
no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.17
16 United States Constitution. Amendment I. Please refer to Appendix B. 
17 United States Constitution, Amendment XIV. Please refer to Appendix B. 
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The interpretation of the Amendments has changed since their passage. The individual cases 
that interpret and apply these Amendments reveal a slow but deliberate trend from the 
endorsement of Separationism, or complete resistance of landmarking and grants, to one of 
Neutralism, or the allowance of grants and regulation.  
According to Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle, Professors of Law at the George 
Washington University Law School, “true Separationists oppose both the landmarking of 
worship sites and the payment of grants to owners of landmarked worship sites. Committed 
Neutralists, however, favor both the regulation and the support of landmarked worship sites 
precisely to the same extent and on the same terms that other structures are regulated and 
supported.”18 Lupu and Tuttle advocate Religion Clause symmetry e.g., what the government 
may regulate, it may also subsidize and specifically advocate “that the religion-specific line 
between permissible and impermissible subsidy (and regulation) should be drawn between 
the exteriors and interiors of houses of worship.”19 The persistent growth of the historic 
preservation field as well as the increasingly vociferous nature of religious groups that enter 
the public policy realm has lent significant support to Neutrality.
The trend towards Neutralism is evident in the most recent interpretation of the 
Constitution which allows for the preservation of religious sites with active congregations. 
The change in policy that enabled the Save America’s Treasures grants to be applied to 
active religious historic properties can be traced to the internal deliberations of the Office of 
Legal Counsel (OLC). In the past, the OLC has maintained that grants to active houses of 
worship were unconstitutional. A memorandum written in 1995 by Walter Dellinger, 
18 Lupu, Ira C. and Tuttle, Robert W. "Historic Preservation Grants to Houses of Worship: A Case Study in the 
Survival of Separationism." Boston College Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 5, September 2002. p. 1140. 
19 Ibid. p. 1139. 
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Assistant Attorney General, entitled the “Constitutionality of Awarding Historic 
Preservation Grants to Religious Properties”20 was crucial to the Department’s stance. 
Dellinger’s memorandum referred to several Supreme Court interpretations of the 
Constitution and was subsequently implemented as the Department’s official guideline. He 
began by discussing Tilton v. Richardson21  which approved federal school construction and 
repair grants even though the school in question was religiously affiliated. The case 
established that religious groups were not to be excluded automatically because of their 
religious nature. It was clarified, however, that the funds may be granted but may not go 
directly to any religious activities. The grants per se were not found to advance religion but 
the conveyance of the building to the institution after 20 years was and thus in part 
invalidated. The Dellinger memorandum also referred to Committee for Public Education v. 
Nyquist22 that made essentially the same point. The Court invalidated certain maintenance 
and repair grants to parochial schools because it was determined that such unchecked grants 
may advance religion. The same logic was applied to Hunt v. McNair23 in which grants to 
pervasively sectarian institutions were considered unconstitutional even if such grants were 
permissible in situations involving secular institutions. Dellinger commented that 
“nevertheless, we have no doubt that you are correct in assuming that most if not all active 
houses of worship would fall within this category.  Indeed, the notion that religion plays 
something less than a vital and pervasive role in an active church’s mission might appear 
inconsistent with a proper respect for religious institutions as well as with common sense.”24
Dellinger explained that the issue with preservation grants to pervasively sectarian 
20 Walter Dellinger, “Constitutionality of Awarding Historic Preservation Grants to Religious Properties.” 
October 31, 1995. Found at:  http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/doi.24.htm. 
21 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
22 Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
23 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973). 
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institutions was the ineluctable sectarian nature of these institutions. “As the Court has 
explained, the reason for the prohibition on direct monetary grants to pervasively sectarian 
institutions is the unacceptable risk that where secular and religious functions are 
‘inextricably intertwined,’ government aid, though designated for a secular purpose, will in 
fact advance the institution's religious mission.”25 The extrication of the building from the 
religion it houses was problematical for Dellinger. What was ordinarily considered secular 
such as roof repair or window renovation was not considered secular when applied to a 
church. He stated that “though a structural element like a roof can be characterized as 
‘secular’ rather than ‘sectarian’ in most contexts, the distinction cannot be maintained in any 
meaningful sense when the roof is a component part of an active church.”26 The conclusion 
was that the inability to separate the religious and secular elements of an active house of 
worship effectively denied grants to the historic preservation of such structures.  
Dellinger also referred to First Covenant Church of Seattle v. Seattle27 which endorsed the 
importance of free exercise over any such historic preservation rights. Dellinger revealed that 
the reasoning behind exempting religious houses of worship was persuasive and that the 
Free Exercise Clause limited the government in landmarking religious buildings. The 
separationist sentiment underlying the position of the OLC stance was further endorsed by 
the White House. “Both the [Ronald] Reagan and the [George H. W.] Bush Administrations 
took the position that direct financial support of active churches would be inappropriate in 
light of Establishment Clause concerns.”28 Dellinger concluded that a reversal of official 
protocol was not imminent. “We think, however, that a court applying current precedent is 
24 Id., Dellinger Memorandum (1995). 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). 
28 Id., Dellinger Memorandum (1995). 
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most likely to conclude that the direct award of historic preservation grants to churches and 
other pervasively sectarian institutions violates the Establishment Clause.”29
As of 1995, however, federal historic preservation grants were given to properties 
listed on the National Register. They were funded by the federal government and awarded 
by the states. Since the 1980’s however, the influential separationist attitude has subsided and 
instead a more neutralist approach has been endorsed by the Supreme Court. The Dellinger 
Memorandum was antiquated even in 1995 when it was written. The qualifications necessary 
for National Register listing included that the property must prove “significance in American 
history, architecture, archeology, engineering, and culture,” including “integrity of location, 
design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association.”30 Religious properties can 
qualify for National Register status if it “deriv[ed] primary significance from architectural or 
artistic distinction or historical importance,”31 with the states being the final arbiter of 
worthiness.
In 1992, Congress amended the NHPA to authorize preservation grants to religious 
properties. The amended Act stated that: 
Grants may be made under this subsection for the preservation, stabilization, 
restoration, or rehabilitation of religious properties listed in the National 
Register of Historic Places, provided that the purpose of the grant is secular, 
does not promote religion, and seeks to protect those qualities that are 
historically significant.  Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to 
authorize the use of any funds made available under this section for the 
acquisition of any property referred to in the preceding sentence.32
After a series of internal inquiries, on April 30, 2002, the OLC also amended its position and 
released its official opinion regarding the status of the restoration of historic religious 
29 Ibid. 
30 National Register of Historic Places, 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (1995). 
31 Ibid. 
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properties. The modified policy allowed for the federally funded preservation of religious 
properties.
The quintessential example of the application of such a grant was the Old North 
Church in Boston which is currently being restored by a grant from Save America’s 
Treasures. Though the religious site is actively used by a congregation of 150, it is also a 
museum that opens its doors to 500,000 annual visitors. The federal grant of $317,000 to the 
foundation created by the congregation was intended for repair and renovation. The 
previous issue of dissecting the secular from the religious functions and the question of 
whether the aid intended for the secular function would advance the religious function were 
not advanced.
Save America’s Treasures was established by the White House Millennium Council 
Executive Order 13072 on February 3, 1998. In part, the Order was established to: 
Make recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior regarding the 
provision of assistance from funds made available for Save America's 
Treasures in the Historic Preservation Fund to public and private entities 
that are protecting America's threatened cultural treasures. These treasures 
include significant documents, works of art, maps, journals, and historic 
structures that document and illuminate the history and culture of the United 
States….33
In total, President Clinton earmarked $95 million in federal grants from 1999-2001 and 
President Bush has proposed $30 million each year from 2002-2004. The grants, which 
are managed by the National Park Service, must be matched dollar-for-dollar with non-
federal funding. “To date, over $242 million in public-private funds has been raised to 
save our nation’s treasures. Together, the public and private commitments and the greater 
public awareness of the nation’s needs will result in the largest increase in preservation 
32 Id., 16 U.S.C. § 470a(e)(3) (2002). 
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activity in over thirty years.”34 The eligibility for a grant is still limited to 501(c)(3) 
nonprofit organizations including religious institutions, and local, state and tribal 
government agencies but has now been expanded to include religious properties with 
active congregations. “Historic properties and collections associated with active religious 
organizations are eligible to apply for grants. They must meet the Selection Criteria and 
Review Criteria, including national significance.”35 The grants may be used for 
preservation and conservation: 
Include[ing], but are not limited to, historic structure reports and 
conservation plans, structural engineering assessments, architectural 
planning, paint analysis, material conservation analysis, archeological 
investigation, ongoing maintenance plans, and site management plans. 
Landscape planning is eligible either as part of a historic structure report or 
as a separate conservation plan. Planning grants may be used for temporary 
emergency stabilization efforts implemented while the planning process is 
under way.36
The grants for bricks and mortar construction, historic resource surveys, as well as expenses 
pertaining to preparing nominations are expressly prohibited. 
 This thesis continues by first examining the Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence and 
is followed by the Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The ability to grant federal funds to 
religious historic properties with active congregations can only be truly understood in 
context as well as in magnitude by a careful analysis of the relevant judicial decisions. 
33 White House Millennium Council Executive Order 13072, February 3, 1998. Found at: 
http://www.saveamericastreasures.org/about.htm. 
34 “Save America’s Treasures.” Found at http://www.saveamericastreasures.org/about.htm. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
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II.     F r e e   E x e r c i s e   –   E a r l y  C a s e  H i s t o r y
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment were intended to be mutually 
sustaining. Over time, however, the interpretation and the subsequently delineated 
boundaries have worked to enforce and perpetuate tension between the Clauses. This 
tension is described by Norman Redlich, author of Understanding Constitutional Law. He states:
In our modern welfare state, stringent separation of government and religion 
may at times deprive religion of an otherwise generally available benefit; thus, 
free exercise is inhibited. Conversely, the Supreme Court has recently held 
that free exemptions of religious practitioners from otherwise generally 
applicable laws favor religion in a manner inconsistent with strict 
separation.37
These early cases are generally described as devoid of any unifying principles but are 
nevertheless significant. As history reveals, two sets of tests were established to determine 
whether a law violated either Clause. The Supreme Court first tested the Free Exercise 
Clause in 1878, over 100 years after the ratification of the Bill of Rights. “While ‘neutrality’ is 
still a central principle of both clauses, we have no single standard for determining what a 
religiously neutral act is. Instead, we must examine the neutrality or permissibility of a law in 
terms of the challenge to it.”38
The Reynolds v. United States39  case involved George Reynolds, a Mormon polygamist 
from Utah who did not agree with a federal anti-polygamy law and claimed that polygamy 
was part of his right to exercise his religion. He reasoned that his right was protected by the 
Free Exercise Clause which states that Congress cannot make any laws that prohibit the free 
exercise of religion. Reynolds was charged with bigamy after trying to marry Amelia Jane 
37  Norman Redlich, et al. Understanding Constitutional Law. Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. San Francisco, 
CA. 1999. p. 505. 
38 John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda. Principles of Constitutional Law. 2004. p. 741. 
39 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).  
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Schofield while already being married to Mary Ann Tuddenham – specifically, in violation of 
section 5352 of the Revised Statutes law stating that: 
Every person having a husband or wife living, who marries another, whether 
married or single, in a Territory, or other place over which the United States 
have exclusive jurisdiction, is guilty of bigamy, and shall be punished by a 
fine of not more than $500, and by imprisonment for a term of not more 
than five years.40
The District Court sentenced Reynolds to two years hard labor and fined him $500. Chief 
Justice Waite examined the issue and concluded that the pertinent question is “whether 
religious belief can be accepted as a justification of an overt act made criminal by the law of 
the land.”41 Waite concluded that “laws are made for the government of actions, and while 
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”42 His 
reasoning was justified by expounding on other exemptions that would be necessitated if 
polygamy was permitted.  
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious 
worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under 
which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife 
religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of 
her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to 
prevent her carrying her belief into practice?43
Waite explained that if such exemptions were made, the laws created would lose their 
effectiveness. The laws created would be undermined by religious belief and relegated to a 
secondary position engendering a nation whose citizens each had their own set of laws. 
Waite explained that this would render “the professed doctrines of religious belief superior 
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid. 
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to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. 
Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.”44
Justice Waite thus set the precedent that government can step in and modify the 
behaviors of citizens even when they claim their actions are part of their religion. He stated 
“it matters not that his belief was a part of his professed religion: it was still belief and belief 
only.”45 The preservation of this authority is essential for the government to maintain its 
power and survive as more than a mere façade. Neutral, generally applicable laws, without 
specific implications for impact on religious beliefs became the standard. The lower court’s 
decisions were upheld and the judgment was affirmed. 
 Exemptions from the law based on religious beliefs were tested again in 1963 with 
the Sherbert v. Verner46 case. The appellant, Adell Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day 
Adventist Church, was fired from a textile mill where she had worked for 30 years because 
of a new policy that required employees to work on Saturdays. This new policy conflicted 
with her religious beliefs, which required her to specifically not work on Saturdays, her 
Sabbath day. While unemployed, she filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits 
under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act. The Employment Security 
Commission denied her benefits because they determined that she qualified for work, as 
opposed to being disabled, and thus did not qualify for benefits. Both the lower court and 
the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected Sherbert’s claim that the South Carolina statute 
burdened her right to free exercise. 
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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The 7-to-2 Supreme Court ruling reversed the decisions reached in the lower courts. 
The Supreme Court viewed the previous rulings as particularly harsh, in effect forcing 
Sherbert to choose between her job and religion – a mutually exclusive choice. Justice 
William Brennan equated this choice to a governmental fine imposed for Saturday worship. 
He explained the ruling:  
The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her 
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the 
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. 
Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden 
upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant 
for her Saturday worship.47
Brennan further explained that the actions of South Carolina were discriminatory. “The 
unconstitutionality of the disqualification of the Sabbatarian is thus compounded by the 
religious discrimination which South Carolina's general statutory scheme necessarily 
effects.”48 The ruling established a threshold trigger to justify any encroachment on religious 
liberty: a compelling state interest must exist to justify an infringement of First Amendment 
rights. Brennan explained:
It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable 
state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, "only 
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for 
permissible limitation." No such abuse or danger has been advanced in the 
present case.49
If a compelling state interest was proven, the infringement on the free exercise of religion 
would be justified. No such compelling state interest was established in Sherbert and an 
exemption was made. The South Carolina Supreme Court was reversed and the case 
remanded.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
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Figure 1 
Westchester Reform Temple in Scarsdale, New York. 
Sherbert v. Verner set the precedent for exemptions. The way was cleared for religious 
believers to have reasons, justified by their religion, for them to be accommodated from 
otherwise generally applicable laws. It is important to note that the Court was greatly 
influenced by the civil rights litigation of the 1950s and 1960s. “It had become clear to 
Brennan that the Court must give a ‘heightened scrutiny’ to cases in which fundamental 
rights were at stake and require the state to demonstrate that the law in question served only 
the interests that were of paramount interest.”50 The substantiation of any encroachment on 
religious liberty via the establishment of a compelling state interest is a recurring element in 
future cases. 
The 1968 Westchester Reform Temple v. Frederick W. Brown51 case was a product of the 
exemption-based case law. This case clearly shows the power of religious institutions to 
justify, based on their right of Free Exercise, their unique societal position. Further, this case 
shows how this power is wielded to effectuate different treatment from laws that would, in 
other cases, be applicable to all other citizens.
50 Clare Mullally, “Religious Liberty in Public Life.” February 15, 2004. Found at: 
www.firstamendmentcenter.org/rel_liberty/free_exercise/index.aspx. 
51 Westchester Reform Temple v. Frederick W. Brown et al, Constituting the Panning Commission of the Village of Scarsdale,
239 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1968). 
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The case involved the Westchester Reform Temple, a single-story synagogue, located 
on a 6.7 acre lot on a heavily traveled residential road in Scarsdale, New York. The Temple 
initiated measures to expand its facilities to meet the increasing needs of its Congregation. 
The Planning Commission rejected their proposals for expansion due to the unmet setback 
requirements. The plan called for a 62-foot setback on one side and a 29-foot side-yard on 
the other which was inconsistent with the required 130-foot and 40-foot requirements. The 
Temple claimed that the arbitrary setbacks violated their First Amendment rights.  
       The Planning Commission predicated its rejection of the expansion on the established 
zoning laws. The Temple, however, based their position on the Supreme Court’s perception 
of the law as well as another New York case, Matter of Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board.52 In 
that case, clear rules were articulated about the status of religious entities. "Churches and 
schools occupy a different status from mere commercial enterprises and, when the church 
enters the picture, different considerations apply."53  This distinctive status clearly resonates 
with existing Supreme Court developments. These precedents allowed the court in Westchester 
Reform Temple v. Brown54 to analyze the case based on the peculiar status of religious 
institutions.
Westchester Reform Temple’s status as a religious entity excluded its requirement to 
comply with generally neutral laws which were not unconstitutional per se. Judge Keating 
explains that an exception was made to established police powers: 
Religious structures enjoy a constitutionally protected status which severely 
curtails the permissible extent of governmental regulation in the name of the 
police powers, but the power of regulation has not been altogether 
obliterated.55
52 Ibid. Quote from Matter of Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board., 1 N Y 2d 508 (1956). 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid. 
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Though Keating clarifies that the government still has some powers to regulate religious 
entities, he makes it clear that in this case the government does not. The opinion justifies the 
zoning procedure but concludes that the free exercise issue outweighs the benefits of zoning. 
Keating states: 
We have not said that considerations of the surrounding area and potential 
traffic hazards are unrelated to the public health, safety or welfare when 
religious structures are involved.  We have simply said that they are 
outweighed by the constitutional prohibition against the abridgement of the 
free exercise of religion and by the public benefit and welfare which is itself 
an attribute of religious worship in a community.56
Though the Planning Commission’s goal is to implement reasonable regulation, the power 
religious entities posses to evade generally applicable rules outweigh the Commission’s 
objectives. The Court clearly follows this logic. Keating states that “where an irreconcilable 
conflict exists between the right to erect a religious structure and the potential hazards of 
traffic or diminution in value, the latter must yield to the former.”57 The court sided with the 
Temple and followed the established Supreme Court’s direction. The First Amendment was 
the clear winner in this heavy-weight challenge between police power and First Amendment 
rights. Unmistakably, religious entities stand in a unique realm. 
The 6-to-1 ruling in the 1972 Wisconsin v. Yoder58 Supreme Court case involved two 
Amish fathers, Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, who refused to send their children to school 
after the completion of the eighth grade. These fathers, members of the Old Order Amish 
religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, had violated Wisconsin's 
compulsory school-attendance law which stated that children must attend school until the 
age of sixteen. The respondents were “charged, tried, and convicted of violating the 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid.
58 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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compulsory-attendance law in Green Country Court and were fined the sum of $5 each.”59
Yoder and Miller claimed that the compulsory-attendance law violated their free exercise 
rights as stated in the Free Exercise Clause.
Chief Justice Burger explained that the compulsory-attendance law, though created 
neutral and underscored by a strong compelling state interest, effectively burdened Yoder. 
He states: 
However strong the State's interest in universal compulsory education, it is 
by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests. 
A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the 
constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens 
the free exercise of religion.60
Burger advised that decisions should not be absolute, but balanced, depending on case 
specific circumstances. Though a facially neutral law such as compulsory school attendance 
has as its basis a compelling state interest, it may, without intent, burden the free exercise of 
religion. The impact of this compelling state interest objective was too harsh. Yoder’s 
burden “is not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels 
them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with 
fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.”61 Thus, the Supreme Court again granted an 
exemption. The rights of Free Exercise, free of any substantial burden from a government 
action, were placed above a government’s compelling interest. Burger explained that a 
“regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional 
requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”62
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid. 
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The facially neutral compelling state interest of uniform education was outweighed by First 
Amendment rights.  
23
III.     T  h  e    S  h  e  r  b  e  r  t   -   Y  o  d  e  r     E  r  a
The free exercise of religion has proven to be a heavy-weight rival to government 
interests. The Sherbert and Yoder cases have safeguarded the First Amendment rights of 
people and organizations. Repeatedly, their precedents have outweighed government 
interests in the name of these rights and have paved the way for religious exemptions. The 
Sherbert-Yoder era produced mixed results, but consistently upheld the right of Free Exercise.  
The first exception to the trend of upholding the rights of religion is the 1980 Society 
for Ethical Culture in the City of New York v. Spatt63 case. In this case, the Court of Appeals of 
New York found that the designation of the Society for Ethical Culture’s property, located 
on an entire Central Park West block at Two West 64th Street, New York, was not 
unconstitutional. The Society deemed the designation “a confiscation without due 
compensation and an interference with the free exercise of the Society's religious purpose.”64
Specifically, the Society believed “that it is improper to restrict its ability to develop the 
property to permit rental to nonreligious tenants.”65
63 Society for Ethical Culture in the City of New York v. Beverly M. Spatt et al., Constituting the Landmarks Preservation 
Commission, 415 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1980). 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
Figure 2 
Exterior view of Society for Ethical 
Culture in New York. 
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Founded in 1876 "to unite in one group, in one bond, those who had religious 
feeling and those who simply cared for moral betterment,"66 the Society is known for its 
religious, educational and charitable endeavors. The Society is located in two five-story 
buildings on an approximately 20,000 square foot parcel. The suit involves only the 
historically designated Meeting House, built in 1910, not the Ethical Culture School, built in 
1904. “Only the Meeting House has received landmark designation. It occupies 
approximately 40% of the Central Park West property, the value of which has been 
estimated at about $4,000,000.”67
New York City's Landmark Preservation Commission designated the Meeting House 
in 1974 for its exquisite art nouveau façade. The building was assessed as the:  
best piece of Art Nouveau architecture yet designed in this country, and 
compares well with the magnificent German department store buildings 
whose excellence is so great as to almost promise a future for this style.68
66 Society for Ethical Culture in the City of New York v. Beverly M. Spatt et al., Constituting the Landmarks Preservation 
Commission Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division 416 N.Y.S.2d 246 (N.Y. 1979). 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. From Determination of Landmarks Preservation Commission, July 23, 1974, No. 5, LP-0831. 
Figure 3 
View from Society for Ethical 
Culture in New York.
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Notwithstanding the contentious designation, the Meeting House was "a tangible symbol of 
the Society's permanent social contribution and a rich architectural element of the fabric of 
our City." 69 Although the trial court agreed with the Society regarding insufficient historical 
or architectural significance and found the designation unconstitutional, the Appellate 
Division reversed on the grounds that landmark designation is a permissible land use 
regulation. Justice Wachtler explained:  
we have recognized that despite this particularized burden on the owner, 
landmark designations, if not unreasonable, are not an undue imposition 
under proper circumstances.70
Unlike previous cases involving historic preservation, the legitimacy of designation was 
established. Equally shocking, Wachtler explained that the Society’s role as a religious 
institution did not excuse it from following reasonable regulation, especially since the goals 
of the Society were secular in nature. He stated:  
although petitioner is entitled to First Amendment protection as a religious 
organization, this does not entitle it to immunity from reasonable 
government regulation when it acts purely in secular matters.”71
Furthermore, the Society’s status as a charitable organization changes the equation of 
landmark designation restriction.  Wachtler states:  
with this standard now set, and the emphasis properly placed on how the 
restriction effects the charitable activities of the organization, it is clear that 
on this record the landmark designation withstands constitutional scrutiny.72
This conclusion indicates the Court looked beyond the religious status of the Society and 
delved into the specific results of the designation and found that the designation did not 
impede its ability to perform charitable work.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid. Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt  415 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1980). 
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
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During the 1960’s the Society decided to develop the property to take advantage of 
its lucrative location. The plan called for:
the demolition of the school and Meeting House, high-rise development of 
the entire site, and lease of the property to a developer for 99 years at an 
annual ground rent of $ 175,000.  According to this proposal, a high-rise, 800 
unit, 240,000 square-foot luxury apartment building was to be built, in which 
the society would occupy 27,500 square feet on the lower floors.73
Ultimately, this plan was expected to generate a $ 2,000,000 mortgage loan. The Society 
justified its plans to demolish the building and develop the land by claiming that the 
increased revenue would contribute to furthering the goals of the charitable organization. 
The sorting of the facts led the court to pinpoint that “it appears that market conditions, and 
not the designation, prevented the society from taking remedial action to cure the buildings' 
shortcomings.”74 The Society insisted that both buildings be torn down to increase revenue 
and further their charitable work while eliminating the option of developing only the Ethical 
Culture School parcel of 60%. The plummet of the New York City real estate markets 
rendered the project worthless.
The court acknowledged the unique stance of religious institutions but looked deeper 
into the motives of the Society to conclude that the First Amendment rights were not 
violated. The Appellate Court decision was affirmed. Though the Court rejected the 
argument that a decline in market value impinged on the Free Exercise rights of a religious 
organization, the Court declined to further the Society’s protection when it steps into the 
realm of purely secular matters. Though the Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt case is not a 
distinctive victory for historic preservation in terms of the implementation of preservation 
values based on their societal merit, the case levels the field and furthers the religious 
property landmarking litigation. 
73 Ibid. 
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The only consistent theme in religious property landmarking litigation is the 
inconsistent and sometimes contradictory rulings of the Courts. The next case, involving the 
Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church, a Colorado non-profit Corporation that wanted to 
expand its facilities with the construction of a new gymnasium to meet the increasing needs 
of the community demonstrates such a reversal. The City of Lakewood Department of 
Community Services allowed the new construction, provided that certain conditions were 
met. The new construction would be approved if the Church would agree to supply a public 
right of way in addition to certain street improvements such as new curbs, gutters, and 
sidewalks.
The 1981 Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Lakewood75 case determined
that the conditions imposed on the Church were not an unconstitutional use of police 
power. Justice Lee, delivering the opinion, asserted that though the actual construction of 
the religious site may be regulated to ensure the public health, safety, and general welfare, 
74 Ibid.
Figure 4 
Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church 
in Lakewood, Colorado. 
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“the law provides preferential treatment for churches”76 This ‘preferential treatment’ was not 
the exemption of religious entities from police powers, but, as Lee explains, religious entities 
are subject to the police powers as long as the state justifies its imposition. This conditional 
relationship must be proved. Lee states that “this court has previously held that churches are 
subject to the police power when the state can show a substantial interest.”77 After the state 
justifies its substantial interest, the state must show that an alternative does not exist. Lee 
quoted from the 1973 case Pillar of Fire v. DURA78 and DURA v. Pillar of Fire:79
We must balance the interests involved in the controversy before us and 
recognize that the state must show a substantial interest without a reasonable 
alternate means of accomplishment if the state is to be constitutionally 
allowed to take the birthplace of the Pillar of Fire Church.80
The Court decided that though the conditional requirement of public improvements in 
conjunction with the dedication of public lands was not unconstitutional in return for a 
permit, a compelling interest was not justified. The privileged treatment approved for 
religious entities is unmistakable. This restricted position, unassailable by neutral and 
generally applicable land use regulation continues to be a common theme in religious 
organizations’ fight against Historic Preservation.
The contentious City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church81 case of 1982 ended with a split 
decision, again representing the uneasy position of the Courts.  Justice Floyd Hicks, writing 
for the concurring Justices intimated the heated judicial battle. He stated: “as is apparent 
from the extended period we have held the matter under consideration, the court has not 
75 Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Lakewood   626 P.2d 668 (1981). 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., Referencing Pillar of Fire v. DURA 181 Colo. 411, 509 P.2d 1250 (1973). 
79 Ibid., Referencing DURA v. Pillar of Fire 191 Colo. 238, 552 P.2d 23 (1976).  
80 Ibid., Quoting from DURA v. Pillar of Fire 191 Colo. 238, 552 P.2d 23 (1976).  
81 City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 639 P. 2d 1358 (Wash. 1982). 
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been of one mind on the issues concerned.”82 The city tried to enjoin the First Baptist 
church-operated school after certain violations of the building and zoning regulations were 
identified. The Church claimed that the building code and zoning regulations violated its 
First Amendment right of religious freedom. This case is indicative of police power and 
religious entity skirmishes. Appallingly, the court sided with the rights of religious entities. 
The nature of the dispute places the health and safety of the public at risk for the sake of 
maintenance of the religious entity status. 
The First Baptist Church created the Washington Christian Academy in 1978 to 
advance the education of its youngest members. The church-operated school, conducted in 
the basement of the church was cited for noncompliance with the building code safety 
standards, as applied to educational edifices. As dissenting Judge Dolliver explained, the 
evidence of multiple violations is overwhelming. The building is inadequate as a school for 
several reasons including:
inadequate floor space, inadequate ventilation, no approved fire alarm 
system, no fire extinguishers, no fire detectors, no sprinkler system, no fire-
retardant walls and ceilings, no lighted exit signs, no exit signs at all, stairs 
that are too narrow, doors that do not open out, and stairs of inconsistent 
rise and run. In addition to these violations which constitute a safety hazard, 
there are health code violations such as inadequate restroom facilities.83
Based on these violations, the trial court shut the school down until compliance could be 
confirmed. The trial court made explicit that the religious uses were not burdened. “The 
building's use as a church was not affected.”84 The Church complained that the 
“uncompromising enforcement…would deny to church members the right to guide the 
education of their children by sending them to their church-operated school, a fundamental 
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid. 
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and constitutionally protected right.”85 The Church believed that even though the impact 
was not directly on religious practices, an impact nonetheless existed.  
Justice Hicks explained that “where, as here, two legitimate and substantial interests 
collide, one may ultimately have to give way to the other. In such a situation, the court's 
function is to balance the interests of the parties and, if an accommodation cannot be 
effected, determine which interest must yield.”86 Hicks believed that the trial courts ignored 
this principle and did not balance the interests. He also believed that the trial court did not 
“determine that uncompromising enforcement of the building code and zoning ordinance 
constituted a governmental interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming 
protection under the Free Exercise Clause."87 In addition to not balancing the interests of 
the parties and not determining a sufficient government interest, the trail court also did not 
consider other options to determine which accommodated the religious entity most. “Finally, 
the trial court did not consider whether the means chosen to enforce the governmental 
interest were necessary and the least restrictive available to achieve the ends sought.”88
The religious status of one party changed the balance requirement. Hicks states “this 
case concerns more than the mere routine application of a building code and a zoning 
ordinance.”89 The solution, as purported by the Court, was to infuse the issue with flexibility. 
Hicks stated: 
There should be some play in the joints of both the zoning ordinance and 
the building code. An effort to accommodate the religious freedom of 
appellants while at the same time giving effect to the legitimate concerns of 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
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the City as expressed in its building code and zoning ordinance would seem 
to be in order.90
The Court dissolved the injunction and sustained the status of religious entities. As will soon 
be evident, the Washington State religious land use jurisprudence differs significantly from 
the U.S. Supreme Court Free Exercise Clause precedence. These issues have unavoidably 
“touched off a holy war.” 91
The 1986 Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew v. Barwick92 case once more pitted the 
interests of historic preservation against the interests of a religious institution. The Church of 
St. Paul and St. Andrew is located at West End Avenue and 86th Street in New York City. 
The Church occupies a 150-foot by 125-foot parcel and includes a church, parish house and 
rectory. New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission designated the church and 
parish house as a landmark in 1982. It is a "brilliant exemplar of the eclecticism that spread 
through American architecture in the late 19th century representing a fusion of Early 
Christian, German Romanesque and Italian Renaissance styles.” 93 Just before the 
designation, however, the Church determined that its financial situation revealed a bleak 
future. The meager financial resources were well documented in affidavits and described by 
dissenting Judge Meyer: 
In 1980, it was estimated that exterior repairs in the amount of $ 250,000 
were required.  When this action was commenced in 1982, that estimate had 
risen to $350,000. Other than the buildings and land and a small endowment 
of approximately $ 35,000, there are few assets.  The church operates with 
annual pledge income and donations from its membership together with 
other contributions, which totaled approximately $ 60,000 in 1982 and barely 
met the most necessary of salary and maintenance expenses.94
90 Ibid.
91 Beth Prieve, “Religious Land Use Jurisprudence: The Negative Ramifications for Religious Activities in 
Washington After Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County”
Found at http://www.law.seattleu.edu/lawrev/vol26/262/prieve.html. 
92 Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew v. Barwick, 496 N.E.2d 183 (N.Y. 1986). 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
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The Church concluded that its best option was to renovate the Church and develop the land. 
Because of the long-continued disrepair of the church, the expense of 
maintaining and heating it, and its meager financial resources, plaintiff had 
developed a rebuilding program which included plans for the complete 
renovation of the church and the construction of a commercial high-rise 
condominium on part of the property.95
The Church claimed that as applied, the Landmarks law was unconstitutional.  
Justice Hancock delivering the opinion of the Court of Appeals stated that in New 
York, noncompliance with landmark designation is taken very seriously. “Violation of the 
maintenance and repair requirements subjects an owner to a fine of not more than $250 and 
not less than $ 25, or to imprisonment for not more than 30 days, or both.”96 Hancock 
explained that the Church plan to develop the land was intended to "provide a new building 
with appropriate facilities and income for plaintiff's continuing religious and charitable 
program, thereby assuring its survival."97 Facing criminal sanctions however, the Church 
describes that it cannot afford to fulfill the requirements and obligations of the designation 
and Landmarks Law. The Church argues that the sheer size of the structure (it was built to 
seat a congregation of 1,400, but currently only caters to 250 members) renders it 
unmanageable.  
The Church believed that the Landmarks Law amounted to a taking as well as 
burdened its First Amendment free exercise rights. Specifically, the Church claims that the 
Landmarks Law interferes with its charitable duties. “The statute, as applied, physically or 
financially prevents or seriously interferes with the carrying out of the charitable purpose.”98
The case, however, was deemed not ripe for judicial interpretation. The Court of Appeals 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
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agreed with the Supreme Court that the case was not ripe. “The issue presented -- whether 
the alleged interference with plaintiff's ability to carry out its charitable purpose amounts to a 
constitutional injury -- is not ripe for judicial determination.”99 The Court explained the 
concept of ripeness as: 
administrative action which produces the alleged harm to plaintiff; the focus 
of the inquiry is on the finality and effect of the challenged action and 
whether harm from it might be prevented or cured by administrative means 
available to the plaintiff.100
The Court found that the Church did not apply for a Certificate of Appropriateness101 and 
thus never received approval or denial for its plans. The failure to get such Certificate 
brought the proceedings to a halt. The Court did however acknowledge the status of 
religious organizations but did not see the need to alter the application of the ripeness 
doctrine because of the religious status of the Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew. “Unless a 
special exception to the ripeness doctrine is to be created, plaintiff's status as a religious 
organization has no relevance.”102 The 4 to 3 decision concluded that the Constitutional 
infringement claim cannot be determined. Interestingly, this case differs from the 1980 
Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt in that the Church planed to renovate the Church as well as 
develop a certain area, not demolish it. 
The Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew case caps the end of the Sherbert-Yoder era. 
Though these cases have produced mixed results, they have consistently upheld the right of 
Free Exercise. The next section, the Attempted Smith Shift revolved around the pivotal 
1990 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of the State of Oregon v. Smith103 case. In 
effect, it reshuffled the heavyweight challenge and knocked religious entities out of their 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid.
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distinguished realm. As represented in the historic preservation regulation and religious 
rights battle, its intended effect however, was different than the outcomes. 
103 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of the State of Oregon v. Smith, 495 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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IV.     T  h  e    A  t  t  e  m  p  t  e  d    S  m  i  t  h    S  h  i  f  t
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of the State of Oregon v. Smith,104 was a 
pivotal 1990 case, indicating a shift in Supreme Court principles and set a new precedent.  
The plaintiffs Alfred Smith and Galen Black, both counselors at a drug rehabilitation center, 
were fired after ingesting peyote, and filed a suit after their applications for unemployment 
compensation were denied. The plaintiffs purported that since they ingested peyote for 
religious purposes in their Native American Church, the denial of their unemployment 
benefits violated their First Amendment religious right.  In the 6-to-3 decision, the court 
boldly moved away from the sanctioned application of strict scrutiny guidelines to 
government actions as witnessed in Sherbert-Yoder. The Sherbert-Yoder era effectuated a 
standard in which religious free exercise rights were strongly protected. Instead, the court 
considered the case based on the general applicability of a law guideline, as established in the 
1878 Reynolds v. United States case. The required heightened scrutiny standard for government 
actions that even unintentionally burden religious beliefs or practices was concluded. 
Delivering the majority opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia, stated that the religious 
motivation for using peyote does not place Smith and Black beyond the grip of criminal law. 
Smith and Black believed that “their religious motivation for using peyote places them 
beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious 
practice.”105 Scalia further stated that the contentions of Smith and Black are flawed. They 
believe that "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" includes requiring any individual to 
observe a generally applicable law that requires (or forbids) the performance of an act that 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid.
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his religious belief forbids (or requires).”106 The Court rejected the “strict scrutiny test” and 
allowed religious beliefs to be burdened by laws generally applicable to everyone so long as 
they promote a substantial state interest. It was determined that religious beliefs do not 
excuse citizens from compliance with valid laws, even if they indirectly affect religious 
practices. Scalia stated: 
We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from 
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is 
free to regulate....The mere possession of religious convictions which 
contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the 
citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities.107
In reversing the Oregon Supreme Court decision, this Supreme Court returned to a standard 
instituted in Reynolds v. US. Scalia reaffirmed that a neutral, generally applicable law should 
govern conduct, without regard to indirect affects on religious practices. Scalia addressed 
that religions may have to tolerate disadvantages for the sake of democracy. He believed:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will 
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely 
engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government 
must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or 
in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality 
of all religious beliefs.  
In spite of the burdens placed on Smith and Black, they were denied unemployment 
benefits. The Court specifically did not recognize the case as a pure employment benefits 
case such as Sherbert and Yoder. Instead, the Court really sidestepped the employment 
benefits issue. The most convincing rationale the Court used was its cogent explanation for 
not applying the Sherbert-Yoder compelling interest requirement. Scalia explained: 
The "compelling government interest" requirement seems benign, because it 
is familiar from other fields. But using it as the standard that must be met 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
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before the government may accord different treatment on the basis of race, 
or before the government may regulate the content of speech,  is not 
remotely comparable to using it for the purpose asserted here. What it 
produces in those other fields -- equality of treatment and an unrestricted 
flow of contending speech -- are constitutional norms; what it would 
produce here -- a private right to ignore generally applicable laws -- is a 
constitutional anomaly....108
This “private right to ignore generally applicable laws” is what Smith undermines. Had the 
respondents won the case, the First Amendment’s protection of religion would be widened 
to include many exemptions not necessarily intended by the Framers. Scalia explains that:  
The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally 
required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every 
conceivable kind -- ranging from compulsory military service to the payment 
of taxes to health and safety regulation such as manslaughter and child 
neglect laws, compulsory vaccination laws, drug laws, and traffic laws; to 
social welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws, child labor laws, 
animal cruelty laws, environmental protection laws, and laws providing for 
equality of opportunity for the races.109
The intention of the Smith ruling was to ensure that such a Pandora’s Box of exemptions is 
not opened and that neutral and generally applicable laws even if they incidentally burden 
religion pass Constitutional muster. 
The 1990 Society of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Commission110 case was 
decided in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. The conflict began when the 
Boston Landmarks Commission designated the historic interior of the Church of the 
Immaculate Conception, located in Boston's South End. The Court admitted that “there are 
few finer examples of classic mid-Nineteenth Century church design.” The Jesuits claimed 
that the designation of the interior of the church violated the free exercise clause of the First 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Society of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Commission, 564 N.E.2d 571(Mass. 1990). 
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Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Superior Court already granted summary 
judgment to the Jesuits and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 
In light of dwindling membership, Church officials decided to renovate the building 
to better ensure their future financial needs.  “The plan called for renovation of the main 
church into office, counseling, and residential space.”111 The Commission quickly designated 
the interior of the Church to stop the renovation.  The designation restricted permanent 
alteration of the "nave, chancel, vestibule and organ loft on the main floor -- the volume, 
window glazing, architectural detail, finishes, painting, the organ, and organ case.112
Justice Lunch, writing for the majority, explained that designation of the interior was 
found to violate Article 2 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. 
Article 2 states:  
No subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or 
estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner and season most agreeable to 
the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious profession or 
sentiments; provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others 
in their religious worship.113
The Jesuits claimed that their inability to change the interior of their Church violated their 
rights. The Court concluded that “Article 2 protects the right freely to design interior spaces 
for religious worship, thus barring the government from regulating changes in such places, 
provided that no public safety question is presented.”114 Justice Lynch stated that the interior 
designation was exceedingly invasive. “The government intrusion here is substantially more 
invasive, reaching into the church's actual worship space.”115
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
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Figure 5 
Interior view of Society of Jesus of 
New England in Boston.
Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks 
Commission deals Historic Preservation’s 
battle to preserve religious buildings another 
blow. Lynch explained that the Court did 
consider the worthiness of preservation.  He 
stated:
The government interest in historic 
preservation, though worthy, is not 
sufficiently compelling to justify restraints on 
the free exercise of religion, a right of 
primary importance. In short, under our 
hierarchy of constitutional values we must 
accept the possible loss of historically 
significant elements of the interior of this 
church as the price of safeguarding the right of 
religious freedom.116 This consideration, however, was not favorable to the objectives of 
historic preservation. The landmark designation was found to burden religious worship and 
was deemed unconstitutional. The next case, however, was a long awaited triumph for 
preservationists. Unfortunately, its success was a mere speck on the regulation of historic 
religious property timeline.  
116 Ibid. 
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The next case, Rector, Wardens, and Members of the Vestry of St. Bartholomew’s Church v. 
City of New York 117 is a significant post-Smith case that directly addresses historic religious 
landmarking issues. St. Bartholomew’s Church is a Protestant Episcopal Church built in 
1917 and located on the east side of Park Avenue between East 50th and East 51st Streets in 
the City of New York. The Church brought suit after the New York Landmarks 
Preservation Commission denied their request to replace an adjacent structure, the 
Community House, with a fifty-nine story office tower. They claimed that landmark status 
violated the Free Exercise Clause, Establishment Clause and Takings Clause.  
117Rector, Wardens, and Members of the Vestry of St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York  and the Landmarks 
Preservation Commission of the City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990). 
Figure 6 
St. Bartholomew’s Church in 
New York. 
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In 1967, the Landmarks Preservation Commission of the City of New York 
determined that pursuant to the Landmarks Law, St. Bartholomew's Church, the exterior of 
the Community House and the surrounding property should all be designated landmarks. 
The 1919 Church structure was designed by architect Bertram G. Goodhue.  Justice Winter 
explains that:  
the Church building is a notable example of a Venetian adaptation 
of the Byzantine style, built on a Latin cross plan. Significant 
features include its polychromatic stone exterior, soaring octagonal 
dome, and large rose window. Perhaps most significantly, Goodhue 
incorporated into his building the Romanesque porch of St. 
Bartholomew's former Church building at Madison Avenue and 
44th Street. Designed by the renowned architectural firm of 
McKim, Mead & White, the porch is composed of a high arched 
central portal flanked by two lower arched doorways, all supported 
by slender columns.118
Though not the point of contention in this case, the description of the Church is significant 
when determining the significance of the other structures. The relationship of the Church to 
the Community House, the focus of this case, is meaningful when determining the overall 
significance of the landmarked structures. The Community House is described by Justice 
Winter as a terraced seven-story structure located at the corner of Park Avenue and 50th 
Street just neighboring the Church. “Completed in 1928 by associates of Goodhue, the 
Community House complements the Church building in scale, materials and decoration.”119
The Landmarks Preservation Commission deduced that these architectural features as well 
as the inherent value based derived from the complementary relationships between the 
buildings warranted protection. The Commission affirmed “St. Bartholomew's Church and 
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid. 
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Community House have special character, special historical and aesthetic interest and value 
as part of the development, heritage and cultural aspects of New York City.”120 This 
uncontested designation necessitated special approval for any alteration or demolition of the 
landmarked structures.
Beginning in 1983, pursuant to the obligations of landmark status, several 
applications were filed for permission to change the Community House. The commission 
summarily rejected them. First, the Church requested a “Certificate of Appropriateness” to 
tear down the Community House and erect a 59-story tower in its stead. After altering its 
plans from a 59-story to a 47-story tower to appease the Commission, and then filing for a 
“hardship exception,” the Church was denied again. Frustrated, the Church filed suit for 
declaratory and injunctive relief in 1986. Along with other claims, they declared that the state 
landmark designation burdened its free exercise of religion “by excessively burdening the 
practice of religion and entangling the government in religious affairs.”121
The Church viewed the Landmarks Commission’s denial to grant a permit for 
demolition and construction of the new office tower as an imposition on their rights as a 
religious institution.  They claimed that the denial had negated its ability to “carry on and 
expand the ministerial and charitable activities that are central to its religious mission.”122
They claim that the development of an office tower was necessary to shore up their 
dwindling assets as well as provide additional space for their activities. “The Church 
concludes that the Landmarks Law unconstitutionally denies it the opportunity to exploit 
this means of carrying out its religious mission.”123 Circuit Judge Winter explained that the 
limitation was not severe enough to warrant any change of action. He explained that St. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
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Bartholomew’s Church had three sources of funds with an overall endowment of $ 14.3 
million. The Church claimed that their overall endowment could not sustain the imminent 
debt produced by the Commission’s recommended renovation and that in effect, the 
renovations negatively impacted its future earnings potential.  
The Church's principal argument is that a major improvement expenditure of 
the type required to repair and renovate the Church building and Community 
House would severely damage this ‘precarious’ balance of revenues and 
expenses.  Because such expenditure would come from endowment funds, 
the Church contends, future investment income will inevitably decline as the 
result of a depleted portfolio. Such a decrease in future revenues, it 
concludes, will produce ‘severe deficits.’124
Though the designation did monetarily restrict the Church, the takings claims failed because 
of the Penn Central Transportation Co v. New York City125 precedent. Circuit Judge Winter 
turned to Employment Division v. Smith,126 the new shepherd, intended to guide.
Such an invasion into a religious entity’s finances would never be allowed pre-Smith.
The Court justified the Landmark Commission’s actions of incidentally impinging on the 
activities of the Church and not the beliefs which are protected by the Free Exercise Clause. 
“No one seriously contends that the Landmarks Law interferes with substantive religious 
views.”  Additionally, Justice Winter defends the Landmarks Law by quoting from Smith.
The Landmarks Law is a facially neutral regulation of general applicability 
within the meaning of Supreme Court decisions. It thus applies to ‘any 
improvement, any part of which is thirty years old or older, which has a 
special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value.’127
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Federal District Court’s decision and ruled that the 
actions of the City of New York and the Landmarks Preservation Commission were 
constitutionally valid. The historic preservation ordinances were again deemed facially 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
126 Ibid., Employment Division v. Smith.
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neutral laws of generally applicability. The courts deemed that the Church’s right to free 
exercise was not substantially burdened by the landmark designation and the subsequent 
denials of demolition permits. The Court also analyzed the impact of the Smith decision. The 
Court described that post-Smith:
the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to 
comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground 
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes). The critical distinction is thus between a neutral, generally 
applicable law that happens to bear on religiously motivated action, and a 
regulation that restricts certain conduct because it is religiously oriented.128
As long as a law is determined to be generally applicable and does not target a specific 
religion or its practice, little governmental justification is necessary. Without the influence of 
a system of individualized exceptions in this case, regard as to whether the government had 
used the least restrictive means to further a compelling interest was not an issue. “In sum, 
the Smith case meant that the compelling interest standard would be applied under the U.S. 
Constitution to a much smaller number of cases than had previously been thought.”129
Finally, the hallowed realm that religious entities have held for so long have given way in 
favor of historic preservation! Or so preservationist’s thought. 
Just two years after Smith, in First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle,130 the rules 
changed once again. The promising headway that the Smith and Saint Bartholomew Courts 
made was uprooted to the dismay of preservation organizations. The First Amendment 
rights of religious organizations persevere as the relentless factor that determines the survival 
of the historic preservation of religious sites.  
127 Ibid., St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York, Code § 25-302(n) (1986). 
128 Ibid. 
129 David W. Kinkopf. “Religious Freedom Litigation” March 31, 1999. Found at  
www.gejlaw.com/focuson/kinkopf.html 
130 First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). 
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The First Covenant Church is located at the corner of Pike and Bellevue Streets in 
Seattle. In October of 1980, the Seattle's Landmarks Preservation Board nominated the First 
Covenant Church as a landmark. The First Covenant Church fit the 1977 Landmarks 
Preservation Ordinance criteria: 
designate, preserve, [and] protect,…improvements and objects which reflect 
significant elements of the City's cultural, aesthetic, social, economic, 
political, architectural, engineering, historic or other heritage . . .[.]131
Though the Church fit the necessary requirements, the Church vehemently opposed the 
designation. The opposition was to no avail and after several contentious public hearings the 
Board approved designation anyway in September 1985.  
The case records indicate that “the church and City unsuccessfully negotiated about 
the controls that the City would impose on the church.”132 The controls the city exercised 
were delineated in the Designation Ordinance which required that while the Ordinance did 
not dictate any religious activity, it did require approval of any changes to the architecturally 
significant building. The Ordinance had several components that immediately impacted the 
Church upon designation including:
interference with the Church's freedom to alter the exterior of the church 
structure; necessary secular approval of any proposed alteration of the facade 
requiring additional paperwork, negotiations and hearings; a limitation on the 
131 Ibid., Clerk's Papers, at 6 found in Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 25.12.020(B) (1977). 
132 Ibid.
Figure 8 
Sketch of First 
Covenant Church in 
Seattle, Washington. 
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Church's ability to sell its property; and uncertainty of discretionary approval 
confronting the Church in its planning of any exterior change.133
The designation also affected the market value. “In addition, an uncontroverted affidavit 
stated that landmark designation of the church resulted in a depreciation of the market value 
of the property from $700,000 to $400,000”134 The application of the Ordinance is pivotal to 
First Covenant Church’s claim that its First Amendment right of free exercise was violated. 
Justice Dore explained that “applying the City's ordinances to First Covenant burdened the 
church's right to free exercise of religion under the federal and state constitutions.  And the 
majority, again for different reasons, concluded that the liturgy exemption did not mitigate 
the burden on free exercise.”135
 The landmark designation and subsequent regulation was found to violate First 
Covenant’s Free Exercise rights. The rights of the Church were violated administratively and 
financially.
The ordinances burden free exercise "administratively" 
because they require that First Covenant seek the approval of 
a government body before it alters the exterior of its house of 
worship, whether or not the alteration is for a religious 
reason. Further, they burden First Covenant financially, 
because they reduce the value of the church's property by 
almost half.136
The court dealt historic preservation another blow by determining that the preservation of 
historic structures is not a compelling interest. Justice Dore explained: 
We hold that the City's interest in preservation of aesthetic and 
historic structures is not compelling and it does not justify the 
infringement of First Covenant's right to freely exercise 
religion. The possible loss of significant architectural elements 
is a price we must accept to guarantee the paramount right of 
religious freedom. 
133 Ibid., Clerk's Papers, at 345-46. 
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The basis for this decision was the application of Sherbert. With this application, the majority 
concluded that historic preservation was not a compelling state interest “that justified the 
burden on First Covenant's right to free exercise and, therefore, that applying the City's 
ordinances to First Covenant violated First Covenant's free exercise rights under the state 
and federal constitutions.”137 The Washington Supreme Court, on remand from the Supreme 
Court, was required to use the Smith test and found the test to be inapplicable because they 
considered this case to be a “hybrid situation.” Smith was not applied in this case because the 
church claimed infringement of its free exercise and free speech rights. The Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court’s decisions and judged that the landmarks preservation ordinance 
unconstitutionally infringed on the religious organization's religious freedom.  
The 1993 Supreme Court Church of the Lukumi Babalu v. City of Hialeah138 decision 
reaffirmed the Smith standard as well as introduced many to the Santeria religion. The 
Santeria religion was established in the 19th century when Yoruba slaves from western Africa 
were transported to Cuba and were exposed to Roman Catholicism. “The resulting 
syncretion, or fusion, is Santeria, ‘the way of the saints.’”139 Justice Kennedy explains that the 
interesting amalgam created a worship of orishas. “The Cuban Yoruba express their 
devotion to spirits, called orishas, through the iconography of Catholic saints, Catholic 
symbols are often present at Santeria rites, and Santeria devotees attend the Catholic 
sacraments.”140 Problems arose when the city of Hialeah, Florida enacted a ordinances aimed 
at preventing the Church of the Lukumi Babalu, a not-for-profit corporation founded in 
137 Ibid.
138 Church of the Lukumi Babalu v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid. 
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1973 from animal sacrifice, as required for religious purposes. The Church claimed these 
ordinances violated their First Amendment right to exercise freely.  
As soon as the Church leased land in Hialeah, the city council passed five resolutions. 
The enactments included Resolution 87-66 which declared that “[t]he City reiterates its 
commitment to a prohibition against any and all acts of any and all religious groups which 
are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety.”141 Ordinance 87-40 warned of criminal 
punishment to “[w]hoever . . . unnecessarily or cruelly . . . kills any animal.”142 Resolution 87-
90 “declared the city policy ‘to oppose the ritual sacrifices of animals’ within Hialeah, and 
announced that any person or organization practicing animal sacrifice ‘will be prosecuted.’ 
Sacrifice is important to keep the spirits going. Kennedy explained:  
They depend for survival on the sacrifice. Sacrifices are performed at birth, 
marriage, and death rites, for the cure of the sick, for the initiation of new 
members and priests, and during an annual celebration. Animals sacrificed in 
Santeria rituals include chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea pigs, goats, 
sheep, and turtles. The animals are killed by the cutting of the carotid arteries 
in the neck. The sacrificed animal is cooked and eaten, except after healing 
and death rituals.143
The city, however, exempted animal slaughter for food consumption. Justice Kennedy 
explained that “all ordinances and resolutions passed the city council by unanimous vote. 
Violations of each of the four ordinances were punishable by fines not exceeding $500 or 
imprisonment not exceeding 60 days, or both.”144
 The Supreme Court did not interpret these Resolutions and Ordinances as neutral or 
generally applicable. The compelling state interest was weak. Instead, the city council tailored 
the Resolutions and Ordinances to meet their specific objectives: removal or obstruction of 
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
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the Church of the Lukumi Babalu from the City of Hialeah. The Supreme Court reversed 
the judgment of the District Court. The District Court ruled in City of Hialeah’s favor 
“although acknowledging that the foregoing ordinances are not religiously neutral.”145 The 
court concluded that: 
compelling governmental interests in preventing public health risks and 
cruelty to animals fully justified the absolute prohibition on ritual sacrifice 
accomplished by the ordinances, and that an exception to that prohibition 
for religious conduct would unduly interfere with fulfillment of the 
governmental interest, because any more narrow restrictions would be 
unenforceable as a result of the Santeria religion's secret nature.146
Justice Kennedy explained that “the ordinances’ texts and operation demonstrate that they 
are not neutral, but have as their object the suppression of Santeria’s central element, animal 
sacrifice”147 The Ordinances were deemed gerrymandered. He stated: Moreover, the latter 
ordinances’ various prohibitions, definitions, and exemptions demonstrate that they were 
‘gerrymandered’ with care to proscribe religious killings of animals by Santeria church 
members but to exclude almost all other animal killings.”148 The Ordinances also do not 
show a compelling government interest.  He stated:
The legitimate governmental interests in protecting the public health and 
preventing cruelty to animals could be addressed by restrictions stopping far 
short of a flat prohibition of all Santeria sacrificial practice, such as general 
regulations on the disposal of organic garbage, on the care of animals 
regardless of why they are kept, or on methods of slaughter.149
In a concurring statement, Justice Scalia opined: “The ordinances ha[ve] every appearance of 
a prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshippers], but not upon 
itself." This amounts to complete disregard to what ‘general applicability’ is supposed to 
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
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enforce. To scold the City Council of Hialeah as well as remind governing bodies of their 
obligations, Kennedy states: “Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, 
designed to persecute oppress a religion or its practices.”150
 The Church of the Lukumi Babalu case was the last case argued before Congress 
intentionally treaded on this historically contested ground. Congress’s objective was to 
implement a standard for all Courts to follow when deciding First Amendment claims. 
Overall, it was anticipate that the Religions Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 would add a 
measure of stability to the historically unpredictable Free Exercise Clause litigation. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid.
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V.     R e l i g i o u s   F r e e d o m   R e s t o r a t i o n   A c t
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)151 of 1993 became law after a 
unanimous voice vote in the House and a 98-to-2 vote in the Senate.152 RFRA was 
Congresses attempt to allay the burdening of religion even by neural and generally applicable 
laws as established by Smith. RFRA was an attempt to provide guidance and ultimately 
stabilize the tremendous latitude courts exhibited in their decisions. Both RFRA and the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000 tried to shore up 
the First Amendment rights of religious organizations. 
Congress initiated the research by returning to the roots of the issue – back to the 
Constitution itself and the need for the First Amendment. “The framers of the Constitution, 
recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First 
Amendment to the Constitution.”153  They affirmed that the right to practice a religion was 
an unalienable right and should be protected. They acknowledged that even laws that were 
neural may burden the exercise of religion. “Laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden 
religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.”154 Congress 
ensured that RFRA protected First Amendment rights even from generally applicable laws. 
RFRA stated that “government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion 
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.”155  Congress also 
substantiated the necessity for a compelling state interest. “The compelling interest test as set 
forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between 
151 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3, 107 Stat 1488 (1993) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994)). Found at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/42/ch21B.html. 
152 Id., David W. Kinkopf. “Religious Freedom Litigation.”  
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
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religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.”156 This compelling interest test 
was specifically addressed in the legislation by declaring that it was erroneously eliminated in 
Employment Division v. Smith.157
The purpose of RFRA was specific. Its ultimate goal was to protect the free exercise 
of religion. Congress believed that the most reliable way to ensure this was to restore the 
precedents established in Sherbert v. Verner158 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.159 The basis for this 
restoration was to reinstate the compelling interest test and to “guarantee its application in 
all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened and to provide a claim or 
defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.”160
Exemptions, however, were allowed that enabled, in effect, the government to substantially 
burden a person’s exercise of religion. The burden was permissible if the government proved 
that the action was “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”161 Once the burden 
was satisfactorily established by the plaintiff, the government must prove that the action is in 
furtherance of a compelling government interest and has been carried out in the least 
restrictive way.  
RFRA was thus intended to guide and stabilize. It was a response to Smith’s
sanctioned burdens on religion via the establishment of neutral and generally applicable laws. 
RFRA was designed to guarantee that religious institutions were not substantially burdened. 
155 Id., Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). 
156 Id., David W. Kinkopf. “Religious Freedom Litigation.” 
157 Id., Employment Division v. Smith (1990). 
158 Id., Sherbert v. Verner (1963). 
159 Id., Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972). 
160 Id., Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).  
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The response to RFRA has covered the entire spectrum, drawing harsh criticism as well as 
praise.
Some have vilified RFRA as an ‘unconstitutional grab for power’ by 
Congress, while others remain  steadfast in their belief that RFRA was a 
legitimate expansion of rights that correctly imposed ‘the highest standard of 
constitutional protection from one of the most important freedoms 
guaranteed by the Constitution.’162
Unfortunately, it also placed Historic Preservation in an increasingly awkward position and 
perpetuated preservation’s uphill battle.
Post-RFRA cases involving historic preservation are limited. Specifically, two cases 
directly address preservation. The first, Cardinal William H. Keeler v. Mayor and City Council of 
Cumberland163 involves St. Peter and Paul's Roman Catholic Church, located in Cumberland, 
Maryland. Pursuant to the 1974 Historic Zoning Ordinance that created the town’s Historic 
Preservation Commission, the historic religious structures became part of the Washington 
Street Historic District. Occupying an entire city-block, St. Peter and Paul's Roman Catholic 
Church, built between 1848 and 1889, is comprised of “a ‘massive’ monastery with a large 
chapel, and a corridor known as the ‘White Elephant,’ which connects the monastery to the 
sacristy of the Church.”164 The monastery and chapel, however, have been vacant since 1986 
due to financial difficulties.  
162 Kathryn S. Kanda. “Validity and Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 
the Tenth Circuit after City of Boerne v. Flores.” Denver University Law Review. 79 Denv. U.L. Rev. 295 
(2002).
163 Cardinal William H. Keeler v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879 (1996). 
164 Ibid. 
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Consequently, in 1995, the Church applied to the Cumberland Historic Preservation 
Commission for a Certificate of Appropriateness to demolish the structure and build a 
Church Annex. The choice to demolish was made on the basis that:  
the estimated cost for reconstruction simply to retain and adequately 
maintain the structure exceeds $380,000. . . plus significant annual 
maintenance costs…and the estimated cost for a complete renovation of the 
entire building exceeds $2 million dollars.165
The Church claimed that the financial burden impeded its ability to fulfill their duties. The 
inability to demolish the structure “is a significant financial liability and whose presence 
prevents the parish from meeting the religious needs of its congregation.”166 This Certificate 
was denied and the Church filed suit claiming that the Ordinance and denial of demolition 
165 Ibid., (Cmplt. PP 13 and 14). 
166 Ibid., (Cmplt. at P 2). 
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St. Peter and Paul's Roman Catholic 
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request violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and substantially burdened their 
First Amendment rights.
The City moved to dismiss on the basis that RFRA is unconstitutional. “This purely 
legal argument is appropriate for disposition on a motion to dismiss. If RFRA itself is 
invalid, then no set of facts alleged by the plaintiffs could entitle them to relief under that 
statute.”167 The United States District Judge Frederic N. Smalkin explained the complicated 
issues and found that both parties were confused about the application of RFRA.
According to the defendants, the statute violates the separation of powers 
because it imposes a rule of constitutional interpretation upon the courts. 
The plaintiffs and the United States take the position that RFRA ‘simply 
provides prophylactic statutory protection for the Fourteenth Amendment's 
free exercise guarantee, as substantively interpreted by the judiciary’.168
Notwithstanding the confusion, the objectives of historic preservation were promptly 
curtailed. The Court deemed that “the ordinance neither furthers a compelling government 
interest nor constitutes the least restrictive means of furthering possible interests of the 
government in historic preservation.”169 In effect, the City did not prove a compelling 
governmental interest enough to justify the refusal to demolish. In this extreme 
interpretation, historic preservation was deemed neither neutral nor a generally applicable 
regulatory law.
One issue raised was that of individual exemptions. The ordinance had detailed 
exemptions, e.g. for economic hardship, that allowed alterations if any of these criteria were 
met:
   (1) The structure is a deterrent to a major improvement program 
         which will be of substantial benefit to the City of Cumberland; 
   (2) Retention of the structure would cause undue financial 
         hardship to the owner; or 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid., (Memo. of United States at 18).  
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   (3) The retention of the structure would not be to the best interest  
         of a majority of persons in the community.170
The Court ruled that the availability of exemptions for certain criteria allowed for the 
addition of other criteria, including religion. Judge Smalkin quoted from Bowen v. Roy171 when
he opined that “where the State has in place a system of individualized exemptions, it may 
not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason." 
Hence the Court moved away from Smith which “recognized that where the government 
enacts a system of exemptions, and thereby acknowledges that its interest in enforcement is 
not paramount, then the government ‘may not refuse to extend that system [of exemptions] 
to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason."172 Historic preservation was not 
recognized as a compelling enough reason.
In a bold move, the Court held that Cumberland did not provide enough evidence of 
the compelling state interest to support Historic Preservation Ordinance No. 2970 and 
denial of Certificate of Appropriateness for the demolition. The Keeler Court did not apply 
Smith or Saint Bartholomew and found that Church’s right of Free Exercise was violated. 
Historic Preservation was deemed not neutral or a law of general applicability. This is a trend 
that the Maryland State Courts predictably follow. Historic Preservation through landmark 
designation has been consistently rejected. RLUIPA, as we shall see, could possibly fuel 
these types of cases. This legislation may stimulate and further embolden the privileges that 
religious organizations have that enable them to exist above the general rules that apply to all 
other organizations.
The second post-RFRA case that involved the Free Exercise Clause and Historic 
Preservation directly was First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Examiner for the Seattle 
170 Ibid., Ordinance 2970, § 7.d. 
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Landmarks Preservation Board.173 First United Methodist Church, built in 1907, and a 
corresponding chapel and community center, built in 1950, are located in downtown Seattle 
on the west side of 5th Avenue between Marion and Columbia Streets. The parcel of land is 
divided with the First United Methodist Church situated on the northern part of the 
property and the chapel and community center located in a separate building on the 
southern part of the property.174 In spite of the highly contested landmark status, the Church 
was nominated in 1984 and approved in 1985. “In December 1984, Seattle's Office of Urban 
Conservation nominated both the interior and exterior of the church for landmark 
designation under the Landmarks Preservation Ordinance.”175 The 1910 structure was clearly 
meritorious of designation. The “Beaux Arts style sanctuary, with 66-foot high interior 
ceiling, brick and terra cotta façade, and orange tile-covered central dome”176 was created by 
the well known Seattle based architects 
James Schack and Daniel Huntington. 
171 Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
172 Ibid. 
173 First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Examiner for the Seattle Landmarks Preservation Board. 916 P.2d 374 
(Wash. 1996). 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid. 
Figure 10 
First United Methodist Church in 
Seattle, Washington. 
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The Trial Court ruled that the Landmark Preservation Ordinance was 
unconstitutional. Justice Baker, opining for the Court of Appeals, explained that the Court 
agreed in part. The Court disagreed, however, and clarified that landmark designation itself 
does not interfere with the exercise of religion. “Merely designating property as a 
landmark…does not interfere with the free exercise of religion.”177 The Court deduced that 
only the application of the restrictions rendered the Ordinance unconstitutional. “It is the 
placing of restrictions on the property which causes the prohibited interference. We 
therefore hold that the portions of the LPO which place restrictions… cannot be applied to 
the church building owned by First United as long as the building is being used primarily for 
religious purposes.” This ruling indicates that preservation was considered a legitimate 
government interest. Justice Baker explained that  
our ruling that these provisions cannot presently be applied 
to the church building does not invalidate the entire LPO. 
The City may still choose to designate the church building as 
a landmark, but the landmarks board cannot restrict 
modification of the structure in any way unless and until the 
structure ceases to be used primarily for religious purposes.178
The Court excused the Church from complying with the Ordinance as long as the structure 
was used for religious purposes. The Court further asserted that once the property changes 
to a use that does not include religious use, then the preservation ordinance would be in 
effect. “The Court of Appeals, reversing in part, held that the City could enact an ordinance 
designating the church a landmark as long as it refrained from imposing any controls ‘until 
the structure ceases to be used for primarily religious purposes.’"179 First United was not 
176 “Washington State Supreme Court rules against Seattle landmark designation of First United Methodist 
Church on May 9, 1996.” The Online Encyclopedia of Seattle / King County History. Found at: 
http://www.historylink.org/output.cfm?file_ID=3773. 
177 First United Church v. Hearing Examiner for the Seattle Landmarks Preservation Board,
887 P.2d 473 (Wash.1995). 
178 Ibid. 
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satisfied and appealed to the Washington Supreme Court. They received a more favorable 
ruling.
Justice Durham explained in detail the Court’s decision to reverse. In the 5 to 4 
decision, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that the Landmarks Preservation 
Ordinance, as described in the Seattle Municipal Code, does impose an unconstitutional 
burden on the United Methodist Church. The Church appealed to the City’s Hearing 
Examiner claiming that the Church’s state of disrepair required significant attention and 
funds. Justice Durham explained that the Church believed that “repairs to the church would 
be affordable only absent government controls.”180 United Methodist also maintained it 
needed smaller sanctuary claiming that the size of the current building was too large for its 
congregation which was estimated at only half of its patronage of 40 years ago. “The present 
sanctuary is too large to foster as dynamic and meaningful worship services as desired.”181
The decline in patronage was attributed to the dynamic changes in city function significantly 
the “expansion of the commercial core of the city, the construction of the freeways, the 
construction of vastly expanded medical and commercial facilities on First Hill are some of 
the changes in Seattle which have contributed to the decline in the Church's membership.182
First United Methodist Church believed that it was their right to utilize their property as they 
wished, especially in light of their financial situation. “United Methodist argued that it should 
be free to designate any portion of its property for commercial use in order to fund religious 
and social service programs.”183 The Washington State Supreme Court agreed with the First 
United Church on September 27, 1995. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Id., First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Examiner (1996). Clerk's Papers at 27. 
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In a 5-to-4 decision, the Washington State Supreme Court reversed the Court of 
Appeals and reaffirmed that the Preservation Ordinance was unconstitutional. The Supreme 
Court deemed that the Court of Appeals did not apply the strict scrutiny analysis and 
ultimately, the Church did not prove that the landmark status burdened its right to free 
exercise. The Court did, however, reaffirm that the City could designate the church a 
landmark once the structures “cease[d] to be used primarily for religious purposes.”184
Specifically, the Court stated that Landmark status can be confirmed as long as the controls 
that were embodied in the designation were not enacted. The Court had issue with the 
‘primarily for religious purpose’ phraseology which it deemed “wholly amorphous.”185 As the 
Christian Legal Society stated, this terminology implies that the  
burden will fall to the church to prove that its building is 
being used primarily for religious purposes, which will be 
open to interpretation. Suppose that the congregation rented 
the building to community groups each night of the week, so 
that the total number of hours for such "secular" use 
exceeded the number of hours spent in worship. Is that a 
cessation of primary use for religious purpose?186
The Christian Legal Society statement addresses the overall complexity of religious land use 
as well as the myriad of subtleties involved when deciding the impact on religious entities. 
The Court went on to explain how landmark designation would restrict United 
Methodist and burden its First Amendment rights if the Church decided to sell its property. 
The very survival…of First United Methodist Church of 
Seattle... depends on its having the freedom to sell its 
sanctuary for demolition and commercial redevelopment. The 
record makes clear, however, that the Church is not claiming 
a right to maximize revenue for the purpose of commercial 
gain, but only for the purpose of furthering its Christian 
mission.187
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid., Br. of amici curiae Christian Legal Society at 11-12. 
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The Supreme Court sided with United Methodist Church and acknowledged that this type of 
restriction is impermissible. The landmark status unduly burdened their free exercise rights 
by “creating administrative or financial burdens.”188 The impediment caused by First United 
Methodist Church’s inability to sell its property and exploit the profit to advance their 
religion is excessively burdensome. Justice Durham reiterated that “The free exercise clause 
prevents government from engaging in landmark preservation when it has a coercive effect 
on religion. This protection does not cease if United Methodist sells its property.”189 Durham 
pinpointed that this case exemplifies exactly what the First Amendment was created to 
safeguard.
 The First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Examiner190 case concluded that even a 
nomination for landmark status can be declared unconstitutional. It is unclear precisely how 
the Court determined that this case was ripe for adjudication. It is evident that the realm of 
religious entities has remained strong - even withstanding the hefty blow from Smith. State 
enacted RFRAs are clearly not needed in some states where religious entities are afforded 
greater than average refuge. As has become evident in the Washington cases, the 
Washington State Constitution confers considerable protection for religious freedom – more 
than is afforded by the federal Constitution. 
The Munns v. Martin191 case of 1997 clearly illustrates the distinctive position of the 
Washington Supreme Court. In a 6-to-1 decision, the Court held that even the application of 
an ordinance that incorporated a demolition delay violated the Washington Constitution 
when applied to a structure owned by a religious entity. In 1996, Frank Munns, the Catholic 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Id., First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Examiner.
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Bishop of Spokane, Washington, attempted to demolish St. Patrick's School in Walla Walla. 
The Bishop intended to demolish the structure and build a new pastoral center. Since its 
construction in 1928 the building was used as a school. Since 1974, the building had several 
functions including fulfilling educational, social, and community needs.192 The new center 
would focus on Catholic education needs as well as other Church activities. “There is no 
dispute that the proposed functions of the pastoral center will be in furtherance of the 
church mission.”193
In 1994, Frank Munns, the owner of the property located next to the Church, 
applied to the City of Walla Walla for a demolition permit. As stated in Walla Walla 
Municipal Code, the permit was required due to the nature of the change which included the 
conversion of a historic structure. The next day, Robert Martin, the City's Development 
Services Manager, consulted the community regarding the historic and architectural 
significance of St. Patrick's School. The response regarding the significance of the structure 
was overwhelming. “They contend the building is the only example of Romanesque revival 
architecture in Walla Walla, and was built to complement the Gothic architecture of the St. 
Patrick Church built in 1881.”194 This initial assessment was bolstered during the required 
10-day stay. The Walla Walla demolition permit ordinance requires “a 10-day period for 
comments concerning the demolition of any structure over 50 years old, or ‘places of 
historic value.’” 195 During this 10-day holding period, the community was allowed to 
respond to the proposed changes. “Based on the comments the City received during the 10-
day holding period (numerous letters protesting demolition), on August 15, 1994, Martin 
191 Frank Munns, et al v. Robert C. Martin, 930 P.2d 318 (1997).  
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
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195 Ibid., Walla Walla's demolition permit ordinance WWMC 20.146.040. 
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declared a 60-day stay in the issuance of the demolition permit to allow for a hearing before 
the Planning Commission.”196 The Trial Court found the issuance of the stay had a coercive 
effect on the practice of religion.  
This is not a deminimis delay. In our cases, the potential 
burden of an ordinance creates constitutional 
infirmity….More significantly here, the additional delay is 
specifically for the purpose of permitting opponents of the 
proposed demolition to attempt to broker various alternatives 
to the church's planned religious purpose for the structure. 
The ordinance indicates the delay is designed to provide an 
‘opportunity for acquisition, easement, or other preservation 
mechanism to be negotiated after the public hearing.’197
The potential for an additional time delay was deemed an administrative burden. The Trial 
Court ruled that both the municipal ordinance and the additional rule requiring the 
establishment of possible historic loss burdened Munns’ First Amendment rights. 
On appeal to the Superior Court of Walla Walla County, Justice Philip A. Talmadge 
clearly stated the issue. 
we are confronted yet again with the question of whether a 
local land use ordinance designed to further historic 
preservation and aesthetic purposes violates our State's free 
exercise of religion clause when applied to a structure that is 
part of a church's religious ministry.198
The Court investigated whether the state’s Free Exercise clause pertains to a church building 
clearly used for religious purposes but is not considered the house of worship. Specifically, 
the Court investigated whether the established Walla Walla ordinance burdened the Roman 
Catholic Church’s free exercise of religion either administratively or financially. Talmadge 
explained that the ordinance did in fact burden the Bishop administratively. “The Bishop's 
plans are in furtherance of his fundamental right to the free exercise of his religion. The 
196 Ibid. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid. 
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ordinance therefore has a coercive effect on the practice of religion. That being the case, 
the appellants have the burden of showing a compelling governmental interest in creating 
delay.”199 The Court also investigated the nature of the demolition permit ordinance’s 
required 60-day stay or “cooling off period.”200 Initiated due to the nature of the religious 
ownership, the period is required “during which the religious organization is subject to 
negotiation with governmental and private authorities before an historic or architecturally 
significant structure can be demolished.”201 This 60 day stay was rescinded based on the 
decision reached in First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle202 which determined that an historic 
preservation ordinance was not a compelling government interest and in effect violated the 
First Amendment.  The Court reiterated that the “possible loss of significant architectural 
elements is a price we must accept to guarantee the paramount right of religious freedom.”203
The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order to dismiss the appellant's petition for a 
writ of mandamus. 
The Munns v. Martin204 case clearly illustrates the immense latitude the states possess 
when deciding local land use issues. The Washington Court has historically not shown any 
leniency for historic preservation and continuously denies even the legitimacy of 
preservation. Its distinctive position is defined by consistently effortless religious freedom 
victories. The evolution of historic preservation, however, is hindered in the state of 
Washington as evidenced by the Munns ruling in which a landmark designation of an historic 
school owned by a religious entity is deemed unconstitutional. The Washington state 
allowances and protections are so entrenched that with or without the RFRA a religious 
199 Ibid. 
200 Ibid. 
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entity is given enhanced protection. But as the next case demonstrates, the ability of RFRA 
to affect the outcome of historic preservation versus religious freedom cases becomes 
incontrovertible.
  The significance of the City of Boerne v. Flores205 case lies in its verdict that the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court delved into the 
relevant Free Exercise case history and re-established the standard for scrutiny. The Supreme 
Court recognized that RFRA was a backlash to the Smith decision that did not apply the 
balancing test of Sherbert v. Verner206 and tried to resolve the issue by setting a higher standard 
of scrutiny than that applied in Smith. Many historic preservationists looked to this ruling as 
heaven-sent. They hoped that the muscle behind the religious freedom protection clauses 
would deflate and allow opportunities for other legitimate purposes to exist. Many in the 
field had hoped that this standard of scrutiny would be applied in future free exercise claims 
jurisprudence.
The case began when the Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio, P.F. Flores, brought 
action under RFRA challenging the denial of a building permit to enlarge the church. The 
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division 
decided RFRA was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth and Tenth amendments. The 
Fifth Circuit Appellate Division reversed in part and declared RFRA constitutional. In 1997, 
the Supreme Court granted Certiorari, reversed, and declared RFRA unconstitutional. This 
decision rippled through the historic preservation community and rekindled a great hope in 
the field’s validity. As witnessed previously, one step towards the embrace of preservation is 
unfortunately interpreted by the Courts in vastly different ways, usually to the dismay of 
204 Ibid. 
205 City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). 
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preservationists. Even with RFRA declared unconstitutional, religious freedom rights have 
been confirmed a time-honored foe. 
The 1923 mission style St. Peter Catholic Church located in the historic district of 
Boerne, Texas sparked a Supreme Court case and established Free Exercise case law 
precedent. Due to its inability to accommodate its parishioners, the parish decided to enlarge 
its structure. “Both the city and the parish were growing rapidly, and the church regularly 
had to turn away 40 to 60 parishioners for the 11:00 a.m. Sunday Mass. In response to the 
206 Id., Sherbert v. Verner.
Figure 11 
Interior view of St. Peter Catholic 
Church in Boerne, Texas.
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overcrowding, the Archbishop of San Antonio, P.F. Flores, approved an expansion plan.”207
The 1993 plan included a complete rehabilitation that would consequently remove much of 
the Church’s authenticity. Meanwhile, the Boerne City Council passed Ordinance 91-05208
that authorized the city's Historic Landmark Commission to create historic districts and 
identify individual buildings as landmarks. This required that any changes to the structure be 
approved by the Historic Landmark Commission.  
 The earliest conflict centered on the actual boundaries of the Historic District. 
This was quickly solved by ensuring that the boundaries were redrawn. “Any dispute as to 
the actual boundaries of the City Historic District, as to whether the church was within the 
207Jared Roberts. “City of Boerne v. Flores and the United States of America: Congress Versus the Court in a 
Struggle Over Free Exercise: Will Employment Division v. Smith Survive?” Found at 
http://www.dcl.edu/lawrev/98-4/roberts.htm. 
Figure 12 
Exterior view of St. Peter Catholic 
Church in Boerne, Texas. 
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district or not, were de facto answered when the City amended the boundaries of the 
Historic District to include the entire church structure.”209 The next issue arose when the 
Church filed a building permit that would “completely gut the church building, destroying 
the building itself, save for the distinctive mission-style façade.”210 This permit was rejected 
and a suit was filed by Archbishop Flores alleging that the preservation ordinance was 
unconstitutional and violated RFRA.211  After the Solicitor General intervened on the 
Church’s side to uphold the constitutionality of RFRA, the Senior District Judge, Lucius D. 
Bunton held RFRA unconstitutional. “The Court is cognizant of Congress' Authority under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, yet it is convinced of Congress' violation of the 
doctrine of Separation of Powers by intruding on the power and duty of the judiciary.”212
Congress reshuffled the separation of powers and assumed power it was not delegated. 
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part. They 
concluded that RFRA was constitutional because the judiciary's authority to interpret the 
Constitution was not removed. Instead, the new legislation created new protections in 
addition to the constitutional rights already recognized by the courts. The Supreme Court 
felt differently and deemed RFRA unconstitutional in a 6 to 3 decision. Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Kennedy began by defining the core issue: “the 
parties disagree over whether RFRA is a proper exercise of Congress' §5 power "to enforce" 
by "appropriate legislation" the constitutional guarantee that no State shall deprive any 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Flores v. City Of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996).
212 Flores v. City Of Boerne SA-94-CA-0421 (1995).  
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person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" nor deny any person "equal 
protection of the laws."“213
 The Court began the intricate process of delineating the issues by considering 
Congress’s intent and method exercised when enacting the RFRA. The Court deduced that 
when enacting RFRA, Congress relied on §1 of the 14th Amendment which states in part that 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.214
The safeguard that the state cannot deprive a person of these rights was coupled with §5 that 
states “the Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions 
of this article.”215 This empowers Congress to enforce the guarantees of §1. Although the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that RFRA was constitutional, the Supreme 
Court ruled otherwise. The Justices felt that the enforcement power conferred to the 
Congress was improperly applied and consequentially traversed the visible as well as invisible 
lines that entail the separation of powers. “RFRA is not a proper exercise of Congress' §5 
enforcement power because it contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of 
powers and the federal state balance.”216 Justice Scalia concurring in part, with whom Justice 
Stevens joined, wrote:
The issue presented by Smith is, quite simply, whether the people, through 
their elected representatives, or rather this Court, shall control the outcome 
213 Id., City of Boerne v. Flores (1997). 
214 “U.S. Constitution: Fourteenth Amendment – Rights Guaranteed Privileges and Immunities of Citizenship, 
Due Process and Equal Protection Amendment Text.” Found at 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendment14/.
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of those concrete cases. For example, shall it be the determination of this 
Court, or ratherof the people, whether (as the dissent apparently believes) 
church construction will be exempt from zoning laws? The historical 
evidence put forward by the dissent does nothing to undermine the 
conclusion we reached in Smith: It shall be the people.217
The question before the Court centered on the issue of whether or not RFRA was deemed 
enforcement legislation under the 14th Amendment. If RFRA was characterized as 
enforcement legislation under the 14th Amendment, this triggered the question of whether 
Congress exceeded its constitutional power.  
RFRA's most serious shortcoming, however, lies in the fact that it is so out 
of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be 
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional 
behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in 
constitutional protections, proscribing state conduct that the Fourteenth 
Amendment itself does not prohibit. Its sweeping coverage ensures its 
intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting 
official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter.  
The answer was yes. The Court found that Congress’ enactment of RFRA was substantive 
rather than remedial. The problem, as Justice Kennedy explains is that the legislation not 
only enforces the Clause, but also changes the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. 
“Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is.”218 Kennedy 
admits that the “line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and 
measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern.”219
Though difficult to discern, the line exists. Kennedy explains that “there must be a 
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the 
means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive 
in operation and effect.”220 This was the issue the Court dealt with. Congress does not have a 
217 Ibid. 
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substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment. If it did, the 
Constitution would be subverted and Congress would reign. As Kennedy stated, “under this 
approach, it is difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit congressional power.”221
RFRA was deemed an intrusion too large to permit – RFRA was held unconstitutional as it 
applied to the states, concluding that it exceeded Congress's enforcement powers under § 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Stevens concurred that RFRA violated the First Amendment. He also placed 
the backlash against Smith in context. He gave a great example. 
If the historic landmark on the hill in Boerne happened to be a museum or 
an art gallery owned by an atheist, it would not be eligible for an exemption 
from the city ordinances that forbid an enlargement of the structure. Because 
the landmark is owned by the Catholic Church, it is claimed that RFRA gives 
its owner a federal statutory entitlement to an exemption from a generally 
applicable, neutral civil law. Whether the Church would actually prevail under 
the statute or not, the statute has provided the Church with a legal weapon 
that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This governmental preference for 
religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment.222
Boerne v. Flores breathed life into the historic preservation field. It reopened the door closed 
by RFRA on the preservation of religious landmarks. The optimism was fueled in part by 
the long anticipated voice from above – not from the heavens, but from the Supreme Court 
that held RFRA was unconstitutional because it trenched too hard on state sovereignty to 
regulate to promote the public welfare and because it transgressed the separation of power 
doctrine by trying to change first amendment principles that the US Constitution had 
articulated in the Employment decision. The Supreme Court ruling was expected to be the 
guide that would establish some uniformity in the arena of historic preservation and freedom 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid. 
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of religion cases. The Boerne much needed boost to the historic preservation field was 
heeded.  The Post-Boerne era began with a small victory for historic preservation. 
73
VI.    P  o  s  t   -   B  o  e  r  n  e
The 1998 Metropolitan Baptist Church v. District of Columbia Department of Consumer and 
Regulatory Affairs223 case culminated in a small victory for preservation. The Church claimed 
that its rights under the Free Exercise Clause and the RFRA were violated when the District 
of Columbia Historic Preservation Review Board refused its request to have a public hearing 
continuance.
The District of Columbia Historic Preservation Review Board established the 
Greater Fourteenth Street Historic District after the Logan Circle Community Association 
petitioned for designation. “According to the application, the area possessed unique 
historical and architectural characteristics related to the development of 14th Street, N.W., as 
a transportation corridor.”224 The appellant, Metropolitan Baptist Church, owned five 
rowhouses in the area located between 1701 and 1711 13th Street, N.W. The application 
described these rowhouses as “multi-storied brick buildings with multi-storied polygonal 
bays, corbelled cornices, stringcourses and other decorative brickwork."225 Significantly, the 
Church’s actual house of worship is not included in the historic district boundaries but is 
located nearby. A sixth property, also owned by the Church, is included in the district but 
not in the suit.  
According to the statement given by Reverend Dr. H. Beecher Hicks, Jr., the pastor 
of Metropolitan Baptist Church, the first rowhouse was acquired by the Church in 1939. He 
explained that currently, the rowhouses were used by the Church for their Church-related 
functions. Specifically, the “five properties provided space for a variety of church projects 
223 Metropolitan Baptist Church v. District of Columbia Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, 718 A.2d 119 
(D.C. App. 1998). 
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including a pre-school, a Sunday school, food and clothing distribution centers, and self-help 
classes.”226 Hicks explained that the properties were imperative to the fulfillment of the 
Church’s “Vision 2000” goals which included expansion of their ministry by building new 
structures where the five rowhouses currently exist. He stated: 
The church had incurred a debt of approximately two million dollars in 
connection with the five rowhouses, and a bank had secured the properties 
as collateral. Members of the church community would not have invested in 
these properties over the decades if they had anticipated that their plans 
would be ‘so unjustly and unreasonably thwarted’ by historic designation.227
With this background, the Court delved into ascertaining whether the District of Columbia 
Historic Preservation Review Board abused its authority and violated the Church’s rights. 
The Church believed that the designation would slow the Vision 2000 plan by 
requiring certain permits. They contend that the designation would impede their ability to 
renovate the rowhouses and thus unconstitutionally burden the church's free-exercise rights. 
“Because the rowhouses have been designated historic, however, the church would be 
required to comply with various permit procedures before it could begin renovations as part 
of its Vision 2000 plan.”228 Because the Church established the case depending on what 
might happen in the future, the Trial Court decided that the Church’s free exercise rights 
were not burdened because the issue was not ripe yet.  “The historic designation did not 
interfere with the church's current use of the properties for its social programs, and, as for 
the Vision 2000 plan, the church had not even tried to apply for a permit to alter or 
demolish the properties as it wishes.”229
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The trial court also concluded that the designation of the district and the inclusion of 
the Church’s rowhouses were without problem. On the issue of First Amendment rights, the 
trial court found that the claim was not ripe. 
With respect to the church's religious-freedom claims, the court held that 
they were not ripe for adjudication because (1) there was no evidence that 
the church's current use of the rowhouses was impeded by the historic 
designation and (2) the church's future plans for the properties were not yet 
impeded because the church was free to apply for a permit to alter or 
demolish them, and such a permit might well be granted.230
The Church appealed this decision and Associate Judge Steadman delivered the opinion. 
Steadman agreed with the Trial Court decision that the Board “did not abuse its 
discretion or otherwise err in the denial of the motion.”231 RFRA was not pivotal in the 
appeal as evidenced by the Church’s tactical switch since the Superior Court ruling. Due to 
the Supreme Court's 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,232 the Church focused their case 
on proving that it was ripe for adjudication. Regarding the ripeness issue, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. Judge Steadman explained that ”in 
any event, we are not persuaded that the particular record before us, even with the stricken 
exhibits, presents the question of unconstitutional burden in a sufficiently concrete factual 
form to ensure that a definitive constitutional ruling at this point would not be premature.” 
The 1998 City of Ypsilanti v. First Presbyterian Church233 case was the second post-Boerne
era victory for historic preservation. The Michigan Court of Appeals applied the standards of 
Smith, Boerne, and Saint Bartholomew’s Church to reject the Church’s claim of First Amendment 
infringement.  
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Figure 14 
The Towner House pre-restoration 
in Ypsilanti, Michigan. 
Figure 15
The Towner House post-restoration in
Ypsilanti, Michigan.
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The Church purchased the “Towner House” in 1972. The property was built in 1837 
and “represents the earliest example of post-log cabin living by settlers in the area.”234 The 
Towner House became part of a Historic District as created by the Ypsilanti Historic 
District Ordinance in 1978. Even before the designation, the Church planned to demolish 
the structure. “Ironically, it could have then done so, but it instead acceded to the wishes of 
preservationists who were, as it turns out, unable or unwilling to move the building.”235 The 
Church concluded that their attempt to deal with the preservationists was fair but 
unfortunately failed and resumed their original plans to demolish the structure by applying 
for the necessary permits. Ypsilanti denied two applications for demolition of the historic log 
cabin to make room for a parking lot. “Counterdefendants, through a succession of leases 
with defendant, organized in an attempt to forestall defendant's decision because of the 
Towner House's historical and architectural value.”236 The Church felt that the treatment 
they received was unfair, especially in light of their original attempts to work with the 
preservationists. They claim that 
After the designation, the necessary permits for the planned demolition were 
not only denied, but the church was required by the city to expend 
considerable amounts of scarce money to repair the building – a structure for 
which it had no particular use. In short, the city has forced the church to 
spend significant funds to repair a building it does not want.237
The second denial was appealed to the State Historic Review Board which agreed with the 
Historic Preservation Commission’s decision.
The First Presbyterian Church argued that the City of Ypsilanti burdened its free 
exercise of religion rights under the RFRA. Due to RFRA’s invalidation in City of Boerne v 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid. 
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Flores238  the Court used the standard of review established in Employment Division v. Smith239
The Court believed that even buildings with religious uses are subject to generally applicable 
laws. The Court also believed that the Church’s rights were not infringed upon specifically, 
rendering the law neutral and generally applicable. “Here, the ordinance applies to all 
building owners within the historic district without distinction. Thus, the ordinance is a 
facially neutral, generally applicable law requiring only minimal review to determine that 
prohibiting the exercise of religion is not the object of the ordinance but merely the 
incidental effect.”240 The court believed that the burdens, if there were any, were incidental in 
nature. The Court gave an example. “If allocating funds in defendant's budget for renovation 
of the Towner House would decrease the funds available for other areas of defendant's 
mission, this effect does not indicate that the ordinance singles out defendant for differential 
treatment.”241 The Court was confident that the burdens, incidental in nature, did not replace 
the authority of the Church with the goals of historic preservation. The Washtenaw Circuit 
stated:
Although defendant's control of its financial resources may be fundamental 
to its free exercise of religion, the ordinance in question here does not 
directly force defendant into refraining from spending money in certain 
areas, such as outreach to the community….Thus, the ordinance in this case 
does not give the historic preservation commission authority over 
defendant's ecclesiastical decisions. In short, the ordinance is a law of general 
application which does not burden defendant any more than other 
citizens, let alone burden defendant because of its religious beliefs. 242
The Court made it clear, through the use of Smith in St. Bartholomew’s and Boerne, that the 
ordinance, as applied to all properties in the historic district, is facially neutral and generally. 
238 Id., Boerne v Flores (1997). 
239 Id., Employment Division v Smith (1990). 
240 Id., City of Ypsilanti v. First Presbyterian Church.
241 Ibid.
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The Church’s contention that the Ordinance was equivalent to a taking was also 
rejected. “The fact that the ordinance in this case affects defendant more severely than 
others does not itself result in ‘taking’. Historical preservation benefits all the citizenry both 
economically and by improving the overall quality of life in Ypsilanti.”243 The Church’s 
contention that the Historic District Commission abused its power was also rejected. The 
Church claimed that the demolition of the Church would have been granted if any of the 
following conditions existed: 
(1) The resource constitutes a hazard to the safety of the public or the occupants. 
(2) The resource is a deterrent to a major improvement program that will be of 
      substantial benefit to the community. 
(3) Retaining the resource will cause undue financial hardship to the owner. 
(4) Retaining the resource is not in the interest of the majority of the community.244
242 Ibid. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid., Historic District Ordinance, art 2, ch 55, § 5.334(3).  See MCL 399.205(5); MSA 5.3407(5)(5). 
Figure 13 
First Presbyterian Church in 
Ypsilanti, Michigan. 
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The Court again reaffirmed the denial of the demolition permit and confirmed that these 
conditions did not exist. The Michigan Court of Appeals applied the established standards in 
Smith, Boerne, and Saint Bartholomew’s Church. Using these standards, the Court of Appeals 
rejected the Church’s claim of First Amendment infringement. Unfortunately, the historic 
preservation victories are short lived.
 The Diocese of Toledo v. Toledo City-Lucas County Plan Commissions245 began as another 
step forward in the progression of historic preservation but on Appeal, succumbed to 
“appellant's constitutional arguments [that were] rendered moot and found not well-
taken.”246 The Lucas County Court of Common Pleas found that the denial of permission to 
demolish a house in an historic district to establish a parking lot did not burden the Diocese 
of Toledo’s First Amendment Rights but the Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed the 
decision. The judgment was reversed again in favor of the Diocese of Toledo.  
 The Diocese of Toledo purchased a house in the historic district of the Old West 
End, Toledo, Ohio in January 1996.247 Justice Knepper explained that “the house was 
purchased for $ 17,500. Prior to closing, appellant authorized the removal of interior leaded 
and stained glass windows and french doors. Also removed from the residence were exterior 
windows; however, there is no evidence that appellant authorized their removal.”248  After 
receiving two public nuisance notices, the Church applied for a Certificate of 
Appropriateness to demolish the house and build a parking lot.249 The Old West End 
Historic District Commission denied the certificates and the Trial Court agreed. The 
incorporation of the house in the Historic District, though in need of repairs, still 
245 Diocese of Toledo v. Toledo City-Lucas County Plan Commissions, No. L-98-1150 (Ohio App.1999). 
246 Ibid. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Ibid. 
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contributed to the overall character of the neighborhood. “The structure does maintain the 
character of the historic district. It is considered a gabled cottage style house in the book 
American Vernacular Design.”250
 The Diocese appealed the Trial Court’s decision which they believe “erred in 
affirming the decision of the Toledo City-Lucas County Plan Commission, denying a 
Certificate of Appropriateness to permit the Diocese of Toledo to demolish the property."251
The Diocese explained that the retention of the house was a financial burden that impinged 
on their ability to promote their charitable activities. The Diocese tried to establish that other 
means of disposing of the liability were investigated. They explained that they searched for 
investors.
It is the appraiser's understanding that the purchase price for the subject was 
$17,500 this coupled with a renovation cost of 110% of the estimate or 
$37,100 results in a total of $54,600. With [a] ‘When Completed’ value of 
$59,000, the estimated margin for a proposed developer would be less than 
ten percent. This is not adequate to attract a developer and realistically the 
project must be viewed as not feasible.252
The Trial Court entertained different appraiser estimates for repair. Other evidence was 
introduced that the property was so dilapidated that even repair was not feasible. “The 
property has so severely deteriorated over the past year through obvious abuse and neglect, 
that sadly, it cannot be economically restored today.”253  The Trial Court concluded that 
based on this evidence, denial of the demolition permit did not amount to an undue burden. 
The Court found that the method in which the Toledo City-Lucas County Plan 
250 Ibid. 
251 Ibid. 
252 Ibid. 
253 Ibid., Panel’s Report statement by Art St. John, Associate Broker for The Salsberry Company.  
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Commissions derived their decision “was supported by the preponderance of substantial, 
reliable, and probative evidence.”254
The Court of Appeals contributed additional information which introduced evidence 
debunking the Diocese’s position regarding the potential economic use of the property.  “At 
the time of the Diocese’s application, there was a reasonable economic use for the structure, 
rehabilitation by Neighborhood’s in Partnership was economically sound, and the NIP 
offered a feasible and prudent alternative to demolition.”255 Significantly, the Court found 
that “if appellant established that there was no reasonable economic return for the structure 
and rehabilitation was not economically sound, then it was irrelevant, and appellant did not 
need to prove, whether the structure contained features of architectural or historic 
significance, contributed to maintaining the character of the historic district, or whether 
there was a feasible and prudent alternative to demolition.”256 The Court concluded that the 
estimates of rehabilitation and overall cost to the Diocese were too much.  “We find as a 
matter of law that based on the economic information available at the time of the 
application, and the testimony from renovation experts and appraisers…the amount of gain 
after renovation could not earn a reasonable economic return.”257 The Court thus concluded 
that the Diocese should have been granted the demolition permit. “We find that the 
preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence establishes that appellant has 
met its burden.”258 The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas was reversed 
and the goals of historic preservation undermined yet again. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Ibid. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Ibid. 
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The First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Historic District Commission of the Town of Ridgefield259
can be considered another notch in the belt of historic preservation. The Church followed 
procedures to reclad their structure with vinyl siding instead of painting, an intensive 
procedure that would have to be intermittently repeated. Because of its location within an 
historic district, the applications for a Certificate of Appropriateness to allow the installation 
of vinyl siding on its church building were denied. The Church filed suit claiming that this 
denial to utilize the vinyl material on their structure violated their right to free exercise. The 
Appellate Court affirmed and adopted the decision of the lower court by applying the Smith
analysis. Furthermore, the Court reiterated the importance of Historic Preservation and its 
legitimacy as a use of police power. The Church believed that the Historic District 
Commission decision should be reversed for two reasons: “should be reversed because it 
improperly (1) relied on undefined aesthetic considerations in denying its application for a 
certificate of appropriateness and (2) burdened its free exercise of religion.” 260
Justice Mihalakos delivered the opinion. He explained that vinyl siding as a material 
was investigated by the Historic District Commission and deduced to be an inappropriate 
material. “The record before the commission reflects that the plaintiff's proposal to ‘reclad’ 
its church with vinyl siding does not fall within the scope of “ordinary maintenance or 
repair.””261 The Church claimed the motivation for the used of vinyl was its need to repair 
the structure. Unfortunately, the application of this material would harm the structure more 
than help and in effect destroy some of its authenticity. “The record reveal[ed] that the 
application of vinyl siding on the church [would] create a loss of trim detail, cause a 
substitution of V-groove for tongue in groove siding and change the clapboard width and 
259 First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Historic District Commission of the Town of Ridgefield, 738 A.2d 224 (1998).
260 Ibid. 
261 Ibid. 
84
shine.”262 Along with the loss of authenticity that would incur because of these changes, the 
material is foreign and not within the realm of general repair, hence requiring the Certificate 
of Appropriateness from the Historic District Commission. “Since the plaintiff is not 
proposing to reapply or restore the existing material, i.e., a coat of paint, the plaintiff's 
proposal falls outside the scope of "ordinary repair."”263
The Church claimed that the true issue is merely an aesthetic consideration. Even 
though the Connecticut case law has not defined the importance of aesthetic considerations, 
the Court reaffirmed that aesthetic control is legitimate. Justice Mihalakos cited “As for the 
plaintiff’s contention that the commission abused its discretion by exceeding the bounds of 
permissible aesthetic considerations, our Supreme Court has stated that aesthetic 
considerations are valid in land use regulation.”264  The Church claimed that the Historic 
District Commission acted illegally and arbitrarily by not providing a fair hearing by 
262 Ibid. 
263 Ibid. 
264 Ibid., Quoting Figarsky v. Historic District Commission, 368 A.2d 163 (1976). 
Figure 16  
Exterior view of First Church of Christ 
Scientist in Ridgefield, Connecticut. 
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essentially predetermining that vinyl siding was not appropriate thus precluding the option of 
granting a Certificate of Appropriateness. They state that “no applications for Certificates of 
Appropriateness to install vinyl siding have ever been granted by the commission.”265
The Church claimed that the process and ultimate rejection of the Certificate of 
Appropriateness as part of the historical district regulations burdened its right of Free 
Exercise. The Connecticut Superior Court answered by reasserting the legitimacy of historic 
preservation. “The Supreme Court has recognized that the preservation of a historical area 
or landmark falls within the meaning of general welfare and, consequently, the police 
power.”266 The Court found that the laws applied to the Church were within the scope of the 
state's police power. Quoting from Employment Division v. Smith267, the Court said “the first 
amendment cannot be extended to such an extent that a claim of exemption from the laws 
based on religious freedom can be extended to avoid otherwise reasonable and neutral legal 
265 Ibid. 
266 Ibid., Quoting from Figarsky v. Historical District Commission, supra, 171 Conn. 208.
Figure 17
Interior view of First Church of Christ 
Scientist in Ridgefield, Connecticut. 
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obligations imposed by government.”268 In this case, the Court was able to look beyond the 
claims and legitimize the historic preservation discipline as well as deduce that in this case, 
the implications of preservation did not equate to diminishing the rights to of the plaintiff to 
assemble or express their religious views. Justice Mihalakos opined that the Free Exercise 
rights of the First Church of Christ were not violated and the plaintiff’s appeal was 
dismissed.
267 Id., Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).   
268 Id., First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Historic District Commission.
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VII. R e l i g i o u s    L a n d    U s e    I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d
P e r s o n s    A c t
The invalidation of RFRA and the multiple post-Boerne historic preservation victories 
placed religious rights groups on edge. RFRA’s attempt to restore the standard of strict 
scrutiny was invalidated by the Court which deemed that Congress was only permitted to 
develop laws that would enforce the standard of protection as opposed to establish new, 
stricter standards, as attempted by RFRA. In 1998 and 1999, Congress again attempted to 
implement a guide by enacting the Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA). The bill would 
have established: 
a ‘strict scrutiny’ test for state and local laws that infringe on the free 
exercise of religion. The new standard [would require]... that such laws 
must further a ‘compelling interest’ by ‘the least restrictive means.’ 
Under current law, state and local governments must prove only a 
‘rational relationship’ to the government’s interest. To trigger a claim 
against a state or local government under the [proposed] bill, an 
individual must demonstrate that the government ‘substantially 
burdened’ his freedom of religion and places the burden of proof on 
the government.269
The Act failed due to the Commerce Clause connection.  RLPA would have “prohibited a 
State from placing a substantial burden upon a person’s religious exercise under the 
following conditions: (1) in a State-operated program or activity that receives Federal 
financial assistance; or (2) in or affecting international or interstate commerce."270 The Act 
failed to get support and also received negative press. While protecting one freedom, 
religious freedom, the Act would have negatively affected children in child abuse and neglect 
cases.
269 “Religious Freedom Restoration Acts.” Found at http://www.religioustolerance.org/rfra3.htm. 
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RLPA could have devastating effects for children whose parents disapprove 
of medical treatment due to religious beliefs. Parents could use RLPA as a 
defense for withholding needed medical care from their children or engaging 
in other child abuse or neglect if they cite religion as their reason for doing 
so. Therefore, a person could use the federal law as a defense in court against 
state or local child abuse or neglect charges.271
In 2000, to quell nervous feelings, President Clinton signed the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)272 into law after passing Congress almost 
unanimously. RLUIPA directly addressed the issues of zoning and landmarking and was 
established to settle what religious entities declared outrageous discrimination at the hands of 
land use regulations. It was carefully crafted to withstand claims of unconstitutionality by 
incorporating limits. RLUIPA protects religion through the Spending and Commerce Clause 
and did not rely, as did RFRA, on the Free Exercise Clause.
The Act reestablished the pre-Smith standard of demonstrating a burden by 
specifically reinstating the two-part analysis. The Act states:  
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner 
that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, 
including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government 
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or 
institution—
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that    
compelling governmental interest.273
270 Thomas, Legislative Information on the Internet, Bill Summary & Status on H.R. 4019 & S. 2148 (Aug. 29, 
2001). Found at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery. 
271 “Religious Liberty Protection Act: Possible Danger to Children.” September 9, 1999. Found at 
http://www.aap.org/advocacy/washing/rlpa9_99.htm. 
272 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 USCA § 2000cc. Found at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/rluipa.htm.  
273 Ibid. 
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RLUIPA clearly allows for a wide range of applicants and reinforces the protection of 
religious entities by bolstering the arsenals of religious organizations and solidifying their 
chances when disputing zoning and landmarking laws. The law defined land use regulation 
as a “zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a 
claimant’s use or development of land (including a structure affixed to land), if the claimant 
has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property interest in the regulated 
land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest.”274 Specifically, RLUIPA defined 
religious exercise as including “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or 
central to, a system of religious belief.”275 RLUIPA also specified what the use or building 
meant. “The use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious 
exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or 
intends to use the property for that purpose.”276 A religious institution utilizing RLUIPA as a 
defense would still be required to initially prove that a burden exists. The burden of proof 
next shifts to the government that initiated the law and must prove that the burden furthers 
the government interest by the least restrictive means. 
RLUIPA, as described in the text, addressed its broad construction but also 
delineated several restrictions. “This chapter shall be construed in favor of a broad 
protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this 
chapter and the Constitution.”277 To avoid future claims, RLUIPA’s scope was limited to 
cases in which: 
274 Ibid.
275 Ibid. 
276 Ibid. 
277 Ibid. 
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(A) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives 
Federal financial assistance, even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability;
(B) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden 
would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or 
with Indian tribes, even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability; or 
(C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use 
regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a government 
makes, or has in place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit 
the government to make, individualized assessments of the proposed uses for 
the property involved.278
RLUIPA draws support from financial assistance under the Spending Clause listed in Part A, 
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause in Part B, and §5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Part C. RLUIPA is still in its infancy and still very susceptible to invalidation. 
The land use cases that have utilized RLUIPA have either validated the constitutionality of 
the Act, invalidated its application, or are still pending. The overwhelming majority of its 
application, however, has been related to institutionalized persons. “Although to date most 
of the litigation under RLUIPA has involved the religious exercise claims of prisoners, the 
statute provides a powerful tool for faith-based groups and religious property owners 
engaged in land use disputes with local government entities.”279
Between 2002 and 2004, RLUIPA has steadily gained ground. Four federal courts of 
appeal have upheld the constitutionality of RLUIPA.  The cases include Mayweathers v. 
Newland,280 Charles v. Verhagen,281 Madison v. Riter,282 and Midrash Sephardi Inc. v. Town of 
Surfside.283  In November 2003, however, the consistency and momentum of RLUIPA was 
278 Ibid. 
279 Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (2002). 
280 Ibid.
281 Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (2003). 
282 Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (2003). 
283 Midrash Sephardi Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214 (2004).  
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disrupted by the decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson.284 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit held RLUIPA unconstitutional and reversed and remanded the decision 
reached by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. 
Approximately one year later on October 12, 2004, the United States Supreme Court granted 
a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court opinion is still pending. 
The 2002 Mayweathers v. Newland285 case was initiated by several California Muslim 
state prisoners that claimed that their inability to attend a Friday afternoon religious service, 
known as Jumu'ah, violated their rights under RLUIPA. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit agreed. Senior Circuit Judge D. W. Nelson delivered the opinion of a 
unanimous Court. He stated that RLUIPA “intends a secular legislative purpose - to protect 
the exercise of religion in institutions from unwarranted and substantial infringement.”286
The Court determined that Congress did not exceed its Spending Clause power when 
enacting RLUIPA and that its legislative purpose was legitimate and ultimately promoted 
general welfare. Nelson stated that “protecting religious worship in institutions from 
substantial and illegitimate burdens does promote the general welfare. By ensuring that 
governments do not act to burden the exercise of religion in institutions, RLUIPA is clearly 
in line with this positive constitutional value. Moreover, by fostering non-discrimination, 
RLUIPA follows a long tradition of federal legislation designed to guard against unfair bias 
and infringement on fundamental freedoms.”287 The Court upheld RLUIPA. Significantly, 
the Court also addressed the Smith ruling:
284 Cutter v.  Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (2003).   
285 Id., Mayweathers v. Newland (2002).
286 Ibid.
287 Ibid. 
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RLUIPA does not erroneously review or revise a specific ruling of the 
Supreme Court because the statute does not overturn the Court’s 
constitutional interpretation in Smith….Rather, RLUIPA provides additional 
protection for religious worship, respecting that Smith set only a 
constitutional floor—not a ceiling—for the protection of personal liberty. 
Smith explicitly left heightened legislative protection for religious worship to 
the political branches.288
The Court found that the statute carried out the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First 
Amendment’s requirement that religious practices be reasonably accommodated. Examples 
of religious practices that prisons have attempted to prevent, and which are protected by 
RLUIPA are receiving religious texts, Muslim inmates being forced to handle pork, Catholic 
prisoners wearing a crucifix, and Christian prisoners receiving communion wine or Jewish 
prisoners maintaining a kosher diet. 289  While the statute affected religious worship, it was 
not deemed unconstitutional because it did not provide any corresponding protections to 
secular activities or non-religious prisoners. 
The next federal appeals court to address RLUIPA was the 2003 Charles v. Verhagen290
case which, incidentally, also involved prisoners. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision reached by the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Wisconsin. The case involved Jerry Charles, a Muslim prisoner at the 
Oshkosh Correctional Institution in Oshkosh, Wisconsin. He claimed that his inability to 
obtain prayer oils violated his rights under RLUIPA. “According to Muslim practices, 
Charles prays five times a day and undergoes ritual cleansing or purification, in part to 
288 Ibid.
289 “Constitutionality of RLUIPA to be Reviewed by the Supreme Court.” Found at 
www.rluipa.com/cases/CutterSC.html. 
290 Id., Charles v. Verhagen (2003).
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eliminate offensive body odors prior to prayer. This ritual cleansing often involves the 
application of fragrant prayer oil.”291
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the finding 
of constitutionality in Mayweathers v. Newland.292 Circuit Judge Bauer reaffirmed that it was 
within the scope of Congress to create safeguards for prisoners’ religious rights and to 
promote the rehabilitation of prisoners. This pursuit was clearly within Congress’ pursuit of 
the general welfare under its Spending Clause authority and was not considered an 
advancement of religion. “The requirements of RLUIPA cannot fairly be said to amount to 
government advancement of religion through the government’s own activities or 
influence…The statute does not promote religious indoctrination, nor does it guarantee 
prisoners unfettered religious rights, and not every challenge under RLUIPA will be deemed 
valid.”293 For the second time, the Court found that RLUIPA did not violate the 
Establishment Clause. It was upheld as a valid exercise of Congress’ Spending Clause 
authority.
In 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard Madison v. 
Riter.294 Ira Madison, a prisoner at the Virginia's Buckingham Correctional Center, and a 
Hebrew Israelite, brought suit claiming that his inability to follow his special religious dietary 
needs violated RLUIPA. He claimed that his inability to maintain a kosher diet defined by 
the Virginia Department of Corrections as a ‘common fare diet’ violated his rights as a 
prisoner. On January 23, 2003, the U.S. District Court Judge James C. Turk held that the 
provision had an impermissible effect of advancing religion under the second prong of the 
Lemon test. “Because we find that Congress can accommodate religion in section 3 of 
291 Ibid. 
292 Id., Mayweathers v. Newland (2002). 
293 Id., Charles v. Verhagen (2003). 
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RLUIPA without violating the Establishment Clause, we reverse. To hold otherwise and find 
an Establishment Clause violation would severely undermine the ability of our society to 
accommodate the most basic rights of conscience and belief in neutral yet constructive 
ways.”295 Section 3 of RLUIPA was held unconstitutional on the basis that it offered greater 
legislative protection for the religious rights of prisoners than for other fundamental rights.
On December 8, 2003, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
unanimously overturned the decision reached by the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Virginia. Circuit Judge Wilkinson, writing the opinion of the Court, again upheld 
RLUIPA and specified how it was constitutional under each prong of the Lemon test. 
According to Wilkinson, RLUIPA passed the secular purpose prong. “This secular goal of 
exempting religious exercise from regulatory burdens in a neutral fashion, as distinguished 
from advancing religion in any sense, is indeed permissible under the Establishment Clause. 
To be sure, Congress has no constitutional duty to remove or to mitigate the government-
imposed burdens on prisoners’ religious exercise. But the Supreme Court has held that 
Congress may choose to reduce government-imposed burdens on specific fundamental 
rights when it sees it appropriate.”296 Similarly, RLUIPA was not found to promote an 
impermissible effect by enacting a statute that reduces burdens on religious exercise while 
not considering other burdens. “There is no requirement that legislative protections for 
fundamental rights march in lockstep. The mere fact that RLUIPA seeks to lift government 
burdens on a prisoner's religious exercise does not mean that the statute must provide 
commensurate protections for other fundamental rights.”297 Finally, RLUIPA was not 
determined to create an excessive entanglement. Wilkinson commented that in fact, 
294 Id., Madison v. Riter (2003). 
295 Ibid. 
296 Ibid. 
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RLUIPA does the opposite. “RLUIPA itself minimizes the likelihood of entanglement 
through its carefully crafted enforcement provisions.”298 Madison was the third federal court 
of appeal case raising RLUIPA and the third to declare its validity.   
In the 1999 Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Surfside299 case, Surfside sought to enjoin Midrash 
Sephardi and Young Israel of Bal Harbor, two small Orthodox Jewish congregations from 
meeting on the second floor of a bank building in Surfside’s B-1 zoned district. In a 
unanimous decision on April 21, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit issued a stay of the lower court injunction. In an opinion written by Circuit Judge 
Wilson, the Court held that “Surfside improperly targeted religious assemblies and violated 
Free Exercise requirements of neutrality and general applicability.”300 The Court warned that 
“while merely the mention of church or synagogue in a zoning code does not destroy a 
zoning code’s neutrality, we must nevertheless be mindful of the potential for impermissible 
‘religious gerrymanders,’ which may render a zoning code operatively non-neutral.”301 The 
Court rejected the notion that the Surfside ordinance violated RLUIPA by substantially 
burdening congregations and found, instead, that Surfside violated RLUIPA’s equal terms 
provision. Surfside’s exclusionary practice that disallowed churches and synagogues from an 
area in which it allowed private clubs and lodges was deemed impermissible. The Court also 
ruled that RLUIPA was constitutional. “RLUIPA’s core policy is not to regulate the states or 
compel their enforcement of a federal regulatory program, but to protect the exercise of 
religion, a valid exercise of Congress’s § 5 power under the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
297 Ibid. 
298 Ibid. 
299 Id., Midrash Sephardi Inc. v. Town of Surfside (2004). 
300 Ibid. 
301 Ibid. 
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does not run afoul of the Tenth Amendment's protection of the principles of federalism.”302
Midrash was the final case that ruled in favor of RLUIPA. The next case, Cutter v. 
Wilkinson,303 which was actually heard before Midrash on November 7, 2003, halted 
RLUIPA’s momentum and declared it unconstitutional.  
The federal courts of appeal track record including the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits seemed steady and positive until the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Cutter v. 
Wilkinson. The Sixth Circuit consolidated three cases involving the Ohio Department of 
Rehabilitation and Corrections including Cutter v. Wilkinson,304 Gerhardt v. Lazaroff,305 and 
Miller v. Wilkinson.306 The plaintiffs were prisoners in the Ohio State penitentiary system. 
They each practiced what are generally considered unconventional religions including Asatru, 
a religion followed by Vikings, Jesus Christ Christian religion, which promoted the 
separation of races, and finally Wiccan and Satanism.307 They claimed that their rights under 
RLUIPA were violated by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections because 
they claim that that the prison did not allow them sufficient access to religious literature as 
well as the ability to conduct services.  
On November 7, 2003, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Ronald Lee Gilman, the Sixth 
Circuit reversed and remanded the lower court ruling and declared that RLUIPA was 
unconstitutional. RLUIPA was found to violate the Establishment Clause. Prior to RLUIPA, 
prison official restrictions were assessed according to the rational-relationship review which 
included “(1) whether there is a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation 
302 Ibid. 
303 Id., Cutter v. Wilkinson (2003). 
304 Ibid. 
305 Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827 (2002).  
306 Miller v. Wilkinson, No. 02-3299. 
307 “Cutter v. Wilkinson.” Found at http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/case/82.html. 
97
and a legitimate government interest; (2) whether inmates have alternative means of 
exercising the right in question; (3) the impact of a requested accommodation of the right 
upon guards and other inmates; and (4) the absence of alternatives to the regulation.”308
RLUIPA imposed a strict scrutiny standard that placed the burden on officials to prove that 
the restriction or regulation furthered a compelling penological interest and was achieved by 
the least restrictive means. “As is well known from the history of constitutional law, the 
change that RLUIPA imposes is revolutionary, switching from a scheme of deference to one 
of presumptive unconstitutionality.”309 The Court decided that this additional protection 
granted specifically to religious rights rather than to other constitutionally protected rights 
violated the Establishment Clause. “It imposes strict scrutiny where the Establishment 
Clause requires only a rational-relationship review.”310 This highly controversial opinion is 
directly opposed to the recent trend that found RLUIPA constitutional in several federal 
court of appeals cases.
The Supreme Court heard the calls for action and granted a writ of certiorari. On 
October 12, 2004, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cutter v. Wilkinson,
docket number 03-9877, in which it will review the constitutionality of RLUIPA. It is a 
widely anticipated decision that will confirm whether or not Congress violated the 
Establishment Clause when enacting RLUIPA.  
308 Id., Cutter v. Wilkinson (2003). 
309 Ibid. 
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VIII.        T h e   E s t a b l i s h m e n t   C l a u s e
The Establishment Clause trends further exemplify the inconsistency of the courts. 
Beginning in the 1940’s and 1950’s the decisions in Establishment Clause cases have taken 
one of two possible routes. These competing interests still invoke passionate debate. 
Norman Redlich explains that “these approaches – the wall of separation between church 
and state, and the accommodation of religion – continue to dominate the Court’s decisions 
today…Virtually all of the Establishment Clause decisions of the modern Court represent 
one or the other of these approaches. Often, both concerns occur in the same opinion.”311
Establishment Clause jurisprudence begins with the 1899 Bradfield v. Roberts312 case. A strict-
separationist’s nightmare, the Court established that not every form of financial aid, in this 
case a federal construction grant, to religious organizations, in this case a hospital owned by 
a Roman Catholic order, violates the Religion Clauses.   
In 1897 the Commissioners of the District of Columbia made an agreement with 
Providence Hospital, owned and operated by the Sisters of Mercy, whereby the District of 
Columbia would fund the construction of a new building on the existing hospital grounds to 
treat patients with contagious diseases. The plaintiff, Joseph Bradfield, believed that the 
contract between Washington D.C. and the Providence Hospital was illegal because the 
hospital was owned and operated by a Roman Catholic organization. He felt that as a 
taxpayer and a resident of Washington D.C., his First Amendment rights were violated. 
Bradfield believed the funding of the hospital and of its patients indirectly through his tax 
dollars and directly through the established federal appropriation violated the Establishment 
Clause and sued to enjoin the Treasurer of the United States, Ellis H. Roberts, from 
311 Id., Redlich (1999). p. 510. 
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allocating the funds. The District Court agreed that the funding was unconstitutional but the 
Court of Appeals313 reversed the lower court’s ruling that enjoined the Treasurer of the 
United States from paying any money to the Providence Hospital. The Supreme Court voted 
8-to-0 to affirm the Court of Appeals’ ruling. 
 The contract agreed upon between the Commissioners of the District of Columbia 
and the Directors of Providence Hospital signed on August 16 1897, provided that the “said 
building or ward [was] to be erected without expense to said hospital” and that “when [the] 
said building or ward is fully completed, it shall be turned over to the officers of Providence 
hospital.”314 The turn-over stipulated that two thirds of the beds were to be reserved 
specifically for citizens of the District of Columbia. The contract also directed the District of 
Columbia to pay for the use of the beds through the budget dictated and approved by 
Congress. “For each such patient, said Commissioners and their successors in office are to 
pay at the rate of two hundred and fifty dollars per annum, for such a time as such patient 
may be in the hospital, subject to annual appropriations by Congress.”315  The second 
condition was that those patients who had the means to pay for their treatment were allowed 
to seek treatment and pay the Hospital directly for its services. “Such persons will pay to said 
Providence hospital reasonable compensation for such treatment, to be fixed by the hospital 
authorities.”316
The authority to create the contract was contained in the General Appropriation Act 
for the expenses of the District of Columbia and was approved March 3, 1897 under the 
312 Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899). 
313 Bradfield v. Roberts, 12 App. D.C. 453 (1898). 
314 Ibid.
315 Ibid.
316 Ibid.
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general heading of “Health Department.”317 This authority was granted specifically to fulfill a 
need that the City previously tried unsuccessfully to account for. The Act states, in part, that:  
It is a matter of common knowledge that there is no hospital in the District 
for the isolation and proper care of persons suffering from even the ‘minor 
contagious diseases,’ so called in the contract aforesaid; and that all attempts 
heretofore made to meet the imperative demand therefore, through the 
erection of a suitable building by the District itself, have been thwarted by 
the opposition of residents and property owners who feared injury to person 
and property from its location in their neighborhood.318
The District of Columbia’s need for the Hospital outweighed any attempts the citizens made 
to thwart the construction in their neighborhood. The City thus ensured that the General 
Appropriation Act assumed the responsibility for the members of society that could not 
necessarily afford treatment for their diseases. The solution was the agreement with 
Providence Hospital. 
The issue Joseph Bradfield had with the Providence Hospital was that it was a 
“private eleemosynary corporation.”319 It was owned and operated by the Sisters of Charity 
of Emmettsburg, Maryland. It was part of the Roman Catholic Church and was incorporated 
by a special Act of Congress approved April 8, 1864. It was “invested specially with full 
power and all the rights of opening and keeping a hospital in the city of Washington for the 
care of such sick and invalid persons as may place themselves under the treatment and care 
of said corporation.”320 Bradfield believed that the exchange of services for money between 
this religious organization and the City “becomes a grant by law in aid of an establishment of 
religion, and is therefore within the prohibition of the First Amendment.”321
317 Ibid. 
318 Ibid.
319 Ibid.
320 Ibid. 
321 Ibid.
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Justice Shepard, delivering the opinion of the Court for the Court of Appeals, held 
that the contract and exchange of services for money was constitutional. He stated that “in 
respect, then, of its creation, organization, management and ownership of property, it is an 
ordinary private corporation, whose rights are determinable by the law of the land, and the 
religious opinions of whose members are not subjects of inquiry.”322 In other words, 
compensation for the services rendered should be paid. The Court reversed the lower court’s 
ruling and deemed that the payment for the services were legitimate. Shepard asked two very 
important questions that explain the position of the Providence Hospital as well the Court’s 
accommodation of the religious organization. 
If the United States were engaged in war, would they be denied the power, 
no matter how advantageous or necessary it might be in some instances, to 
contract with religious societies or associations for hospital supplies, or for 
nursing their sick and wounded soldiers in their own or in private hospitals? 
If a church or religious establishment were the lowest bidder on a 
proposition by the United States for the lease or sale of a building for any 
legitimate government use or purpose, would the power be denied to 
authorize the lease or purchase because of the character of the ownership of 
the offered property?323
These two questions place the relationship between the Hospital and the City in context. 
Jefferson’s stiff wall melts when the reality of church and state relations is examined. The 
Court of Appeals’ opinion and ultimate decision struck a chord with Supreme Court. 
Though the decisions in cases are often contradictory, the Supreme Court’s ultimate 
accommodation of religious organizations is indicative of the cases to come.  
Justice Peckham delivered the Supreme Court’s reasoning for rejecting the 
Establishment Clause challenge. The Court did not find the fact that the Providence Hotel 
was owned and operated by a religious organization alarming. He stated that “nothing is said 
322 Ibid. 
323 Ibid.
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about religion or about the religious faith of the incorporators of this institution in the act of 
incorporation. It is simply the ordinary case of the incorporation of a hospital for the 
purposes for which such an institution is generally conducted.”324 The court ignored the 
owner of the building and instead highlighted the purpose of the building. The function of 
the hospital e.g., taking care of sick people with contagious diseases, rendered the appellant’s 
argument void. Peckham stated that:  
The above-mentioned allegations in the complainant's bill do not change the 
legal character of the corporation or render it on that account a religious or 
sectarian body. Whether the individuals who compose the corporation under 
its charter happen to be all Roman Catholics, or all Methodists, or 
Presbyterians, or Unitarians, or members of any other religious organization, 
or of no organization at all, is of not the slightest consequence with reference 
to the law of its incorporation….325
The Supreme Court thus affirmed the judgment reached by the Court of Appeals and 
deemed the contract between the Providence Hospital and the City constitutional.  
The Court’s first probe into the Establishment Clause boundaries as exemplified in 
Bradfield v. Roberts is usually dismissed by academia and written off as perfunctory in nature. 
The case is considered cursory since it lacks an in-depth inquiry into the scope of the 
Establishment Clause. Though it is inadequate in that sense, the case at the same time 
illuminates the playing field and allows for the first glimpse of what will develop into a 
strong accommodationist spirit.  The next case, Quick Bear v. Leupp,326 demonstrates that the 
Court picked up just where it had left off nine years earlier – the torch of accommodation 
was raised again.
324 Id., Bradfield v. Roberts (1899). 
325 Ibid. 
326 Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). 
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The United States established annual contracts with various denominational schools 
for the purpose of educating Native Americans. In the 1908 Quick Bear v. Leupp327 case, F. E. 
Leupp, the United States Commissioner of Indian Affairs, contracted with the Saint Francis 
Mission School to educate the Sioux Indian children on the Rosebud reservation. The case 
established that American Indians could use the monies provided them by the federal 
government for all future funding of schools like Saint Francis. 
The Saint Francis Mission School was administered by the Bureau of Catholic Indian 
Missions, a Maryland corporation. In 1905, the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions reapplied 
to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for an annual contract to educate approximately 200 
Sioux children. The contract specified that the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions was 
charged with the “care, maintenance, and education during the year 1906…at the cost of 
$27,000.”328 The Secretary of the Interior approved the contract and specified that the 
funding in the amount of $24,000 would be derived from the ‘Sioux Treaty Fund,’ and 
$3,000 would be from the ‘Sioux Trust Fund.’”329 The Sioux Indians, represented by Reuben 
Quick Bear, found issue with the derivation of the funds. The lower court ruled in favor of 
an injunction against the expenditure of the $24,000 from the Treaty Fund, and allowed the 
$3,000 expenditure from the Trust Fund.330
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia331, however, saw the matter in a 
different light in 1907 and reversed the lower court’s decision. Justice Wright explained why 
the Court approved the injunction of the $24,000 and disagreed with the allowance of the 
$3,000. The Court of Appeals and the impending United States Supreme Court decision 
327 Ibid. 
328 Quick Bear v. Leupp, 30 App. D.C. 151 (1907). 
329 Ibid. 
330 Ibid. 
331 Ibid.
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depended on the definition as well as intention of the term “funds.” This pivotal term 
allowed for a clear explanation as to why government funded sectarian schools on Indian 
land was not considered an establishment of religion and thus not in violation of the First 
Amendment. 
The Sioux Treaty Fund was established by the Sioux Treaty of 1868.332 This treaty 
established government funded education for Indian children for a term of twenty years 
between 1868 and 1888. Specifically, it stated that the United States “would provide for 
every thirty children of the Sioux tribe a house and a teacher competent to teach the 
elementary branches of an English education.”333 Two years later, an amendment was added 
that increased the type of education and established an additional amount of money to fund 
the added expense.  Specifically, the provision stated that “entirely aside from treaty 
obligations, was appropriated $100,000 ‘for the support of industrial and other schools 
among the Indian tribes not otherwise provided for, to be expended under the direction of 
the Secretary of the Interior.’”334 Nearly half way into the agreed upon 20-year term, the 
United States again amended the treaty to further increase Sioux educational support granted 
under the terms of the treaty. In 1877 the treaty was modified to read "schools and 
instruction in mechanical and agricultural arts."335 At the end of the 20-year term, on March 
2, 1889, the treaty was renewed for another 20-year term.336 The accretion of funding and 
general provisions of the second 20-year term also continued. Nearly at the end of this 
second 20-year term, the Indian Appropriation Act of 1905337 referred back to the 1877 
change and allotted $700,000 to fulfill the need of “for subsistence of the Sioux, and for 
332 Ibid. (15 Stat. at L. 635).
333 Ibid. (15 Stat. at L. 635).
334 Ibid. (16 Stat. at L. 335, 359, chap. 296).
335 Ibid. (19 Stat. at L. 254, 255, chap. 72).
336 Ibid. (25 Stat. at L. 894, chap. 405).
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purposes of their civilization.”338 The Appropriation Act also referred to the initial 1868 
agreement and allotted a sum of $225,000 “for support and maintenance of day and 
industrial schools, including erection and repairs of school buildings.”339 The distinction 
between the establishment, intent, and timing of the Sioux Treaty Fund and the Sioux Trust 
Fund rendered the funding constitutional.  
The establishment of education and the Sioux Treaty Fund was followed by the 
Sioux Trust Fund which entailed land acquisition. The funding as well as intent of the Trust 
Fund was completely separate from all earlier agreements. In 1889, just as the initial 20-year 
term ended and the second 20-year term for education was passed, the United States entered 
into another agreement with the Sioux Indians. The arrangement entailed land acquisition in 
the sum of $3 million. The Sioux Trust Fund was:  
in consideration of the relinquishment of the Indian title to lands in 
Dakota…Congress provided ‘there shall be set apart, out of any money in 
the Treasury not otherwise appropriated…which said sum shall be deposited 
in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the Sioux Nation of 
Indians as a permanent fund, the interest of which, at five per centum per 
annum, shall be appropriated,  under the direction of the Secretary of the 
Interior, to the use of the Indians, etc.’”340
The Trust Fund and the Treaty Fund were separate but were both relied upon to provide for 
the education of the Sioux Indians.  
Justice Wright explained that “under the existing legislation the position of the 
United States with respect to the Indian ‘funds’ is practically that of a trustee; with respect to 
the gratuitous appropriations for ‘Support of Schools,’ that of a voluntary donor; so that it 
may well be that a limitation can attach to the use of the gift of money without attaching to 
337 Ibid. (33 Stat. at L. 1048-1055, chap. 1479).
338 Ibid. (33 Stat. at L. 1048-1055, chap. 1479).
339 Ibid. (33 Stat. at L. 1048-1055, chap. 1479).
340 Ibid. (25 Stat. at L. 888-895, chap. 405).
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the trust money.”341 Wright’s view that the United States was a trustee of the Indian funds 
with regards to the Treaty Funds and a donor with regards to the Trust Funds was 
supported by the fact that Congress historically funded for them separately even though they 
both supported the same goal, education. The problem arose when the aid of public funds 
was regularly diminished in the 1896 treaty requiring that only 80% of the 1895 funds be 
allowed and then eliminated in 1899 due to concerns of impingement on First Amendment 
rights. “It is likely that a restriction attached to the disposition of the gratuity, found only in 
juxtaposition with the very words creating the gratuity, was intended to apply only to the 
gratuity.”342
On May 18, 1908, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decree of the 
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.343 The Court reaffirmed that the diminution 
of funds pertained to the public funds and not to the Treaty Funds. The Court determined 
that the use of those monies was at the total bequest of the Sioux Indians - the money 
belonged to the Sioux and could be used in any manner they chose. The appropriation of the 
monies to further the educational needs of their children was a legitimate use regardless of 
the fact that the money came from a government fund and that the schooling was sectarian. 
Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the Court. He stated that “there is no injustice 
in permitting an Indian to select a school for his children under the auspices of the church to 
which he is attached, and allowing on that account a portion of the tribal funds or a 
portion of the annuities or rations to be applied.”344
 Fuller made it clear that withholding the Indian monies was unjust and furthermore, 
the fact that the funds were used for religious education was determined to be valid. “It 
341 Ibid.
342 Ibid.
343 Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). 
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would be unjust to withhold from an Indian or community of Indians the right…to choose 
their own school and to choose it frankly because the education therein is under the 
influence of the religious faith….” He concluded that a differing opinion would “pervert the 
supposed general spirit of the constitutional provision into a means of prohibiting the free 
exercise of religion.”345 Fuller’s point elucidated the narrow path between the Establishment 
and Free Exercise Clauses – a path that has ultimately plagued future courts.  
Although the Supreme Court had already decided Bradfield v. Roberts and Quick Bear v. 
Leupp, both involving the Establishment Clause, most scholars look to the 1947 5-to-4 
decision in Everson v. Board of Education346  as the true starting point of modern Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence. Scholars tend to believe that “First Amendment law is essentially a 
product of the twentieth century.”347 This historical case is highly regarded for certain 
precedents it set as well as for its comprehensive analysis regarding the meaning and 
application of the Establishment Clause.  
Everson v. Board of Education effectively incorporated the Establishment Clause into 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As ratified in 1868, the Fourteenth 
Amendment reads, in part, as follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein 
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.348
344 Ibid. 
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The Amendment was intended to protected citizens from any state encroachment onto their 
liberties and fundamental rights. It established that each citizen was warranted at least due 
process of law and equal protection under the law. The citizens were finally afforded 
protection against any governmental encroachment on their religious rights when the 
Religion Clauses were incorporated into the Amendment.  
The conflict in this case began when Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer and resident of 
Ewing Township, New Jersey challenged a New Jersey statute that reimbursed parents for 
the cost of busing their children to schools. He brought suit against the Board of Education 
on the grounds that it violated the Establishment Clause. Everson claimed that as a taxpayer, 
his taxes should not be spent to reimburse the transportation costs of parents busing their 
children to parochial schools.
Ewing Township lacked schools beyond the eighth grade. The Township solved 
their educational predicament by busing children to nearby jurisdictions, mainly to Trenton 
and Pennington schools, and reimbursed parents for any out of pocket transportation 
expenses. As determined by the Board of Education, Ewing Township contracted out their 
transportation needs, pursuant to R.S. 18:14-8 (1903) and as amended in 1941 to read:
When any school district provides any transportation for public school 
children to and from school, transportation from any point in such 
established school route to any other point in such established school route 
shall be supplied to school children residing in such school district in going 
to and from school other than a public school, except such school as is 
operated for profit in whole or in part.349
The township of Ewing did not intend the reimbursement statute to further religion. The 
fact that Ewing bused children to a parochial school was incidental to the intent of the 
statute.
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The case was initially heard by the Supreme Court of New Jersey on October 5, 
1943.350 Three judges heard the case and two declared that this additional paragraph was not 
legally valid and thus the New Jersey state legislature did not have the right to authorize 
reimbursement under the state constitution. Justice Parker explained that the outcome of the 
statute was to “provide for free transportation of children at the expense of the home 
municipality and of the state school fund to and from any school, other than a public school, 
which is not operated for profit.”351
In reality, the free transportation Parker cites amounted to $859.80. This amount is 
detailed in the opinion of a later case as delivered by Chancellor Campbell: 
Pursuant to such resolution the appellant on February 15th, 1943, authorized 
the payment of $8,034.95 for transportation. Of this sum $357.74 was paid to 
the parents of twenty-one pupils who were transported to parochial schools 
in Trenton, five to elementary schools and sixteen to high schools. The 
transportation was by public carrier bus. The payments to parents were in 
satisfaction of advancements made by them; and the amount was fixed upon 
the basis of the actual number of days’ attendance as indicated upon each 
pupil's report card.352
Justices Parker and Perskie agreed with Everson and declared that the resolution must be set 
aside due to the 1941 amendment’s violation of paragraph 6 of section 7 of article IV of the 
state constitution that specifically states the support of public free schools. 
 Justice Heher, however, disagreed that the Ewing Township Board of Education 
erred in appropriating the transportation funds to and from parochial schools. He believed 
that the Board’s action should not be looked at as unconstitutional, but rather as furthering 
the Child Benefit Theory. Heher’s views become central in the future Appeal where Justice 
349 Everson v. Board of Education, 132 N.J.L. 98 (1944). New Jersey Laws, 1941, c. 191, p. 581; N. J. R. S. Cum. Supp., 
tit. 18, c. 14, § 8.
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Hugo Black agreed and further developed the idea. Heher asserted that giving a gift 
comprised of public funds to a parochial school would be unconstitutional but believed that 
the Board’s actions do not constitute a gift of public funds. He explained that “such 
transportation is a service to the children and their parents rather than to the schools, for 
otherwise the parents would be obliged to provide the conveyance or incur the traffic 
hazards incident to the journey, for which children are generally so ill-equipped.”353 Heher 
believed that the act furthered the execution of compulsory education statues and believed 
that if taken separately and considered an aid to parents, thus removing the institution, that it 
served an essential public interest and in effect the “constitutional doubts lose their force.”354
 The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals reversed two years later on October 
15, 1945 in a 6-to-3 verdict holding that neither the resolution nor the statutes are 
unconstitutional.355 Chancellor Campbell dissected the intent of the 1941 amendment and 
explained that the decision to bus children to parochial schools was only incidental since the 
language of the amendment reads “children attending schools could be furnished 
transportation by any school district from any point on an already established school route to any 
other point on such established school route.”356 He explained that “payment of such expense out 
of local taxes is the payment of "incidental expenses" or "transportation of pupils" 
authorized by R.S. 18:7-78.”357
Finally, on February 10, 1947, in a narrow 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court 
agreed.358 Justice Hugo L. Black explained in detail the two arguments on the basis of which 
the reimbursements to the parents of the children are thought to have violated the Federal 
353 Id., Everson v. Board of Education (1944). 
354 Ibid. 
355 Id., Everson v. Board of Education (1945). 
356 Id., Everson v. Board of Education (1944). 
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Constitution and then explained why the Court rejected them both. The first argument was 
that it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by authorizing the 
State to tax the private property of citizens and then use the money for a specific private 
purpose. Black rejected this by maintaining that “the fact that a state law, passed to satisfy a 
public need, coincides with the personal desires of the individuals most directly affected is 
certainly an inadequate reason for us to say that a legislature has erroneously appraised the 
public need.”359 He believed that it was incorrect to assume that the reimbursement violated 
the due process clause and made clear that the fact that something is subsidized by law does 
not establish that the law has a private instead of a public purpose. As examples, he stated 
that “subsidies and loans to individuals such as farmers and home-owners, and to privately 
owned transportation systems, as well as many other kinds of businesses, have been 
commonplace practices in our state and national history.”360
The second argument was that it violated the First Amendment’s Establishment 
Clause by forcing the citizens to pay taxes to support religious education at Catholic schools. 
The Establishment Clause was violated, so the argument went, because the Fourteenth 
Amendment applied the Religion Clauses to the states. After a lengthy exploration into the 
history and circumstances surrounding the Constitution and the intent of the Framers, Black 
equated providing transportation to children to providing fire and police protection. He 
stated that: 
Moreover, state-paid policemen, detailed to protect children going to and 
from church schools from the very real hazards of traffic, would serve much 
the same purpose and accomplish much the same result as state provisions 
intended to guarantee free transportation of a kind which the state deems to 
be best for the school children's welfare.361
358 Id., Everson v. Board of Education (1947). 
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Black’s position was that the provision of transportation benefited all involved and thus 
should not be rejected to some because of their religious affiliations. Black explained that the 
First Amendment’s purpose was to be neutral and thus a law could not be enacted to aid one 
particular religion. He affirmed that “state power is no more to be used so as to handicap 
religions than it is to favor them.”362 The fact that the reimbursement might have influenced 
some parents to send their children to a parochial school was cast aside by the Court and 
acknowledged as merely incidental. It was deemed a general provision that reimbursed all 
schools, both public and private, and thus valid.
Black affirmed his position of separation with his famous words: “the First 
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and 
impregnable.”363 His words delineate a separationist attitude but his actions remain far from 
implementing it. The separationist rhetoric that was employed by Black and supported in his 
opinion by the writings of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison did little to bolster 
separationism. In fact, Black bolstered the accommodation of religious groups by 
interpreting the beneficiaries of the reimbursement as the children and thus substantiated 
that the aid was secular in nature. Black followed the child benefit theory as did Justice 
Heher in the earlier New Jersey Supreme Court case of 1943.
Dissents by Justices Jackson and Rutledge are important because they also reinforce 
Jefferson’s wall of separation but however do not look away from where the underlying 
benefit actually resides. They state that the reimbursement is a form of aid. The children may 
indeed benefit but the bottom line is that the religious education of children is the backbone 
of the Church. “Its growth and cohesion, discipline and loyalty, spring from its schools. 
362 Ibid. 
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Catholic education is the rock on which the whole structure rests, and to render tax aid to its 
Church school is indistinguishable to me from rendering the same aid to the Church 
itself.”364 Jackson and Rutledge felt that the reimbursement of transportation was equated to 
and indistinguishable from direct aid to the church. They dismissed the child safety argument 
outright. “This expenditure of tax funds has no possible effect on the child's safety or 
expedition in transit. As passengers on the public buses they travel as fast and no faster, and 
are as safe and no safer, since their parents are reimbursed as before.”365
Justices Jackson and Rutledge made a dignified effort to reinforce Jefferson’s wall of 
separation. These next two arguments placed forward, however valiant, fall on deaf ears. The 
first, states that: 
“The state cannot maintain a Church and it can no more tax its citizens to 
furnish free carriage to those who attend a Church. The prohibition against 
establishment of religion cannot be circumvented by a subsidy, bonus or 
reimbursement of expense to individuals for receiving religious instruction 
and indoctrination.” 366
The second states that: 
“But we cannot have it both ways. Religious teaching cannot be a private 
affair when the state seeks to impose regulations which infringe on it 
indirectly, and a public affair when it comes to taxing citizens of one faith to 
aid another, or those of no faith to aid all. If these principles seem harsh in 
prohibiting aid to Catholic education, it must not be forgotten that it is the 
same Constitution that alone assures Catholics the right to maintain these 
schools at all when predominant local sentiment would forbid them.” 367
These two arguments were rejected by the Supreme Court Justices and the Court thus 
rejected a broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause. The Court established that 
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public money may be spent on general public services for religious organization just as any 
other secular organization. The Court reiterated however that public money may not be 
directed to support the religious aspects of a religious organization. It “construed the 
Establishment Clause to require a complete separation of church and state.”368 Since Everson
the tension between the separation of church and state and the accommodation of religion 
has taken center stage. “Establishment decisions subsequent to Everson more clearly have 
turned on whether the Court favored protecting freedom of religion by accommodating free 
exercise or by maintaining a strict wall of separation.”369
 Twenty-three years after Everson, Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York370
explored the meaning of the Establishment Clause and in a vote of 7-to-1 reaffirmed the tax- 
exempt position of religious organizations. Redlich explains that “many of the Court’s 
attempts to reconcile the values embodied in free exercise and establishment have been in 
circumstances where the government has provided some form of aid to religious institutions. 
Often, such cases require the Court to choose, in some measure, between burdening free 
exercise or promoting establishment.”371 Walz is the classic example most scholars cite.  
Frederick Walz, a Christian New York state property owner filed suit seeking an 
injunction against the New York City Tax Commission. Walz challenged the 
constitutionality of property tax exemptions that were granted to properties owned by 
religious organizations used solely for religious purposes. He felt that as a citizen of the state 
of New York and a taxpayer, he indirectly contributed to those religious organizations – 
effectively violating the Establishment Clause. This case significantly narrowed the poorly 
demarcated no man’s land between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.  
368 Id., Redlich. Understanding Constitutional Law (1999). p. 506. 
369 Ibid., p. 508. 
370 Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
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On May 4, 1970, in a 7-to-1 decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the tax-
exempt status of religious organizations was not in violation of the First Amendment. This 
decision was based in part on the fact that historically, exemptions had been granted to all 
religious organizations. The New York Constitution granted the New York City Tax 
Commission statutory authority to grant property tax exemptions to religious organizations 
for religious properties. Tax exemptions were implemented by the New York Real Property 
Tax Law which stated that: 
Real property owned by a corporation or association organized exclusively 
for the moral or mental improvement of men and women, or for religious, 
bible, tract, charitable, benevolent, missionary, hospital, infirmary, 
educational, public playground, scientific, literary, bar association, medical 
society, library, patriotic, historical or cemetery purposes . . . and used 
exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes . . . shall 
be exempt from taxation as provided in this section.372
The Court recognized that the intention of the exemption was not designed to support one 
religion in particular. The Court concluded that in fact, exemptions themselves, if compared 
to the alternative of taxation, created a smaller interaction between church and state and thus 
were not considered to be an excessive entanglement.  
Chief Justice Warren E.  Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. Burger explained 
the Court’s conclusion by first admitting that the decision was problematical due to the 
vagueness of the First Amendment. The issue of the First Amendment’s vagueness bears 
witness to both its beauty as well as its inherent complicated nature. The First Amendment is 
not a statute that was intended to delineate proper action on a case by case basis. The First 
371 Id., Redlich (1999). p. 510. 
372 Ibid., § 420, subd. 1. 
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Amendment, as Burger explains, is an idea that was intended to be applied when deciding 
cases.
The sweep of the absolute prohibitions in the Religion Clauses may have 
been calculated; but the purpose was to state an objective, not to write a 
statute. In attempting to articulate the scope of the two Religion Clauses, the 
Court's opinions reflect the limitations inherent in formulating general 
principles on a case-by-case basis. The considerable internal inconsistency in 
the opinions of the Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been 
too sweeping utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in 
relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general 
principles.373
The First Amendment as an objective, rather than a statute, is further complicated by the 
interaction between the Clauses. Burger explained that this interaction demonstrated the 
difficulty of operating in this zone. “The Court has struggled to find a neutral course 
between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of 
which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.”374 The Walz
decision added to the process of clarifying the indistinct zone between the Clauses and 
bolstered future Supreme Court cases. 
Burger explained an additional conundrum. The absolute neutrality was unattainable 
since the existence of the Clauses connoted involvement and that absolute neutrality would 
in effect defeat its basic purpose. It was unambiguous that the “‘establishment’ of a religion 
connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in 
religious activity.”375 Burger chose instead to advocate a benevolent neutrality which was a 
realistic, and more importantly, achievable intention. He stated that “there is room for play 
in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist 
373 Ibid. 
374 Ibid.
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without sponsorship and without interference.”376 He believed that this benevolent 
neutrality, which was derived from the accommodation of both the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses, was the key to what prevented the inappropriate government involvement 
and control of churches and religious practices.
Burger tipped his hat to Mr. Jackson’s logical analysis in Everson but agreed with the 
Court’s ultimate practical decision. He found the decision to be “eminently sensible and 
realistic [in] application of the language of the Establishment Clause.”377 By rejecting the 
possible narrow and ultimately harmful interpretation, Burger believed that the Court in 
Everson was able to successfully walk what he called the tight-rope between the clauses. 
“With all the risks inherent in programs that bring about administrative relationships 
between public education bodies and church-sponsored schools, we have been able to chart 
a course that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies while avoiding any 
semblance of established religion.”378 Burger asserted that this balance had been the key to 
the Court’s success. 
The first issue raised in Walz was the customary tax-exempt status of religious 
organizations. Burger established that religious groups could be included in the general 
category of eleemosynary organizations and could thus benefit from these general 
exemptions. He explained that the “State has an affirmative policy that considers these 
groups as beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life and finds this classification 
useful, desirable, and in the public interest.”379 Religious organizations were deemed 
charitable due to their programs that help society and that would have been done by the 
government if not otherwise completed by religious organizations.
376 Ibid. 
377 Ibid. 
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Burger made clear that property tax deductions were not created to bolster religious 
groups. Instead, he asserted that the tax exemption was neither to advance nor to inhibit 
religion but was a way to prevent possible abuse of power. He explained that:  
The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does 
not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from 
demanding that the church support the state. No one has ever suggested that 
tax exemption has converted libraries, art galleries, or hospitals into arms of 
the state or put employees "on the public payroll." There is no genuine nexus 
between tax exemption and establishment of religion. As Mr. Justice Holmes 
commented in a related context "a page of history is worth a volume of 
logic."380
Exemption from taxation was the lesser of the two evils in that exemption consisted of a 
comparatively limited involvement. The implementation of taxes would actually increase the 
nexus of interaction between government and religion. Burger stated that “elimination of 
exemption would tend to expand the involvement of government by giving rise to tax 
valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and 
conflicts that follow in the train of those legal processes.”381 The characterization of a benefit 
becomes a crucial recurring theme that become clear in Lemon.382 Burger firmly established 
that the purpose of exemption was neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion 
and next turned to what he felt was crucial in the evaluation – the actual effect, whether 
intentional or incidental. 
Burger remained firm in his beliefs on the necessity of religious tax exemption and 
asserted that “it is hardly useful to suggest that tax exemption is but the ‘foot in the door’ or 
379 Ibid. 
380 Ibid., Justice Burger quotes Mr. Justice Holmes in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
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the ‘nose of the camel in the tent’ leading to an established church.”383 He did, however, 
believe that the effect of tax exemptions, even incidental effects, should be calculated. He 
stated that “we must be sure that the end result -- the effect -- is not an excessive 
government entanglement with religion. The test is inescapably one of degree.”384 These 
three words “excessive government entanglement” became significant a year later in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman385 when it became the third prong of the three-part test that determined whether or 
not an action violated the Establishment Clause.
Justice Brennan, concurring, made an interesting historical point that became central 
an upcoming Supreme Court case. James Madison, an advocate for religious tax exemptions 
had later in life, changed his mind and argued against tax exemptions for churches among 
other things. Specifically, he argued for the removal of religious vestiges from the 
government. Madison argued against:
tax exemptions for churches, the incorporation of ecclesiastical bodies with 
the power of acquiring and holding property in perpetuity, the right of the 
Houses of Congress to choose chaplains who are paid out of public funds, 
the provision of chaplains in the Army and Navy, and presidential 
proclamations of days of thanksgiving or prayer.386
Though the issue of Madison’s late-life change of heart was not approached again, it further 
complicated the issue. The proper course of action was further blurred by yet another 
interpretation of the original intention. The dissent by Justice Douglas also revealed an 
interesting personal admission that followed in the footsteps of Madison’s change of heart. 
He stated that “the Everson decision was five to four and, though one of the five, I have since 
383 Ibid. 
384 Ibid. 
385 Lemon v. Kurtzman , 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
386 Id., Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York (1970).
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had grave doubts about it, because I have become convinced that grants to institutions 
teaching a sectarian creed violate the Establishment Clause.”387 This candid statement shed 
light on his opinion that a tax exemption was a subsidy and placed the accommodation of 
religion decided in the last four Supreme Court cases on questionable ground. “From that 
perspective, free exercise concerns were not implicated, and the benefit derived was more 
clearly in violation of the mandated separation and neutrality.”388The basic contention 
between Justices Burger and Douglas was the issue of effect. “The importance of how a 
benefit is characterized is a recurring theme in religion clause decisions. Its importance 
would become clear the next year in Lemon v. Kurtzman, a case involving government aid to 
religious schools, where Chief Justice Burger would apply essentially the same standards with 
opposite results.”389
In 1971, the 5-to-4 decision in Tilton v. Richardson390 continued the trend of religious 
accommodation and laid steadier ground for the Supreme Court.  Tilton reaffirmed the 1899 
Bradfield391 decision that determined that not all government aid to organizations owned and 
operated by religious groups was unconstitutional. Tilton established that government 
construction grants for non-religious academic facilities built on religious university 
campuses were constitutional.  
Eleanor Taft Tilton, representing a group of Connecticut taxpayers, sued Robert H. 
Finch, the Secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare and 
then Elliot Lee Richardson, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare alleging that the 
387 Ibid.
388 Id., Redlich. Understanding Constitutional Law (1999). p. 512. 
389 Ibid., p. 512. 
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Higher Education Facilities Act392 of 1963 violated the First Amendment. Tilton alleged that 
the allocation of federal construction grants paid out under Title I to four institutions of 
higher education in Connecticut amounted to nothing less than the establishment of religion. 
Five projects were constructed including a library building at Sacred Heart University; a 
music, drama, and arts building at Annhurst College; science and library buildings at Fairfield 
University; and a language laboratory at Albertus Magnus College. The four institutions were 
administered by Catholic religious organizations and had predominantly Catholic student 
bodies. While the universities did not require students to attend religious services, theology 
courses were required. The universities maintained that religious indoctrination, however, 
was not at any time or in any form part of the curriculum. 
Title 1 of the Act gave grants and loans for up to 50% of the construction costs to 
colleges and universities for the building costs of academic facilities. Eligibility for the federal 
aid was determined if a university proved that it: 
urgently needed [a] substantial expansion of the institution's student 
enrollment capacity, capacity to provide needed health care to students or 
personnel of the institution, or capacity to carry out extension and continuing 
education programs on the campus of such institution.393
The Act also expressly excluded facilities intended for religious worship or instruction. 
Specifically, it excluded “any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place 
for religious worship, or . . . any facility which . . . is used or to be used primarily in 
connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity.”394 To ensure 
that the new facility was indeed religion-neutral, the government retained an interest in the 
property for twenty years and maintained the right to unannounced spot-checks. If these on-
392 Ibid., 77 Stat. 364, as amended, 20 U. S. C. §§ 711-721 (1964 ed. and Supp. V). 
393 Ibid., 20 U. S. C. § 716 (1964 ed., Supp. V). 
394 Ibid., § 751 (a)(2) (1964 ed., Supp. V). 
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site inspections revealed a prohibited sectarian association, then the government was to 
recover a portion of the grant.
In 1970, the District Court of Connecticut heard the case and upheld the 
constitutionality of the Higher Education Facilities Act.395 District Judge Timbers explained 
that the Court found that in intent as well as effect, the Act was constitutional. The Supreme 
Court however, only partially agreed. In 1971, Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of 
the Court. He began by explaining that over time, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Establishment Clause to protect against sponsorship, financial support, and direct 
involvement. Burger believed that the analysis and ultimate finding that any of these have 
been violated are difficult to assess. He stated: 
Every analysis must begin with the candid acknowledgment that there is no 
single constitutional caliper that can be used to measure the precise degree to 
which these three factors are present or absent. Instead, our analysis in this 
area must begin with a consideration of the cumulative criteria developed 
over many years and applying to a wide range of governmental action 
challenged as violative of the Establishment Clause.396
Without definitive tests, Burger explained, the Court therefore must rely on guidelines 
deduced from history mainly: whether the Act reflected a secular legislative purpose, 
whether the primary effect of the Act was to advance or inhibit religion, whether the 
administration of the Act created an excessive government entanglement with religion, and 
whether the Act in effect violated the Free Exercise Clause.
Regarding the first guideline, the Act clearly served the legitimate secular objective of 
education. Also, the newly constructed buildings were non-religious in appearance. Burger 
asserted that “these buildings are indistinguishable from a typical state university facility.”397
395 Tilton v. Richardson, 312 F. Supp. 1191(1970).
396 Id., Tilton v. Richardson (1971). 
397 Ibid. 
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The function of the five buildings was also non-religious in nature. Two were libraries, one 
was a language laboratory, one was a science building and one is a music, drama, and arts 
building. “There is no evidence that religion seeps into the use of any of these facilities.”398
The Act would have been deemed invalid if religion was taught in any of these buildings.  
The Court found problems with respect to the second consideration, whether the 
Act established an excessive government entanglement. In fact, the Court was unanimous in 
its opinion regarding the 20-year time limitation and the specified necessary surveillance. The 
Court deemed the 20-year period allotted for the government interest unacceptable. The 
dispute was that after the time period elapsed, the religious organization could convert the 
building to whatever it deemed necessary. This conversion could directly augment its agenda 
and therefore work to advance religion. Burger illustrated the potential harm this conversion 
could have. “If, at the end of 20 years, the building is, converted into a chapel or otherwise 
used to promote religious interests, the original federal grant will in part have the effect of 
advancing religion. To this extent the Act therefore trespasses on the Religion Clauses.”399
Burger clarified that though a part of the Act was in violation of the Religion Clauses 
that this did not necessitate the invalidation of the remainder of the Act.  He rested his 
opinion on a general principle expressed in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation that 
“the cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy.”" 400 The 
invalidation of the Act also did not hinge on the retention of the 20-year period. Burger 
explained that: 
In view of the broad and important goals that Congress intended this 
legislation to serve, there is no basis for assuming that the Act would have 
398 Ibid. 
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failed of passage without this provision; nor will its excision impair either the 
operation or administration of the Act in any significant respect.401
The Court thus allowed the remaining part of the Act to stand as valid. 
The third guideline of entanglement was addressed by evaluating the potential for 
entanglement. The potential was determined to be much less at an institution of higher 
learning than at an elementary or secondary school. “There is substance to the contention 
that college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious 
indoctrination.”402 The court determined that the entanglement of government with religion 
was lessened because the substance of the education was not religious, the facilities were 
religiously neutral, and thirdly that government supervision was minimal. The issue of 
entanglement was further reduced by the fact that the aid was given one time and in one 
lump sum only. Burger explained that:
The Government aid here is a one-time, single-purpose construction grant. 
There are no continuing financial relationships or dependencies, no annual 
audits, and no government analysis of an institution’s expenditures on secular 
as distinguished from religious activities. Inspection as to use is a minimal 
contact.403
Burger further explained that taken together, these reasons prove that the interaction 
between government and religion did not constitute excessive government entanglement. He 
stated that the relationship was found to have “less potential for realizing the substantive 
evils against which the Religion Clauses were intended to protect.”404
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in part, had some harsh words. He agreed with the 
Justices that the 20-year stipulation was unconstitutional but he maintained that the Act 
401 Ibid. 
402 Ibid. 
403 Ibid. 
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amounted to an “outright grant.”405 Douglas believed that the payment of the money all at 
once instead of over several years did not detract from what was essentially a block grant. He 
stated that “thus it is hardly impressive that rather than giving a smaller amount of money 
annually over a long period of years, Congress instead gives a large amount all at once. I 
cannot agree with such sophistry.”406 Douglas also believed that the Court’s decision 
departed drastically from Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance: 
 I dissent not because of any lack of respect for parochial schools but out of 
a feeling of despair that the respect which through history has been accorded 
the First Amendment is this day lost. The million-dollar grants sustained 
today put Madison's miserable "three pence" to shame. But he even thought, 
as I do, that even a small amount coming out of the pocket of taxpayers and 
going into the coffers of a church was not in keeping with our constitutional 
ideal.407
Douglas found support in three other Justices but the hairline 5-to-4 ruling was not in their 
favor. The decision was different, however, in Lemon v. Kurtzman408 which was ruled on 
essentially the same subject but held the statute unconstitutional due to the receipt of the 
federal monies.
In 1971, during the same year as the Tilton v. Richardson ruling, the Supreme Court 
also ruled on Lemon v. Kurtzman.409 The Acts at issue included Pennsylvania’s 1968 Nonpublic 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act and Rhode Island’s 1969 Salary Supplement Act. 
In 1969, the District Court found that neither the Establishment nor the Free Exercise 
Clauses were violated. The District Court held that “as long as the purpose and primary 
effect of the statute neither advance[d] nor inhibit[ed] religion, the constitutional standard 
405 Ibid. 
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[was] satisfied.”410 The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the findings and 
reversed. Lemon v. Kurtzman is significant for establishing three criteria for determining First 
Amendment cases. The Lemon test deemed that government action was unconstitutional if 
it established that it did not promote a secular purpose, if its primary effect is deemed to 
advance or inhibit religion, or if the action fostered an excessive entanglement between 
church and state. The invalidation of any one of these three prongs invalidated the action 
and rendered it unconstitutional. The Lemon test was a framework that will be applied 
consistently and with few modifications throughout the 20th and into the 21st centuries, 
although several Justices such as Justice Scalia have indicated dissatisfaction with it.    
Alton J. Lemon brought suit against David H Kurtzman, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in charge of administering funds under 
the Pennsylvania Education Act, Grace Sloan, State Treasurer of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, who allocated the approved funds, and seven sectarian elementary and 
secondary schools who contracted with the Commonwealth for the purchase of secular 
educational services under the Education Act. Lemon represented a group of citizens that 
advocated the separation of church and state and were opposed to the “‘use of public funds 
for the support in whole or in part of sectarian schools, or other private schools whose 
policies and practices, by purpose or effect, exclude or otherwise discriminate against 
persons by reason of race or religion.’"411  Lemon, an African American citizen, a 
Pennsylvania taxpayer, and the father of a public school student alleged that the Act violated 
the Constitution. He based his claim of standing by alleging that unbeknownst to him, his 
purchase of a race track ticket supported the Act.
410 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35 (1969). 
411 Ibid.
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The Legislature passed the Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 
1968 to meet the existing crisis in Pennsylvania’s nonpublic schools. The Act provided funds 
to contract out some of the secular services of nonpublic schools. The nature of this 
arrangement was perceived as non-threatening because nonpublic elementary and secondary 
education were deemed to have a “public welfare purpose and that nonpublic education, by 
providing instruction in secular subjects, contributes significantly to the achievement of this 
public purpose.”412 Kurtzman was empowered to allocate funds for services such as teacher 
expenses and various instructional materials to nonpublic schools. The State would then 
reimburse the nonpublic schools for any approved spending. “Under the ‘contracts’ 
authorized by the statute, the State directly reimburse[d] nonpublic schools solely for their 
actual expenditures for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials.”413 The 
reimbursement had several stipulations including one that required that secular and non-
secular expenses be kept separate and absolutely accounted for subject to audit. 
Reimbursements were made only for secular public school subjects and were limited to 
mathematics, foreign languages physical science and physical education and specifically not 
for “any subject matter expressing religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of 
any sect.”414
The funding for Pennsylvania’s 1968 Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act was originally subsidized by a tax on horse and harness racing but was 
replaced by the state cigarette tax. In total, the revenue allowed for a total of $5 million to be 
reimbursed annually.  At the time of the suit, Pennsylvania had entered into contracts with 
“1,181 nonpublic elementary and secondary schools with a student population of some 
412 Ibid.
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535,215 pupils -- more than 20% of the total number of students in the State. More than 
96% of these pupils attend church-related schools, and most of these schools are affiliated 
with the Roman Catholic Church.”415
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that 
the Act did not violate the Religion Clauses.416 United States District Judge Alfred L. Luongo 
delivered the opinion of the Court and stated that the Act was constitutional. “Admittedly, 
the line is not an easy one to draw. However, we believe the Education Act is consistent 
with neutrality towards religion and comes within the permissible limits and spirit of the 
non-establishment principle.” 417 On June 28, 1971, the Supreme Court of the United States, 
however, reversed and remanded.
Chief Justice Burger concluded that “the cumulative impact of the entire relationship 
arising under the statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement between government 
and religion.”418 Burger found issue with Pennsylvania’s surveillance stipulations. He believed 
that this produced a relationship of excessive entanglement. “As we noted earlier, the very 
restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly non-ideological 
role give rise to entanglements between church and state.”419 Burger also noted a difference 
between the reimbursements in this case and the reimbursement scheme in Everson that was 
deemed constitutional. “The Pennsylvania statute, moreover, has the further defect of 
providing state financial aid directly to the church-related school. This factor distinguishes 
both Everson and Allen, for in both those cases the Court was careful to point out that state 
415 Ibid. 
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aid was provided to the student and his parents -- not to the church-related school.”420
Burger equated this relationship to the typical cash subsidy requirement of control. “In 
particular the government’s post-audit power to inspect and evaluate a church-related 
school's financial records and to determine which expenditures are religious and which are 
secular creates an intimate and continuing relationship between church and state.”421 It 
seems that the accommodative tome displayed by Burger in Walz was absent.422
The second controversy the Lemon Court ruled on was Rhode Island’s 1969 Salary 
Supplement Act.423 The Act was initially contested in the District Court of Rhode Island in 
the 1970 DiCenso v. Robinson424 case where Joan DiCenso, a Rhode Island resident and 
taxpayer filed suit against William P. Robinson and John R. Earley alleging that the Act 
violated the First Amendment. They claimed that the primary beneficiaries of the Act were 
Catholic schools and the approximately 250 teachers that were paid and thus the Act’s 
purpose and effect was the advancement of the Catholic religion. DiCenso also claimed that 
she indirectly had to fund the Act through her tax money, thus violating the Free Exercise 
clause.  On June 15, 1970, Circuit Judge Coffin delivered the opinion of the Court which 
held the Act unconstitutional and enjoined its implementation.  
The Salary Supplement Act compensated the teachers of secular subjects in non-
public elementary schools. “To accomplish this objective, the legislature appropriated 
$375,000 to pay up to 15 per cent of the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in non-public 
elementary schools.” 425 The stipulation detailed that in order to be a recipient of the aid, a 
420 Ibid.
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teacher had to teach subject matter and textbooks similar to that approved by public schools, 
proper certification, and must assure that religious indoctrination did not occur.
The Act was intended to solve the financial crisis of non-public schools. Circuit 
Judge Coffin explained that the state-wide crisis began when nuns stopped teaching and lay 
teachers took their place.   
As recently as ten years ago, the Archdiocese of Providence relied almost 
exclusively on nuns to staff its school system. Lay teachers filled only 4 or 5 
per cent of the system's 1200 teaching positions. By 1969, lay teachers 
constituted one third of the teaching force. Each shift from a teaching sister 
to a lay teacher represents a threefold increase in salary expense (i.e., a shift 
from approximately $1800 to $5500 at present levels).426
The Court found the Salary Supplement Act unconstitutional based on the deep 
entanglement it produced between church and state. The necessary surveillance needed to 
ensure proper use of money was excessive. The Court determined that the Act was in 
violation “not only [in] substantial support for a religious enterprise, but also the kind of 
reciprocal embroilments of government and religion which the First Amendment was meant 
to avoid.”427
On June 28, 1971, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case. Chief 
Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. Regarding the Rhode Island Act, the 
Court affirmed the District Court’s ruling that the Act was unconstitutional. Burger 
explained that providing direct aid to teachers was much different from previous 
accommodations the Court had made in the past.  
Our decisions from Everson to Allen have permitted the States to provide 
church-related schools with secular, neutral, or nonideological services, 
facilities, or materials. Bus transportation, school lunches, public health 
426 Ibid. 
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services, and secular textbooks supplied in common to all students were not 
thought to offend the Establishment Clause.428
But the aid that the Rhode Island Act provided was not in the previously permitted forms 
but instead was for teachers. The Court did not believe that a sectarian teacher could remain 
religiously neutral at all times. The energy expended to inspect the teacher and assess the 
neutrality, though preventive in nature, was deemed an unacceptable entanglement. Burger 
explained that “these prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement 
between state and church.”429 The chance that the relationship would traverse a path not 
sanctioned by the Constitution was deemed too great. Burger explained that “it is a 
relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction of church schools and 
hence of churches.”430
Burger advised the Court that it needed to be very cautious in these types of cases. The 
probable yearly increased funding as well as the underlying political connotations were 
pitfalls the Court needed to be aware of. He also admitted that the path blazed by this case 
was a new one necessitated by the uncertain nature of First Amendment case law. “Candor 
compels acknowledgment, moreover, that we can only dimly perceive the lines of 
demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.”431 A new path was 
indeed blazed. The decision was highly regarded for it outlined what became known as the 
Lemon test which was intended to guide legislation that raised such concerns. The three 
prongs included: 
1. The government’s action must have a legitimate secular purpose;
428 Id., Lemon v. Kurtzman, (1971). 
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2. The government’s action must not have the primary effect of either advancing or 
inhibiting religion; and
3. The government’s action must not result in an ‘excessive entanglement’ of the 
government and religion.
Together, the prongs established guidelines of appropriate legislation. If any of the three 
prongs were not satisfied, the statute was deemed unconstitutional.  
 The 1973 Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,432 case decided 
the constitutionality of reimbursements to parents of nonpublic school children. Past cases 
had ruled on the constitutionality of government aided textbooks and busing and passed 
constitutional muster because of the indirect nature of the funding as well as having been 
deemed beneficial to the children instead of the parents or the school. This case was 
distinguished from past cases due to its direct reimbursements which were deemed to benefit 
the schools. Nyquist is known as the decision at the center of the controversy over school 
vouchers because the case involved grants and tuition tax credits for the benefit of parents 
whose children attended private schools. The state calculated the amount of these grants on 
a per pupil basis, established a maximum amount based on comparable expenditures in the 
public school system, and most significantly did not impose any ‘secular use’ restriction on 
the grants. 
In 1972, the Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty (PEARL), an 
unincorporated association of New York State residents, sued Ewald B. Nyquist, the 
Commissioner of Education of New York. PEARL claimed that amendment to the State’s 
Education and Tax Laws specifically Chapter 414 of the New York Laws of 1972 violated 
the Establishment Clause. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
432 Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
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agreed and enjoined §1 and §2 but allowed §§3, 4, and 5.433  A year later, on June 25, 1973, in 
a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling regarding §§1 and 2 and reversed 
the ruling on §§3, 4, and 5434.
The suit contested only three of the five parts of the amendment. The first section 
provided direct money grants from the State Treasury to nonpublic schools for maintenance 
and repair. Nonpublic schools were eligible for the grants if they demonstrated that they 
“serv[ed] a high concentration of pupils from low-income families for purposes of Title IV 
of the Federal Higher Education Act of 1965.”435 The qualifying schools constructed within 
the last 25 years received $30 per pupil and, if constructed more than 25 years ago, the grant 
increased to $40 per pupil. Reimbursements were made for the previous year’s maintenance 
and repairs. Maintenance and repair was defined as: 
‘the provision of heat, light, water, ventilation and sanitary facilities, cleaning, 
janitorial and custodial services; snow removal; necessary upkeep and 
renovation of buildings, grounds and equipment; fire and accident 
protection; and such other items as the commissioner may deem necessary to 
ensure the health, welfare and safety of enrolled pupils.’ 436
The ‘maintenance and repair’ description above was defined under the heading of Health 
and Safety Grants for Nonpublic School Children.  This section of the Law required that the 
state assume responsibility for the health, welfare, and safety of children. Specifically, the Act 
delineated these responsibilities to the State due to the fact that the “[financial] resources 
necessary to properly maintain and repair [deteriorating] buildings are beyond the capabilities 
of low-income people whose children attend nonpublic schools.” 437 The Act specified that 
in order to assume responsibility for the health, welfare, and safety, “the state ha[d] the right 
433 Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 350 F.Supp. 655 (1972). 
434 Id., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (1973). 
435 Id., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, (1972).    
436 Ibid., U.S.C.A. § 425. 
134
to make grants for maintenance and repair expenditures which are clearly secular, neutral 
and non-ideological in nature.”  In exchange for the funds, the school assumed the 
responsibility of providing the Commissioner of Education a statement of expenses 
pertaining to maintenance and repair. The other stipulation was that the payment of grants 
was limited to 50% of the average maintenance and repair per pupil cost of public school 
students.
In addition to the funds required for maintenance and repair, the second section of 
the Act entitled the Elementary and Secondary Education Opportunity Program to provide 
grants directly from the State Treasury to low-income parents of school children attending 
nonpublic schools. Families with incomes of less than $5,000 would receive a grant of $50 
per year for a child in grade school and $100 per child in high school. The Act detailed that 
the grants could not exceed 50% of the sum the parents originally paid. Some parents did 
not qualify for these grants so parents who had paid at least $50 in tuition and had a child in 
grades 1 through 12 and have an adjusted gross income of $5,000 to $25,000 were given a 
state income tax deduction. A set maximum value of $1,000 per child was predetermined.  
The purpose of the funding was to bolster the competitive nature of nonpublic 
schools which had been experiencing a systematic decline in New York. The goal was to 
keep attendance high at nonpublic schools to ensure that public schools were not 
encumbered by a large influx of nonpublic school students. The New York State Legislature 
feared that “any precipitous decline in the number of nonpublic school pupils would cause a 
massive increase in public school enrolment and costs which would seriously jeopardize 
437 Ibid. 
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quality education for all children and aggravate an already serious fiscal crisis in public 
education.”438
District Court Judge Gurfein delivered the opinion of the Court. He agreed with the 
legislative findings that it was imperative to allow for a maximum choice in schools. Gurfein 
stated that the “vitality of our pluralistic society is, in part, dependent upon the capacity of 
individual parents to select a school, other than public, for the education of their 
children.”439 He continued that this right to a multitude of choices was diminished for poor 
families. The “‘right’ is diminished or denied to children of poor families whose parents have 
the least options in determining where their children are to be educated.”440  Gurfein 
concluded that the state law had a legitimate purpose “to partially relieve the financial 
burdens of parents who provide a nonpublic education for their children.” 441
 As to the first section of the Act, Gurfein stated the Court’s “reluctant 
conclusion.”442 The Court declared that the direct public subsidy for “maintenance and 
repair” was unconstitutional even though the Court sympathized with what it deemed an 
essentially secular intention but regrettably, in effect, advanced religion and created an 
excessive entanglement.  The Court ordered the injunction of the §1 maintenance and repair 
grants. The Court determined that §2, the tuition reimbursement grants, was 
unconstitutional. The only part that passed constitutional muster was the income tax 
provisions of §§ 3, 4, and 5. 
One year later, on appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York, the Supreme Court ruled on the issue. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the 
438 Ibid.
439 Ibid.
440 Ibid.
441 Ibid.
442 Ibid.
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Court by commenting on the difficulty in reaching conclusions regarding permissible and 
impermissible actions.  “For it is evident from the numerous opinions of the Court, and of 
Justices in concurrence and dissent in the leading cases applying the Establishment Clause, 
that no ‘bright line’ guidance is afforded.”443 These cases were complicated by the numerous 
interpretations of the First Amendment’s original intent. Powell stated that “despite 
Madison’s admonition and the ‘sweep of the absolute prohibitions’ of the Clauses, this 
Nation's history has not been one of entirely sanitized separation between Church and State. 
It has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation, 
and as a consequence cases arising under these Clauses have presented some of the most 
perplexing questions to come before this Court.”444
The Court found fault with three of the five sections of the amendment. Powell 
deemed the maintenance and repair grants were unconstitutional because of the possibility 
that the reimbursements would not be confined to the actual maintenance and repair 
expenses. Powell stated that “nothing in the statute…bars a qualifying school from paying 
out of state funds the salaries of employees who maintain the school chapel, or the cost of 
renovating classrooms in which religion is taught, or the cost of heating and lighting those 
same facilities.”445 The Act was not restrictive enough and was therefore deemed 
unconstitutional. Powell reasoned that “in the absence of an effective means of guaranteeing 
that the state aid derived from public funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and 
nonideological purposes, it is clear from our cases that direct aid in whatever form is 
invalid.”446
443 Id., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (1973). 
444 Ibid. 
445 Ibid. 
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The Court determined that the maintenance and repair section as well as the tuition 
reimbursement section failed Lemon’s effect test. The maintenance and repair provisions 
violated the Establishment Clause because their effect was to advance the religious mission 
of sectarian schools. The Court also concluded that all three sections including the 
maintenance and repair grants, the tuition grants, and the tax deductions, all had the primary 
effect of advancing religion. Approximately 20% of New York students or 750,000 students 
attend New York nonpublic schools. Of these nonpublic school children, 85% were church 
affiliated. In all, 280 low income schools were deemed to qualify for the aid.
The Supreme Court affirmed the injunction of the first two sections but reversed the 
decision regarding the third, fourth and fifth sections.  The Supreme Court found fault with 
each section and deemed them unconstitutional. Powell explained “whether the grant is 
labeled a reimbursement, a reward, or a subsidy, its substantive impact is still the 
same.”447 Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist effectively stopped the New York state law 
that authorized reimbursement to low income families of parochial school students, 
prohibited tax deductions for such families, and disallowed direct grants to such families. 
The Act passed the first prong of the Lemon test - all three were determined to have a 
secular purpose but all three, however, failed the second prong in that they furthered 
religion.
The next case that utilized the Lemon test was the 1973 Hunt v. McNair.448 In the 
same year that the Supreme Court struck down maintenance and repair grants, tuition 
reimbursements, and tax deductions for parochial students, it upheld issuance of 
447 Ibid. 
448 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973). 
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government revenue bonds for religious colleges that utilized the bond proceeds to build on-
campus facilities. 
Richard W. Hunt, a resident and taxpayer of South Carolina, sued Robert E. McNair, 
the Governor of South Carolina, for declaratory and injunctive relief against the South 
Carolina Educational Facilities Act.449 The Education Facilities Act created the Education 
Facilities Authority to approve proceeds from a South Carolina state bond that was lent to a 
Baptist College in Charleston, a South Carolina eleemosynary corporation, for the 
construction of an on-campus building until such time the college repaid the loan.  
The issued revenue bonds were intended to assist “higher educational institutions in 
constructing and financing projects, such as buildings, facilities, and site preparation, but not 
including any facility for sectarian instruction or religious worship.”450 Specifically, the bond 
proceeds could not be used to finance “any facility used or to be used for sectarian 
instruction or as a place of religious worship nor any facility which is used or to be used 
primarily in connection with any part of the program of a school  or department of divinity 
for any religious denomination.”451 While the loan was repaid, the the Baptist College at 
Charleston conveyed 400 acres of its land to the state-created Educational Facilities 
Authority which was leased to the college until debt repayment was completed. A stipulation 
required that if the repayment was not completed, the government could foreclose on the 
land. Hunt believed that the South Carolina Educational Facilities Authority Act violated the 
Establishment Clause in that the proceeds of the state issued bonds would directly benefit a 
Baptist College.
449 Ibid., S. C. Code Ann. §22-41(Supp. 1971). 
450 Ibid. 
451 Ibid.
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The college initially requested a loan amount of $3,500,000 from the Authority for 
the purposes of: 
(a) paying off outstanding indebtedness of the Baptist Foundation incurred 
for the purpose of acquiring certain equipment and trailers utilized as a part 
of the College's educational plant in the amount of approximately $275,000; 
(b) reimbursing in part the College's Current Fund for moneys advanced to 
the College's Plant Fund used to purchase school equipment and other 
capital improvements and for the payment of the aforesaid obligation of the 
Baptist College Foundation;   and (c) refunding an outstanding indebtedness 
of the College in the amount of approximately $2,500,000 represented by the 
College's first mortgage serial bonds dated July 1, 1966.452
After this initial request, the college received a bank loan in the amount of $2,500,000 and 
altered its requested amount as well as purpose. The college requested $1,250,000 in revenue 
bonds this time to be used for the purposes of:   
(i) to repay in full the College's Current Fund for the balance (approximately 
$250,000) advanced to the College's Plant Fund as aforesaid; (ii) to refund 
outstanding short-term loans in the amount of $800,000 whose proceeds 
were to pay off indebtedness incurred for capital improvements, and (iii) to 
finance the completion of the dining hall facilities at a cost of approximately 
$200,000.453
The legislative intent of the Act was clearly secular in nature and passed the first prong of 
the Lemon test. The Act was created for the benefit of the people: 
The purpose of this section [is] to provide a measure of assistance and an 
alternative method to enable institutions for higher education in the State to 
provide the facilities and structures which are sorely needed to accomplish 
the purposes of this act, all to the public benefit and good, to the extent and 
manner provided herein.454
The creators of the Act were well aware of the turmoil that could arise and went to great 
lengths to ensure that the Act would be devoid of any section that may eventually be deemed 
452 Hunt v. McNair, 255 S.C. 71 (1970). 
453 Ibid.
454 Hunt v. McNair, 258 S.C. 97 (1972). 
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in violation of the Religion Clauses.  Besides ensuring the secular nature of the Act, the State 
removed itself from connection with the project and thus any implications its participation 
may have. “Revenue bonds issued under the provisions of this chapter shall not be deemed 
to constitute a debt or liability of the State or of any political subdivision thereof or a pledge 
of the faith and credit of the State or of any such political subdivision, but shall be payable 
solely from the funds herein provided therefore from revenues.”455 The State made clear that 
the revenues were not expended from State coffers but from the revenues of the Authority. 
The bonds were very attractive due to the exceptional interest rate.  “The income-
tax-exempt status of the interest enables the Authority, as an instrumentality of the State, to 
market the bonds at a significantly lower rate of interest than the educational institution 
would be forced to pay if it borrowed the money by conventional private financing.”456 The 
College was also pleased with the repayment plan. The plan constituted for a contingency 
plan. “The Authority and the trustee bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would 
create, for the benefit of the bondholders, a foreclosable mortgage lien on the Project 
property including a mortgage on the right, title and interest of the Authority in and to the 
Lease Agreement.”457
The deal was premised on the assurance that the Baptist College at Charleston would 
not provide any sectarian use of the new building:  
The Deed of reconveyance from the Authority to the Institution shall be 
made subject to the condition that so long as the Institution, or any voluntary 
grantee of the Institution, shall own the leased premises, or any part thereof, 
that no facility thereon, financed in whole or in part with the proceeds of the 
bonds, shall be used for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious 
worship, or used in connection with any part of the program of a school or 
department of divinity of any religious denomination.458
455 Id., Hunt v. McNair (1973). 
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The creators of the Act truly covered all possible weaknesses inherent in this type of 
religion-state nexus. The foresight and thoroughness paid off at the Supreme Court of South 
Carolina as well as the Supreme Court of the United States.  
The Supreme Court of the United States followed the principles previously 
established in Lemon “with full recognition that these are no more than helpful signposts, we 
consider the present statute and the proposed transaction in terms of the three ‘tests’: 
purpose, effect, and entanglement.”459 In a vote of 6-to-3, after applying the Lemon-test, the 
Supreme Court found the loan constitutional and upheld the issuance of revenue bonds for 
religious colleges. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, deemed the plan secular in nature 
as well as clever in that it was available to all colleges and thus potentially beneficial to many 
institutions. “The benefits of the Act are available to all institutions of higher education in 
South Carolina, whether or not having a religious affiliation.”460 Since the new building was 
not used for sectarian purposes the plan was deemed to neither advanced nor inhibited 
religion.
The Court has not accepted the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden 
because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other 
resources on religious ends. Aid normally may be thought to have a primary 
effect of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which religion 
is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the 
religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an 
otherwise substantially secular setting.461
But the Baptist College at Charleston was not deemed to be so pervasive even though it was 
administered by the College Board of Trustees which was elected by the South Carolina 
Baptist Convention and that 60% of the College student body was Baptist. The college made 
459 Id., Hunt v. McNair (1973). 
460 Ibid.
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it clear that religious qualifications for faculty and student body were not sanctioned. “On 
the record in this case there is no basis to conclude that the College's operations are oriented 
significantly towards sectarian rather than secular education.”462 Even if they were 
sanctioned, Tilton established that dealings with an institution even if religious in nature were 
not inherently unconstitutional. In addition, the Court found than an excessive entanglement 
did not exist. “Although the record in this case is abbreviated and not free from ambiguity, 
the burden rests on appellant to show the extent to which the College is church 
related…and he has failed to show more than a formalistic church relationship.”463
  It is interesting that Hunt v. McNair came to the same conclusion before the Lemon 
test was invoked as well as after. The trial court denied relief and the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina affirmed even after the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment 
and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the ruling in Lemon. The conclusion 
reached was the same but significantly, it added to the First Amendment case law that 
invoked the decision in Lemon.
Eight years later, the Widmar v. Vincent464 case involved a ruling by the University of 
Missouri at Kansas City that prohibited the use of its facilities by a student led religious 
organization. The school believed that its refusal to allow the on-campus meetings was 
required by the United States Constitution to ensure that the University was not in violation 
of the Establishment Clause. Eleven members of Cornerstone, the student religious group 
that had previously been permitted to use the facilities to hold prayers and Bible studies sued 
the school on October 13, 1977 after being informed of the change in policy. Clark Vincent 
and Florian Chess representing the students that initiated that action filed suit agianst Gary 
462 Ibid.
463 Ibid.
464 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
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Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, claiming that their First Amendment rights of 
religious free exercise and free speech were violated.   
The issue in this case was whether the University of Missouri at Kansas City could 
deny access of one of its facilities to Cornerstone, a group which intended to use the facility 
for religious worship. Cornerstone consisted of various denominational evangelical Christian 
students. “Cornerstone held its on-campus meetings in classrooms and in the student center. 
These meetings were open to the public and attracted up to 125 students. A typical 
Cornerstone meeting included prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious 
views and experiences.”465 The use of the University grounds was deemed easier than 
traveling off-campus since the nearest University chapel was at the University’s Columbia 
campus, approximately 125 miles east of UMKC.466
UMKC openly advocated student organization. “The University officially recognizes 
over 100 student groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the meetings of 
registered organizations. Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to help 
defray the costs to the University.”467 Cornerstone had for four years during 1973 and 1977 
been a registered group and paid the activity fee. The purpose of Cornerstone, as stated on 
the University’s request form, was to “promote a knowledge of Jesus Christ among 
students” and stated that the meetings and events would be open to the public, no 
University funds would be used, no admission would be charged, and no donations would 
be solicited.468
In 1977, however, the University informed Cornerstone that as per a 1972 Board of 
Curators regulation, the group could no longer use the facilities. The regulation that had not 
465 Ibid. 
466 Ibid. 
467 Ibid. 
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yet been enforced prohibited the use of University buildings and grounds “for purposes of 
religious worship or religious teaching."469 The first of a two-part regulation adopted by the 
Curators in 1972 stated that:  
No University buildings or grounds …may be used for purposes of religious 
worship or religious teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. 
Student congregations of local churches…may use the facilities, commonly 
referred to as the student union or center or commons…. The general 
prohibition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious 
worship or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The 
Board of Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open 
to any other construction.470
The second part of the two-part regulation, stated that “Regular chapels established on 
University grounds may be used for religious services but not for regular recurring services 
of any groups. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to any religious 
group.”471
On December 11, 1979, the United Stated District Court for the Western District of 
Missouri heard the case. 472  The Court upheld the University’s regulation and agreed that the 
state could not allow religious use of the building without directly supporting that religion.
The Court also ruled that religious speech could be jeopardized to ensure that a prohibitive 
support to a religion was not created. District Court Justice Collinson explained the decision 
of the Court. Collinson justified the decision by comparing it to the circumstances and 
decision in Tilton v. Richardson.473 “This Court finds that a university policy permitting regular 
religious services in university-owned buildings would have the primary effect of advancing 
religion. This Court holds, therefore, that the university's present ban on religious services in 
468 Widmar v. Vincent, 635 F.2d 1310 (1980). 
469 Id., Widmar v. Vincent  (1981). 
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its buildings is required by the establishment clause.”474 The Court also found that religious 
speech was entitled to less protection than other types of expression even if that meant  the 
subversion of some freedoms in the name of others. Collinson explained that “the State of 
Missouri's interest in maintaining a strict separation of church and state is a sufficiently 
compelling interest to overbalance plaintiffs' claims to free exercise of religion.”475
Unsatisfied with the ruling, the plaintiffs challenged the District’s Court’s decree on 
August 4, 1980 in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit.476 The Court of 
Appeals found UMKC’s refusal to allow Cornerstone access to University facilities 
unconstitutional. The Court found that a religious group could not be excluded based on the 
content of their meetings. Circuit Judge Heaney explained what he considered to be the 
compelling argument of content-based discrimination.  “According to the Court of Appeals, 
the ‘primary effect’ of such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to further 
the neutral purpose of developing students’ ‘social and cultural awareness as well as [their] 
intellectual curiosity.’”477 The primary effect of would not be to advance religion but to 
advance the University’s purpose. Circuit Judge Heaney stated that “neutral accommodation 
of the many student groups active at UMKC would not constitute an establishment of 
religion even though some student groups may use the University’s facilities for religious 
worship or religious teaching.”478 The regulation was determined to violate the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments and the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision. 
In 1981, in an 8-to-1 decision, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the ruling 
of the Court of Appeals. The Court found that the Establishment Clause did not require 
473 Id., Tilton v. Richardson (1971). 
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state universities to limit access to their facilities by religious organizations. Because the 
university had generally permitted its facilities to be used by student organizations, it had to 
demonstrate that its restrictions were constitutionally permitted. It was determined that an 
equal access policy would not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause. The three-
pronged Lemon Test would not be violated by allowing religious groups to meet on campus. 
The legislative purpose was clearly secular and did not foster excessive government 
entanglement. The University’s claim that the policy’s primary effect would be to advance 
religion was rejected. But as Justice Powell explained, “...this Court has explained that a 
religious organization’s enjoyment of merely ‘incidental’ benefits does not violate the 
prohibition against the ‘primary advancement’ of religion.” It was determined that any such 
benefits at UMKC would be incidental.  
The Supreme Court decision ensured religious organization access to public facilities. 
This access was endorsed with the understanding that the University, in this case, was not in 
support of the messages that were communicated in their facilities. The Court also 
concluded that the University policy was found to discriminate against religious groups and 
that this discrimination was not allowed because the rights to Free Exercise outweighed any 
Establishment concerns. Clearly, equal access was not incompatible with the Establishment 
Clause but if, however, the university had not created the public forum it would not have 
been required to furnish facilities for use by religious groups.479 The Court expressly 
prohibited the University from instituting a greater degree of separation. The Clauses 
worked in tandem to define permissible action. The degree of greater separation intended by 
the state was not allowed and was limited by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the 
Free Speech Clause as well.  
478 Ibid.
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 In hindsight, the decision in Wallace v. Jaffree480 is devoid of any difficult 
contemplation. At the time, however, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Alabama had difficulty finding an error in a law that in effect established religion. 
In 1983, Ishmael Jaffree, a resident of Mobile County, filed suit on behalf of his three 
children to enjoin three statutes regarding school prayer and moment of silence. Chief Judge 
Hand delivered the opinion if the Court ruling in favor of Wallace, the governor of Alabama. 
The Court found the Act constitutional because a State had the right to establish a state 
religion.481
 Jaffree’s three minor children, Jamael Aakki Jaffree, Makeba Green, and Chioke 
Saleem Jaffree attended public school in Mobile County, Alabama. The defendants were 
teachers or principals at the public schools. The complaint alleged that at each of the schools 
attended by the Jaffree children, different prayers were led by the teachers. At E.R. Dickson 
School, for example the teacher led the class in singing: “God is great, God is good, Let us 
thank him for our food, bow our heads we all are fed, Give us Lord our daily bread. 
Amen!”482 In another classroom, the teacher led the students in the Lord’s Prayer: “Our 
Father, which art in heaven, hallowed be Thy name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done 
on earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day our daily bread and forgive us our debts as we 
forgive our debtors. And lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil for thine is the 
kingdom and the power and the glory forever. Amen.”483Jaffree, an agnostic, informed the 
school on several occasions that he did not want his children to participate in any type of 
479 Id., Nowak and Rotunda. Principles of Constitutional Law (2004). p. 772. 
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religious activity at school and warned that if the activity continued, he would take legal 
action.
 Jaffree’s complaints did not alter the actions of the teacher who claimed that the 
prayers were conducted voluntarily. The prayers continued even though the school policy 
adopted by the Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County stated that:
Schools shall comply with all existing state and federal laws as these laws 
pertain to religious practices and the teaching of religion. This policy shall 
not be interpreted to prohibit teaching about the various religions of the 
world, the influence of the Judeo-Christian faith on our society, and the 
values and ideals of the American way of life.484
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama decision began 
predictably by stating that in Alabama, prayer in public schools is per se unconstitutional. 
“Prayer is an address of entreaty, supplication, praise, or thanksgiving directed to some 
sacred or divine spirit, being, or object. That it may contemplate some wholly secular 
objective cannot alter the inherently religious character of the exercise.”485 The prayers held 
in public schools were thus deemed to be in violation of the Establishment Clause. The 
Court reiterated the importance of the neutrality principle. “Although a given prayer or 
practice may not favor any one sect, the principle of neutrality in religious matters is violated 
under these decisions by any program which places tacit government approval upon religious 
views or practices.”486 The Court thus established the prayers unconstitutional but took an 
incredible leap and concluded that the U.S. Constitution intended to prohibit only the 
federal government from establishing a national religion. Quoting Professor Charles 
Fairman, Hand stated that the “mountain of evidence has become so high, one may have 
lost sight of the few stones and pebbles that made up the theory that the Fourteenth 
484 Ibid.
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Amendment incorporated Amendments I to VIII.”487 Hand concluded that “suffice it to say 
that the few stones and pebbles provide precious little historical support for the view that 
the states were prohibited by the establishment clause of the first amendment from 
establishing a religion.”488 In effect, the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Alabama concluded that based on their independent historical review, the United States 
Supreme Court had erred in its interpretation of original intent. In a stunning decision based 
on this analysis, the Court decided that “because the establishment clause of the first 
amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit the state from establishing a 
religion, the prayers offered by the teachers in this case are not unconstitutional.” The Court 
went on to denigrate the historical pattern of Religion Clause application:
Consistency no longer exists. Where you cannot recite the Lord's Prayer, you 
may sing his praises in God Bless America. Where you cannot post the Ten 
Commandments on the wall for those to read if they do choose, you can 
require the Pledge of Allegience. Where you cannot acknowledge the 
authority of the Almighty in the Regent's prayer, you can acknowledge the 
existence of the Almighty in singing the verses of America and Battle Hymn 
of the Republic. It is no wonder that the people perceive that justice is 
myoptic, obtuse, and janus-like.489
This decision concluded the first part of the case. It concerned the part of the statute that 
authorized teachers to lead students in voluntary prayer.  
The court separated the cases into two, one deciding on the prayer in school and the 
other, in an amended action, the constitutionality of two laws known as the Alabama school 
prayer statutes.490 Section 16-1-20.1 allowed for a moment of silence for grades 1-6. It stated 
that:
486 Ibid.
487 Ibid.
488 Ibid.
489 Ibid.
490 Ibid., Ala.Code §16-1-20.1 (1982) and Ala.Code §16-1-20.2 (former Ala.Act 82-735). 
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At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public 
schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held 
may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration 
shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such 
period no other activities shall be engaged in. 
Section 16-1-20.2 allowed for a moment of silence and voluntary prayer for all grades. It 
stated that:   
From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any public educational 
institution  within the State of Alabama… may lead the willing students in 
the following prayer to God: 
Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge You as the Creator 
and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your justice, Your truth, and Your 
peace abound this day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the counsels of 
our government, in the sanctity of our homes and in the classrooms of our 
schools. In the name of our Lord. Amen. 
Jaffree v. James,491 the case that dealt with the statutes ordered a preliminary injunction against 
the implementation of the statutes but after the trial, the district court dismissed both actions 
effectively dissolving the preliminary injunction. 
On May 12, 1983, The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed in part and reversed in part.492 The Act was considered an establishment of a 
religion and thus unconstitutional. Circuit Judge Hatchett delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Court affirmed the previous ruling on Ala.Code §16-1-20.1 and Ala.Code §16-1-20.2. 
The statutes were held to be clearly in violation of the Establishment Clause. Regarding the 
payer in schools, the Appeals Court recognized that disregarding approval or disapproval, 
the Court followed the decisions of the Supreme Court as “the final arbiter of constitutional 
disputes.”493 The Court of Appelas stated that based on precedent, specifically Lemon,
491 Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.Ala.1982). 
492 Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (1983).  
493 Ibid. 
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Nyquist, Engel, and Everson, the prayers conducted in school were unconstitutional. The 
Appeals Court reversed the District Court’s dismissal of the prayer case and remanded the 
case to the District Court. 
  On June 4, 1985, on appeal from the United States Court of Appeals, the Supreme 
Court of the United States decided together with Smith v. Jaffree, also on appeal from the 
same court, affirmed in a 6-to-3 decision.494 Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the 
Court. In acknowledging the District Court’s ruling, he sympathized but also admonished 
the Court in looking away from the Establishment Clause jurisprudence that the Courts had 
established since 1899. “This uncertainty as to the intent of the Framers of the Bill of Rights 
does not mean we should ignore history for guidance on the role of religion in public 
education. When the intent of the Framers is unclear, I believe we must employ both history 
and reason in our analysis.”495
Stevens relied on Lemon for guidance. The central issue was the actual intent of the 
law. The Lemon test required that a statute must be invalidated if its intent is established as 
the advancement of religion.  The District Court heard evidence of such an intent. State 
Senator Donald G. Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that was enacted in 1981 as §16-1-20.1, 
stated that he endorsed the bill in an “effort to return voluntary prayer to our public 
schools.”496 In addressing the Court, he stated: 
By passage of this bill by the Alabama Legislature our children in this state 
will have the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of this state and 
this country. The United States as well as the State of Alabama was founded 
by people who believe in God. I believe this effort to return voluntary prayer 
to our public schools for its return to us to the original position of the 
writers of the Constitution, this local philosophies and beliefs hundreds of 
Alabamians have urged my continuous support for permitting school prayer. 
Since coming to the Alabama Senate I have worked hard on this legislation 
494 Id., Wallace v. Jaffree (1985). 
495 Ibid. 
496 Id., Wallace v. Jaffree (1983). 
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to accomplish the return of voluntary prayer in our public schools and return 
to the basic moral fiber.497
Stevens commented on the past accommodation of religion by the Courts. He supported the 
solutions of the Court in that they provided some palpable boundaries to the Religion 
Clauses. “The solution to the conflict between the Religion Clauses lies not in ‘neutrality,’ 
but rather in identifying workable limits to the government's license to promote the free 
exercise of religion.”498 The intent of the statute as revealed by the key sponsor, however, 
made the statute unconstitutional. In this case, the hands of the Court were tied and an 
accommodation could not be reached.    
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the moment of silence clause was 
constitutional but six of the justices held that the voluntary prayer clause unconstitutional. 
Stevens stated that “Alabama has intentionally crossed the line between creating a quiet 
moment during which those so inclined may pray, and affirmatively endorsing the particular 
religious practice of prayer.”499 The accommodation of religion was not permitted here – 
rendering Wallace one of those rare cases where the Court invalidated legislation because the 
legislature was motivated solely by a religious purpose.500 “Even if the Court in the future 
abandons the ‘Lemon tests’ (the formal three part tests: purpose-effect-entanglement), the 
Court is unlikely to overrule its decisions finding that officially authorized prayers, or 
readings from religious texts, in government grade schools and high schools violate the 
establishment clause.”501
497 Ibid. 
498 Id., Wallace v. Jaffree (1985). 
499 Ibid. 
500 Id., Nowak and Rotunda. Principles of Constitutional Law (2004). p. 769. 
501 Ibid. 
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 In 1985, the same year during which Wallace v. Jaffree was decided, the Court again 
applied the Lemon test to decide Aguilar v. Felton.502 The dispute began in 1978 when six 
New York City residents and taxpayers, represented by Betty-Louise Felton, brought suit 
against Yolanda Aguilar in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York alleging that Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965503 violated 
the Establishment Clause. The taxpayers alleged their First Amendment rights were violated 
and sued to enjoin any further funds from going to parochial schools.
 Title I of the New York City Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965504
enabled federal funds to pay the salaries of public school teachers who also taught at 
parochial schools. The teachers provided special educational services to poor children in 
parochial schools. To ensure that proper subject matter was being taught, monthly 
unannounced checks were undertaken. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965 empowered the Secretary of Education to grant aid to local institutions that 
served low-income families.
Congress hereby declares it to be the policy of the United States to provide 
financial assistance… to local educational agencies serving areas with 
concentrations of children from low-income families to expand and improve 
their educational programs by various means …which contribute particularly 
to meeting the special educational needs of educationally deprived children.505
Title I was also made eligible to students attending parochial schools. “To the extent 
consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the 
local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such 
agency shall make provisions for including special educational services and arrangements . . . 
502 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
503 Ibid., 20 USCS 6301 et seq. 
504 Ibid., Title I, 92 Stat. 2153, was codified at 20 U. S. C. § 2701. 
505 Ibid., Title I, 92 Stat. 2153, was codified at 20 U. S. C. § 2701. 
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in which such children can participate.”506 To qualify for such aid, the school had to 
specifically demonstrate that the students must be educationally deprived507, the children 
must reside in areas comprising a high concentration of low-income families,508 and that the 
programs must be in addition to not instead of programs that exist.509
 The Act provided for annual Congressional appropriations contingent on several 
criteria. Title I funding was eligible only if the two criteria were met including educational 
deprivation “defined as below age-level performance”510 and “residence in an area designated 
by the Local Educational Agency, in accordance with Title I regulations, as having a high 
concentration of children from low-income families.”511 Title I was replaced on October 1, 
1982 with Chapter I of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981.512 This 
Act also enabled parochial schools to receive aid but required an application that specified a 
description of what the funds would be used for. Title I was in use since 1966. “Of those 
students eligible to receive funds in 1981-1982, 13.2% were enrolled in private schools. Of 
that group, 84% were enrolled in schools affiliated with the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of 
New York and the Diocese of Brooklyn and 8% were enrolled in Hebrew day schools.”513
 The Court referred to Wheeler v. Barrera,514 another case concurrent with Aguilar that 
also attacked the validity of Title 1. Wheeler held that “Title I mandated that private school 
students receive services comparable to, but not identical to, the Title I services received by 
public school students. Therefore, the statute would permit, but not require, that on-site 
506 Aguilar v. Felton, 739 F.2d 48 (1984). 
507 Ibid., §3804. 
508 Ibid., §3805. 
509 Ibid., §3807. 
510  Ibid., 20 U.S.C. §§ 2722, 2732-34. 
511  Ibid., 20 U.S.C. §§ 2722, 2732-34. 
512  Id., Aguilar v. Felton (1985), 20 U. S. C. § 3801. 
513 Ibid.
514 Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402(1974). 
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services be provided in the parochial schools.”515 Wheeler did not speak to the 
Constitutionality of the Act but did allow parochial schools to receive funds for “programs 
and projects” that included: “the acquisition of equipment and, where necessary, the 
construction of school facilities which are designed to meet the special educational needs of 
educationally deprived children.”516
 Judge Edward R. Neaher and the District Court disagreed with Felton and granted a 
motion for summary judgment in favor of defendant city, ruling that Title 1 was 
constitutional.  Six years later, on July 9, 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit heard Aguilar v. Felton.517 Circuit Judge Friendly gave the unanimous opinion 
of the Court. The Court reversed on the grounds that the funding violated the 
Establishment Clause. It was determined that the Establishment Clause  “as it ha[d] been 
interpreted by the Supreme Court… constitute[d] an insurmountable barrier to the use of 
federal funds to send public school teachers and other professionals into religious schools to 
carry on instruction, remedial or otherwise, or to provide clinical and guidance services of 
the sort at issue here.”518 The Court followed the ruling in School District of Grand Rapids v. 
Ball519 and concluded that though the Court in Grand Rapids found the Shared Time program 
unconstitutional, the District Court found Title I unconstitutional on the grounds that 
Aguilar contained a monitoring system. This distinguishing feature obliged the Court to 
conclude that Title I was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed the original 
decision based on their analysis and found that the intended preventative nature of the 
515 Id., Aguilar v. Felton (1985) 
516 Ibid.
517 Id., Aguilar v. Felton (1984). 
518 Ibid. 
519 Grand Rapids v. Ball, 739 F.2d 48, 72 (CA2 1984). 
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monthly inspections created an entanglement that was too deep. It was deemed 
unconstitutional even if the aid to parochial schools was not found to advance religion.  
 The next year, in 1985, the Supreme Court of the United States heard Aguilar v. 
Felton520 and affirmed the Court of Appeals ruling in a 5-to-4 decision. The Court deemed 
that the necessary inspections created an unacceptable excessive entanglement between 
government and religion.  Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court.  The Court 
determined that an excessive entanglement occurred. “Even where state aid to parochial 
institutions does not have the primary effect of advancing religion, the provision of such aid 
may nonetheless violate the Establishment Clause owing to the nature of the interaction of 
church and state in the administration of that aid.”521 The Court applied the Lemon test to 
determine whether the regulation passed constitutional muster and was deemed 
unconstitutional based on the determination that it produced an excessive entanglement. “In 
short, the scope and duration of New York City's Title I program would require a permanent 
and pervasive state presence in the sectarian schools receiving aid.”522Like Lemon v. 
Kurtzman,523 the unannounced checks were deemed to be an excessive entanglement unlike 
other cases that did pass muster including Tilton v Richardson524 and Hunt v. McNair.525 The 
Court concluded that “despite the well-intentioned efforts taken by the City of New York, 
the program remains constitutionally flawed owing to the nature of the aid, to the institution 
receiving the aid, and to the constitutional principles that they implicate.”526
520 Id., Aguilar v. Felton (1985). 
521 Ibid. 
522 Ibid. 
523 Id., Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971). 
524 Id., Tilton v. Richardson (1971). 
525 Id., Hunt v. McNair (1973). 
526 Id., Aguilar v. Felton (1985). 
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 Two years later, Edwards v. Aguillard527determined the constitutionality of a Louisiana 
Act528 that required that the teaching of evolution be accompanied by the teaching of 
creationism. The conflict originated on January 10, 1985, when the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana decided the constitutionality of the statute in 
Aguillard v. Treen.529 Don Aguillard, a resident and taxpayer of Louisiana, representing 
numerous Louisiana taxpayers, educators, and parents of school-aged children, sued David 
C. Treen, Governor of Louisiana, to enjoin the “Balanced Treatment” portion of the Act. 
The District Court determined that the statute was unconstitutional. 
In 1981, the Louisiana Legislature amended the Louisiana’s “General School Law” 
entitled “Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School 
Instruction.”530 The Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in 
Public School Instruction was an amendment to Part III of Chapter I of Title 17 of the 
Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950. The amendment included seven new parts including 
§§286.1 through 286.7. The amendment was intended to provide a more balanced treatment 
of creation-science and evolution-science in public schools. The purpose, as established in 
§286.2 was to “protect academic freedom”531 but in reality, the Act specified that “when 
creation or evolution is taught, each shall be taught as a theory, rather than as proven 
scientific fact.”532
The plaintiffs allege that the amendment violated the Establishment Clause. District 
Judge Adrian G. Duplantier gave the opinion of the Court after first deliberating on the 
utilization of the three pronged Lemon test. He quoted from the 1984 Lynch v. Donnelly case 
527 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
528 Aguillard v. Treen, 34 F. Supp. 426 (1985). La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 17:286.1 to .7. 
529 Ibid.
530 Ibid., La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 17:286.1 to .7 
531 Ibid. 
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to demonstrate that the Court has not necessarily in the past adhered to the Lemon test nor 
appreciated being confined to the application of only one constitutional caliper. “We have 
repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this 
sensitive area.”533 He went on to encapsulate the historical trends of the Supreme Court 
rulings. “The First Amendment does not prohibit governmental activity of a religious nature 
so long as the activity is neutral to all religions. One conclusion seems clear - the meaning of 
the First Amendment is not set in constitutional stone. The Constitution guarantees freedom 
of religion, but should not be construed to guarantee freedom from religion."534
The Court was hesitant to outright apply the Lemon test. The Court did agree, 
however, that whichever “test” was applied, the outcome of its application would be the 
same - the Louisiana statute violated the Establishment Clause. Duplantier stated that 
“because it promote[d] the beliefs of some theistic sects to the detriment of others, the 
statute violate[d] the fundamental First Amendment principle that a state must be neutral in 
its treatment of religions. The Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-
Science in Public School Instruction Act is a ‘law respecting an establishment of religion.’”535
Unsatisfied with the ruling, the plaintiffs appealed with the new governor, Edwin W. 
Edwards, as the named defendant. On July 8, 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit heard Aguilard v. Edwards.536 E. Grady Jolly, the Circuit Judge gave the 
opinion of the Court. Grady agreed with the District Court’s ruling and affirmed its decision. 
The Court found that the statute’s purpose of guarding academic freedom was completely 
inconsistent with the requirement of teaching creation science in tandem with evolution.  
532 Ibid. 
533 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668(1984). 
534 Id., Aguillard v. Treen (1985). 
535 Ibid. 
536 Id., Aguilard v. Edwards (1985). 
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Circuit Judge E. Grady Jolly began the opinion of the Court by expressing the 
relative ease in distinguishing the facts of the case. “In truth, notwithstanding the supposed 
complexities of religion-versus-state issues and the lively debates they generate, this 
particular case is a simple one, subject to a simple disposal: the Act violates the 
establishment clause of the first amendment because the purpose of the statute is to 
promote a religious belief.”537 Grady acknowledged the sensitive nature of this case: 
We cannot divorce ourselves from the historical fact that the controversy 
between the proponents of evolution and creationism has religious 
overtones. We do not, indeed cannot, say that the theory of creation is to all 
people solely and exclusively a religious tenet. We also do not deny that the 
underpinnings of creationism may be supported by scientific evidence. It is 
equally true, however, that the theory of creation is a theory embraced by 
many religions. Nor can we ignore the fact that through the years religious 
fundamentalists have publicly scorned the theory of evolution and worked to 
discredit it.538
The Court determined that the use of the Supreme Court precedent to determine the 
constitutionality of the Act was reasonable. In invoking the Lemon test, Grady deduced, as 
had the District Court, that the secular purpose of the Act was nonexistent.  
Not only does the Act fail to promote academic freedom, it fails to promote 
creation science as a genuine academic interest. If primarily concerned with 
the advancement of creation-science, the Act, it certainly appears to us, 
would have required its teaching irrespective of whether evolution was 
taught. Thus a primary academic interest in creation-science would seem to 
be gainsaid because the Act requires the teaching of the creation theory only 
if the theory of evolution is taught.539
The Court determined that the Act violated the Establishment Clause in that its intended 
effect was to “discredit evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the 
537 Ibid.
538 Ibid.
539 Ibid.
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teaching of creationism….The statute therefore is a law respecting a particular religious 
belief.”540
On June 19, 1987 Supreme Court of the United States ruled on Edwards v. 
Aguillard.541 In an 8-to-1 decision the Supreme Court invalidated the Act and determined that 
it was unconstitutional for the third time on the grounds that its intention was to serve and 
aid religion. Justice Brennan, delivering the opinion of the Court, deemed that Louisiana’s 
“Creationism Act” violated the Establishment Clause on several grounds. The Act was 
deemed to promote a religious belief and also did not fulfill its stated goal of promoting 
academic freedom. A clear secular purpose was never determined. It was clear that Senator 
Bill Keith as the legislative sponsor intended to actually narrow the science curriculum. “The 
state senator repeatedly stated that scientific evidence supporting his religious views should 
be included in the public school curriculum to redress the fact that the theory of evolution 
incidentally coincided with what he characterized as religious beliefs antithetical to his 
own.”542  Justice Brennan affirmed that “the goal of providing a more comprehensive science 
curriculum is not furthered either by outlawing the teaching of evolution or by requiring the 
teaching of creation science.”543
The Supreme Court concluded that the District Court did not err in granting 
summary judgment. Brennan remarked on how essential the Supreme Court has held the 
intended meaning of the Establishment Clause when dealing with the education of 
elementary and secondary school children.  
Families entrust public schools with the education of their children, but 
condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not 
purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict with the 
540 Ibid.
541 Id., Edwards v. Aguillard, (1987). 
542 Ibid.
543 Ibid.
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private beliefs of the student and his or her family. Students in such 
institutions are impressionable and their attendance is involuntary.544
The assurance of this maintenance was placed in the hands of the states and in upholding 
this awesome responsibility, the Court found the Act unconstitutional. It was reaffirmed that 
the “public schools, in other words, may not proselytize, but they may teach about religion 
when it is appropriate to do so for secular reasons. For example, one cannot understand the 
history of the middle ages without knowing something about the teachings of the Catholic 
Church, just as one cannot understand ancient Greek history without knowing something 
about the ancient Greek gods.”545 The Lemon-test provided the framework and the growing 
stare decisis to definitely determine the Act unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court has consistently verified that tax exemptions for religious 
organizations are constitutional. They have been deemed appropriate or several reasons 
including the fact that they were granted under the auspices of general exemptions to an 
umbrella group of non-profit groups. On February 21, 1989, Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock546
decided the constitutionality of a Texas state sales tax exemption enacted for specific 
religious publications. Texas Monthly Incorporated, a nonreligious publisher, sued Bob 
Bullock, Comptroller of Public Accounts of State of Texas claiming that tax exemptions 
created specifically for religious publications violated the First Amendment.  
In 1982, the Texas Tax Code provided an exemption specifically geared towards 
religious publications. That section provided:
Periodicals that are published or distributed by a religious faith and that 
consist wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of the faith and books 
544 Ibid. 
545 Id., Nowak and Rotunda. Principles of Constitutional Law (2004). p. 771.  
546 Texas Monthly Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
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that consist wholly of writings sacred to a religion or religious faith are 
exempted from the taxes imposed by this Chapter.547
The state denied any similar tax exemption to other publications. Three years later, in 1984, 
the exemption was repealed, and then reinstated on October 1, 1987.548 Throughout 1984 
and 1987, periodicals published by religious groups continued to be exempted. Because 
Texas Monthly was a general interest magazine, it had to pay sales taxes based on 
subscription sales during the three year period in what amounted to $149,107.74. The 
District Court of Travis County, Texas agreed with Texas Monthly and found the exemption 
unconstitutional based on what the Court deemed to be content based exclusion and 
ordered the taxes of Texas Monthly to be returned. “Such an exemption constitutes an 
unlawful discrimination based on the content of a publication and thus violates Plaintiff's 
rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”549
The Court of Appeals of Texas, Third Supreme Judicial District of Texas did not 
agree and reversed in a 2-to-1 vote.550 Justice Shannon delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Following the Lemon test, the Court determined that the exemption served the secular 
purpose of preserving appropriate separation between church and state. In addition, the 
exemption was not determined to advance or inhibit religion, and did not produce 
impermissible government entanglement with religion.
The Supreme Court of the United States found issue with the appellate judgment 
and reversed and remanded the decision. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court found that 
the exemption violated Establishment Clause. Justice Brennan, delivering the opinion of the 
Court, determined that a sales tax exemption granted solely to religious literature violated the 
547 Texas Monthly Inc. v. Bullock, 731 S. W. 2d 160 (1987).Tex. Tax Code Ann. §151.312. 
548 Ibid. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 151.320 (Supp. 1988-1989) 
549 Ibid.
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Establishment Clause. The secular objective of the exemption was never determined. The 
Supreme Court had previously sanctioned exemptions to a wide array of groups. It was 
determined that any incidental benefit that affected religious groups was allowed and did not 
invalidate the intended secular purpose. “The nonsectarian aims of government and the 
interests of religious groups often overlap, and this Court has never required that public 
authorities refrain from implementing reasonable measures to advance legitimate secular 
goals merely because they would thereby relieve religious groups of costs they would 
otherwise incur.”551 The Court gave examples such as Widmar v. Vincent552 in which the Court 
sanctioned the use of university facilities by all groups, including religious groups. The Court 
also referred to Walz v. Tax Commission of New York 553 that affirmed a property tax 
exemption for religious properties. “In all of these cases, however, we emphasized that the 
benefits derived by religious organizations flowed to a large number of nonreligious groups 
as well. Indeed, were those benefits confined to religious organizations, they could not have 
appeared other than as state sponsorship of religion; if that were so, we would not have 
hesitated to strike them down for lacking a secular purpose and effect.”554 The issue in Texas 
Monthly was that the exemption benefited only a small group – in this case, a sectarian group.  
The exemption was not conferred on a multitude of parties and in effect created an 
environment where the taxpayers endorsed a religious aim. “Every tax exemption constitutes 
a subsidy that affect[ed] nonqualifying taxpayers, forcing them to become ‘indirect and 
vicarious donors.’”555 The exemption in effect advanced religion and also created an 
entanglement. “It is difficult to view Texas’ narrow exemption as anything but state 
550 Ibid.
551 Id., Texas Monthly Inc. v. Bullock (1989). 
552 Id.,  Widmar v. Vincent (1981). 
553 Id., Walz v. Tax Commission (1970). 
554 Id., Texas Monthly Inc. v. Bullock (1989). 
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sponsorship of religious belief, regardless of whether one adopts the perspective of 
beneficiaries or of uncompensated contributors.”556 The exemption was not determined to 
be necessary as per the Free Exercise Clause and it was also determined that paying a sales 
tax did not have the effect of impeding religion. Brennan stated that “in this case, the State 
has adduced no evidence that the payment of a sales tax by subscribers to religious 
periodicals or purchasers of religious books would offend their religious beliefs or inhibit 
religious activity.”557
The Court reaffirmed that tax exemptions for religious organizations were 
constitutional, as deduced in Walz, but prohibited an exemption that was only applicable to 
such religious groups. The exemption clearly lacked a secular objective since it only applied 
to religious groups. Additionally, the Court deduced that the application of a tax to these 
secular groups for publication did not violate either of the clauses.  
In the footsteps of Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, Jimmy Swaggart Ministeries v. Board of 
Equalization558 determined the constitutionality of California’s Sales and Use Tax on a 
religious organization’s publications. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries claimed that the California’s 
Sales and Use Tax was unconstitutional both on Free Exercise and Establishment Clause 
grounds.
The California Sales and Use Tax Law imposed a six percent tax for all in-state sales 
on personal property as well as six percent for all such property purchased outside the state. 
It “require[d] retailers to pay a sales tax ‘[for] the privilege of selling tangible personal 
555 Ibid.
556 Ibid.
557 Ibid.
558 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990).  
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property at retail.’”559 Significantly, the constitution of California did not require religious 
organizations to be exempt from the Sales and Use Tax. 
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries was a religious organization incorporated in 1982 as a 
Louisiana nonprofit corporation based on its church services administered since 1980 in 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana.  The incorporated Ministries’s constitution declared:  
That Jimmy Swaggart Ministries is called for the purpose of establishing and 
maintaining an evangelistic outreach for the worship of Almighty God…to 
assume a proper share of responsibility and privilege of propagating the 
gospel of Jesus Christ. This outreach shall…specifically include evangelistic 
crusades; missionary endeavors; education…; radio broadcasting…; 
television broadcasting; and audio production and reproduction of music; 
audio production and reproduction of preaching; audio production and 
reproduction of teaching; writing, printing and publishing; and, any and all 
other individual or mass media methods that presently exist or may be 
devised in the future to proclaim the good news of Jesus Christ.560
In 1980, the California Board of Equalization notified Jimmy Swaggart that it needed to 
register as a seller to ensure that its profits and subsequent taxes could be calculated. In 
California, Jimmy Swaggart had to pay taxes for its religious materials because an exemption 
for religious materials did not exist.  Jimmy Swaggart did not respond to the request holding 
that according to the U.S. Constitution, they were exempt. An audit ensued and concluded 
that between April 1, 1974 and December 31, 1981 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries sold tangible 
personal property in California in the amount of $1,702,942.00 for mail order sales from and 
$240,560.00 for crusade merchandise.561 “These figures represented the sales and use in 
California of merchandise with specific religious content -- Bibles, Bible study manuals, 
printed sermons and collections of sermons, audiocassette tapes of sermons, religious books 
and pamphlets, and religious music in the form of song-books, tapes, and records.”562 The 
559 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1269 (1988). Rev. & Tax. Code, §6001.  
560 Ibid.
561 Ibid.
562 Ibid.
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sales and use taxes owed amounted to $118,294.54, plus interest of $36,021.11, and a penalty 
of $11,829.45, for a total amount due of $166,145.10.563
Jimmy Swaggart paid the amount and filed a petition of redetermination. The 
petition failed, the refund was rejected, and Jimmy Swaggart brought suit in State Court. The 
State Court found the application of the tax constitutional. In an opinion by Justice P.J. 
Kremer on August 29, 1988, the Court of Appeals of California Fourth Appellate District 
affirmed the decision of the Superior Court of San Diego County.564 Two years later on 
January 17, 1990, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision and denied a 
discretionary review and held the tax constitutional.565
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice O’Connor explained that the Court found 
the tax constitutional based on the fact that the tax was applied to all and equally burdened 
all. The tax was not found to specifically burden only Jimmy Swaggart’s religious activity. 
“The sales and use tax [was] not a tax on the right to disseminate religious information, 
ideas, or  beliefs per se; rather, it [was] a tax on the privilege of making retail sales of tangible 
personal property and on the storage, use, or other consumption of tangible personal 
property in California.”566 O’Connor provided a compelling example that “California treats 
the sale of a Bible by a religious organization just as it would treat the sale of a Bible by a 
bookstore; as long as both are in-state retail sales of tangible personal property, they are both 
subject to the tax regardless of the motivation for the sale or the purchase.”567 The Sales and 
Use tax was determined to be nondiscriminatory in nature. The claim that the tax burdened 
Jimmy Swaggart because it produced a reduction in income was not enough to prove a 
563 Ibid. 
564 Ibid.
565 Id., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization (1990). 
566 Ibid. 
567 Ibid. 
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constitutional violation. In addition, the taxation was not deemed to constitute an excessive 
entanglement. “Collection and payment of the tax will of course require some contact 
between appellant and the State,   but we have held that generally applicable administrative 
and recordkeeping regulations may be imposed on religious organization without running 
afoul of the Establishment Clause.”568 As in the previous Texas Monthly v. Bullock, neither the 
Establishment nor the Free Exercise Clauses were violated.  
Texas Monthly v. Bullock and Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization enabled 
the government to tax religious organizations and not necessarily exclude them based solely 
on the religious nature of their organization. The next two cases however, reverse the recent 
trends and accommodate religious groups. The Alger v. City of Chicago569 ruling was 
detrimental to historic preservationists in that the case decided that a statute allowing 
religious properties to resist designation was valid. The 1990 Alger v. City of Chicago570  case 
was disheartening for preservationists. In light of the growing population of aging historic 
religious properties, preservationists find that the preservation of religious properties 
imperative. In an opinion by U.S. District Judge Marvin E. Aspen, the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that a Chicago ordinance, Municipal Code 
§21-69.1(1987), that enabled religious properties to rebuff Landmark status was 
constitutional. 
On September 20, 1990, Rebecca A. Alger, representing the Landmarks Preservation 
Council of Illinois, and The National Trust for Historic Preservation filed suit to 
permanently enjoin the Chicago ordinance. Alger’s objective was to ensure the designation 
of Saint Mary of the Angels Church. The plaintiffs claimed that the application of  §21-69.1 
568 Ibid. 
569 Alger v. City of Chicago, 748 F. Supp. 617 (1990). 
570 Id., Alger v. City of Chicago (1990). 
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Figure 18 
Saint Mary of the Angels Church 
in Chicago. 
was unconstitutional, arguing that it violated the Establishment and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Federal and Illinois Constitutions, and that it unlawfully delegated legislative 
power to religious organizations in violation of the Illinois Constitution. The court sided 
with Chicago and granted its motion to dismiss.  
The case involved a challenge to Chicago’s 
landmark ordinance. The ordinance 
precluded the designation of religious 
buildings as landmarks without the consent 
of the building’s owner. “This ordinance, 
Municipal Code §§21-62 through 21-95, 
sets forth procedures for designating an 
‘area, district, place, building, structure, 
work of art, or other object’ as a ‘Chicago 
landmark.’”571 The designation precluded any 
alteration without approval by the Landmark Commission. The designation process was 
initiated by a decision from the Landmark Commission based on seven statutory criteria. 
After notification, and owner consent, the Commission makes its final decision. The 
ordinance had a specific section that dealt with religious properties. The section provided 
that in the event that the owner of a religious property did not consent, special rules applied. 
“If the property is ‘owned by a religious organization and is used primarily as a place for the 
conduct of religious ceremonies,’ the owner’s refusal to consent precludes designation. This 
effectively ends the designation proceedings.”572 If §21-69.1 was applied, the hands of 
571 Ibid. 
572 Ibid. §21-69.1.
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Historic Preservation were effectively tied. If however §21-69.1 was not applicable, the 
Commission could hold public hearings and designate the property anyway. 
On November 1, 1989, hearings began to designate Saint Mary’s Church as a 
Chicago landmark. Designation was warranted due to the Church’s:
impressive architectural style emphasized by its monumental scale, its 
distinctive and firmly established role as a visual and physical centerpiece of 
the community, and its value as an example of Chicago's historical and 
architectural heritage in its imitation of the grand religious cathedrals of 
Europe.573
The Church was inspired by Francis Gordon and designed by Worthmann & Steinbach. It 
epitomized the Polish Renaissance style.574 Two days later, the Commission sent a letter to 
Cardinal Joseph Bernardin, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Chicago and the owner of 
Saint Mary’s. Cardinal Bernadin declined the designation, which effectively halted the 
designation due to the fact that §21-69.1 was applicable. 
The Court dismissed the compliant for lack of standing. The plaintiffs were not able 
to demonstrate an actual injury. Instead, “they assert that the requirement is met by the 
threat to their use, enjoyment, and aesthetic appreciation of St. Mary's that is created by the 
existence and enforcement of §21-69.1.”575 The Court found this to be insufficient. “Yet, the 
plaintiffs have not alleged any facts which suggest that this is even a vague likelihood.  They 
do not allege that church officials are presently considering, or have ever considered, the 
possibility of altering St. Mary's. They merely allege that as a result of § 21-69.1 there is 
nothing to prevent church officials from doing so.”576
573 Ibid.
574 Found at http://archives.archchicago.org/museum1b.htm. 
575 Ibid.
576 Ibid.
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 On December 19, 1990, the plaintiffs amended their case and brought suit again. 
United States District Judge Marvin E. Aspen again provided the opinion of the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.577 Again, the plaintiffs claim was 
dismissed. The plaintiffs provided additional evidence that they felt would be able to prove 
what the City of Los Angeles v. Lyons578 called “the threat of direct injury must be ‘both real and 
immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” The amended complaint intended to prove that 
the demolition of Stint Mar’s was more than just a possibility.  Saint Mary’s Church had 
structural problems that placed the members of the parish in danger and thus closed the 
Church down in January of 1988.
 In light of problem-solving, two yeas later, “the Archdiocese was offered over $1 
million in donations from parishioners, neighbors, and other ‘restoration supporters’ to 
complete the needed repairs, which it refused to accept stating that it was $150,000 less than 
the necessary amount. Soon thereafter, it was offered a $150,000 guarantee to make up the 
difference, which it also refused.”579 Based on this refusal as well as the historic demolition 
record, the plaintiffs allege that the Church was in great harm. “The Archdiocese has 
demolished approximately one third (seventeen of forty-two) of the churches that it has 
closed since the early 1950's.”580
 The Court found that the new evidence provided no “more than mere speculation 
and conjecture that St. Mary's will be altered or demolished.”581 The Court felt that this did 
not remedy the problems in the original complaint. The reliance on the historical demolition 
trends was dismissed as a statistic. Aspen stated that even if the statistic was applied, it would 
577 Alger v. City of Chicago, 753 F. Supp. 228 (1990). 
578 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
579 Id., Alger v. City of Chicago, 753 F. Supp. 228 (1990). 
580 Ibid.
581 Ibid. 
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be construed to the benefit of the preservationists. “According to the complaint, a 
significant majority (almost two-thirds) of churches that have been closed have not been 
demolished. Therefore, under the plaintiff's rationale, it seems most likely that St. Mary's will 
remain intact and the plaintiffs' interests, therefore, are not in any ‘real and immediate’ 
danger.”582
Aspen believed that the alternative of ruling based on the possibility the Church 
would be harmed was worse than removing the Church’s ability to act on its own behalf. 
Aspen explained that “while we recognize the merits of this argument, the alternative, to 
base standing on simple guesses and weak hypotheses about an action the Archdiocese 
might someday take, is far less attractive. Standing in federal court to litigate the 
constitutionality of legislative action is not a matter of tea leaves and crystal balls.”583 The 
Court denied the complaint without prejudice which meant that the plaintiffs could take 
action if at sometime later the Church was indeed in actual harm’s way. Incidentally, the 
Church was not demolished, but instead due to revitalization efforts, updated and preserved. 
The Church was located in the Wicker Park and Bucktown area of Chicago, which at the 
time of the case was a blue-collar area. Subsequent to the case, the area has changed due to 
the revitalization efforts and is currently described as “overrun by under-30 artists, yuppies 
and grunge types.”584 For now, it seems that the Church is safe from the wrecking ball. But 
this case exemplifies the difficult time Courts have when walking the tightrope between the 
clauses and contributes to inconsistent results.  
582 Ibid. 
583 Ibid. 
584 “Wicker Park/Bucktown.” Found at: 
www.homestore.com/Cities/Chicago/WickerParkGN.asp?poe=homestore. 
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The 1997 Agostini v. Felton585 case was part of a trend during the late 1980’s and 
1990’s in which the Court applied the Lemon test in slightly different ways when reviewing 
aid to students at religiously affiliated schools. This trend was unlike that of the 1970’s and 
early 1980’s in which “very few government programs that provided aid to religious schools 
or religious school students survived the three part test.”586 Agostini changed long standing 
precedent by overruling the ruling in Aguilar v. Felton.587 Agostini modified the Lemon test from 
its established tree prongs to what was called the Lemon test redux which ensured that the 
focus when determining whether a law violated the Establishment Clause was on the 
purpose and the effect of a law. The three prongs of purpose, effect, and entanglement, 
effectively used between 1970 and 1997, were not, however, discarded. The Court also 
specified that the determination of whether a government action had the primary effect of 
establishing religion included an evaluation of government indoctrination, defining the 
recipients based on religious affiliation, and excessive entanglement between government 
and religion. 
In the 5-to-4 decision, Agostini v. Felton,588 decided on June 23, 1997, overturned the 
1985 ruling in Aguilar v. Felton589 that held federal funds distributed for the purposes of 
paying the salaries of public school teachers working in parochial schools was 
unconstitutional. The petitioners, the parties bound by that injunction, brought suit seeking 
relief from the injunction twelve years after the ruling. “Petitioners maintain that Aguilar
cannot be squared with our intervening Establishment Clause jurisprudence and ask that we 
explicitly recognize what our more recent cases already dictate: Aguilar is no longer good 
585 Agostini v. Felton, 521 US 203 (1997). 
586 Id., Nowak and Rotunda, Principles of Constitutional Law (2004). 
587 Id., Aguilar v. Felton (1985). 
588Id., Agostini v. Felton (1997).
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law.”590 Writing the opinion for the majority of the Court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 
representing Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, revisited the case on several 
grounds including the fact that since the ruling, certain cases have changed the interpretation 
of the Establishment Clause.   
Rachel Agostini, representing several parents of parochial school students, brought 
suit against Betty-Louise Felton seeking relief from the permanent injunction entered 
subsequent to Aguilar.  Agostini challenged the ruling under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b). Rule 60(b)(5) states: “on motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
relieve a party . . . from a final judgment [or] order . . . [when] it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application.”591  Agostini felt that the previous 
judgment was no longer equitable in light of three changes that have effectively altered the 
factual and legal landscape.  
First, Agostini claimed that that the costs associated with complying with the District 
Court’s injunction were overly burdensome. Second, the plaintiff claimed that significant 
legal developments since Aguilar required that the decision be reconsidered in light of some 
recent opinions rendered by Justices. Finally, since Aguilar, Witters v. Washington Dept. of 
Services for Blind592and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District593 have interpreted the 
Constitution differently and subsequently work to undermine Aguilar.
In response to the ruling in Aguilar, Title I was modified to ensure that its goals were 
being met constitutionally. This change was accomplished by “revert[ing] to its prior practice 
of providing instruction at public school sites, at leased sites, and in mobile instructional 
589 Id., Aguilar v. Felton (1985). 
590 Id., Agostini v. Felton (1997). 
591 Ibid.
592 Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
593 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
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units (essentially vans converted into classrooms) parked near the sectarian school.”594 The 
program incurred great costs as a result of implementing these alternative delivery systems to 
ensure compliance with the requirements. “Since the 1986-1987 school year, the Board has 
spent over $100 million providing computer-aided instruction, leasing sites and mobile 
instructional units, and transporting students to those sites.”595 This expenditure greatly 
encumbered the program and in effect reduced the program’s outreach to 20,000 
economically disadvantaged children in New York City by 35 percent.  
The Court reasoned that the alleged burden incurred by the necessary compliance to 
the decision in Aguilar was an anticipated burden and was not sufficient to mandate a 
reversal under Rule 60(b)(5). Also under Rule 60(b)(5), the opinions of the Justices in the 
previous 1994 Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet 596case was also 
deemed insufficient to mandate a reversal. O’Connor dismissed the first two contentions for 
a lack of significant change in factual conditions as well as the fact that the additional costs 
to adjust the programs were known.  “That these predictions of additional costs turned out 
to be accurate does not constitute a change in factual conditions warranting relief under Rule 
60(b)(5).”597 She additionally dismissed the claim that a majority of Justice’s assertions that 
Aguilar be revisited warranted review.  “We also agree with respondents that the statements 
made by five Justices in Kiryas Joel do not, in themselves, furnish a basis for concluding that 
our Establishment Clause jurisprudence has changed.”598
594 Id., Agostini (1997). 
595 Ibid. 
596 Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). 
597 Id., Agostini (1997). 
598 Ibid. 
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O’Connor focused on the cases subsequent to Aguilar that changed the Court’s 
interpretation and eroded the logic of Aguilar to the point “it is no longer good law.”599 This 
decision was based on previous Supreme Court rulings such as Witters600 which departed 
from the assumption that all government aid that assisted the education aspect of religious 
schools was invalid.  The Court declared that a state grant to a blind man to attend a 
Christian college with the goal of becoming a pastor was constitutional. The other significant 
ruling was Zobrest601 which rejected the presumption that the presence of public school 
teachers in parochial schools implied state-sponsored indoctrination. Zobrest declared that the 
Catalina Foothills School District’s decision that enabled a deaf parochial student to attend 
classes with his interpreter was constitutional. O’Conner applied the rulings in these cases to 
Agostini and concluded that the rulings in Aguilar would be construed differently. The Court 
determined that the New York City program that paid public school teachers to provide 
remedial education in parochial schools was indeed constitutional. O’Connor stated that 
“Zobrest and Witters make clear that, under current law, the Shared Time program in Ball and 
New York City's Title I program in Aguilar will not, as a matter of law, be deemed to have 
the effect of advancing religion through indoctrination. Indeed, each of the premises upon 
which we relied in Ball to reach a contrary conclusion is no longer valid.”602
Given the precedent set by these cases and the reinterpretation of the facts of 
Aguilar, the Court found that Aguilar was not in violation of the Lemon test’s excessive 
entanglement prong. This conclusion was reached on the grounds that if it was assumed 
constitutional for a deaf man, as in Zobrest, to participate in school activities via an interpreter 
and presumably not to participate in religious indoctrination, then the logic could also be 
599 Ibid. 
600 Id., Witters (1968).
601 Id., Zobrest (1993). 
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applied to a teacher under Title I and likewise does not partake in indoctrination. O’Conner 
concluded that “both our precedent and our experience require us to reject respondents’ 
remarkable argument that we must presume Title I instructors to be ‘uncontrollable and 
sometimes very unprofessional.’”603 The court reaffirmed Title I’s constitutionality:  
New York City's Title I program does not run afoul of any of three primary 
criteria we currently use to evaluate whether government aid has the effect of 
advancing religion: it does not result in governmental indoctrination; define 
its recipients by reference to religion; or create an excessive entanglement. 
We therefore hold that a federally funded program providing supplemental, 
remedial instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis is not 
invalid under the Establishment Clause when such instruction is given on the 
premises of sectarian schools by government employees pursuant to a 
program containing safeguards such as those present here. The same 
considerations that justify this holding require us to conclude that this 
carefully constrained program also cannot reasonably be viewed as an 
endorsement of religion.604
O’Connor explained that the general principles such as the purpose as well as effect of 
advancing or inhibiting religion used to evaluate Establishment cases have not changed. 
O’Conner relied on the components of the Lemon test to resolve this Establishment Clause 
issue. “Agostini not only affirmed the continued vitality of the Lemon test, it confirmed once 
again that the often maligned standard could be used to produce an accommodationist 
conclusion.”605 O’Connor concluded that “what has changed since we decided Ball and 
Aguilar is our understanding of the criteria used to assess whether aid to religion has an 
impermissible effect.”606
Interestingly, the reversal of the Aguilar was not upheld by either stare decisis or 
“law of the case” doctrine that states that a Court should refrain from opening issues that 
have already been decided.
602 Id., Agostini (1997). 
603 Ibid. 
604 Ibid. 
605 John J. Patrick and Gerald P.  Long. Constitutional Debates on Freedom of Religion. 1999.
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The doctrine does not apply if the court is ‘convinced that [its prior decision] 
is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.’ In light of our 
conclusion that Aguilar would be decided differently under our current 
Establishment Clause law, we think adherence to that decision would 
undoubtedly work a ‘manifest injustice, such that the law of the case doctrine 
does not apply.607
The “significant change” coupled with the “change in law” as described by O’Conner 
entitled the petitioners relief under Rule 60(b)(5). O’Conner addressed the statements 
regarding upholding stare decisis. She stated that “we do no violence to the doctrine of stare
decisis when we recognize bona fide changes in our decisional law. And in those circumstances, 
we do no violence to the legitimacy we derive from reliance on that doctrine.”608
The Court that steadily applied the three-pronged Lemon test for over two decades 
applied a modified version to evaluate aid to schools by applying the secular purpose and 
primary effect prongs while dismissing the third. The Lemon Test, however, remained intact. 
In general, it seems that religious schools that teach at higher levels of education have 
successfully traversed the Establishment Clause, while religious schools that teach younger 
pupils have failed. “Financial aid to church-related colleges has fared better in the face of 
establishment challenges than has aid to elementary and secondary schools. The same three-
part test used in the pre-college cases – ‘purpose,’ primary effect,’ and ‘excessive 
entanglements’ – has been more easily satisfied in the higher education cases.”609 While 
Agostini took the first step to open the door for religiously affiliated schools to gain access to 
federal funding, the door was completely blown off three years later in Mitchell v. Helms.
On June 28, 2000, the Court adopted a new interpretation that allowed private 
schools, even though religiously affiliated, to receive aid. In a highly contentious 6-to-3 vote, 
606 Id., Agostini (1997). 
607 Ibid. 
608 Ibid. 
609 Id., Redlich (1999). p.524. 
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Mitchell v. Helms610 allowed local school districts to be eligible for federal funds for education 
related equipment intended for distribution to both public and private schools, even those 
religious private schools. The Court continued to apply its new interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause as established in Agostini and continued to overturn previous rulings. 
In finding that Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 was 
constitutional, the Court overturned Meek v. Pittenger611 and Wolman v. Walter.612
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana originally 
agreed with Helms and held that Chapter 2 had the primary effect of advancing religion 
because the equipment loans were construed a direct aid granted to a pervasively sectarian 
institutions and thus unconstitutional. The District Court originally held that the aid violated 
the second prong of the Lemon test in that the aid was given directly to pervasively sectarian 
schools. The residing judge, however, retired and after the new judge heard Helms v. Cody613
on June 10, 1994, he reversed and held the aid constitutional. The Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit reversed and held Chapter 2 unconstitutional on August 17, 1998 in Helms v. 
Picard.614 The United States Supreme Court ultimately reversed the ruling of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Mary Helms, representing a group of Louisiana public school parents, brought suit 
claiming that Chapter 2 violated the Establishment Clause on the grounds that the federal 
funds were distributed to state agencies which in turn distributed the funds for educational 
materials and equipment to public and private religious institutions. The Jefferson Parish 
entity that was empowered to the handle the funds doled out 30 percent to private Catholic 
610 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
611 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 US 349 (1975). 
612 Wolman v. Walter, 433 US 229(1977). 
613 Helms v. Cody, 856 F. Supp. 1102 (1994). 
614 Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347 (1998).  
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institutions. “For the 1985-1986 fiscal year, 41 private schools participated in Chapter 2. For 
the following year, 46 participated….Of these 46, 34 were Roman Catholic; 7 were otherwise 
religiously affiliated; and 5 were not religiously affiliated.”615
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA),616 created Chapter 2 
of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981.617 Chapter 2 was established 
to distribute federal funds via state educational agencies (SEA’s) to local educational agencies 
(LEA’s). The LEA’s would in turn loan educational materials to local schools. “Among other 
things, Chapter 2 provides aid ‘for the acquisition and use of instructional and educational 
materials, including library services and materials (including media materials), assessments, 
reference materials, computer software and hardware for instructional use, and other 
curricular materials.’”618 The establishment of SEA’s and their counterpart LEA’s followed in 
the footsteps of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 in Aguilar. Though 
initially invalidated, the program was reinterpreted as constitutional in Agostini. Chapter 2 
did, however, establish some restrictions for private schools. “Most significantly, the 
‘services, materials, and equipment’ provided to private schools must be ‘secular, neutral, and 
nonideological.’”619 The materials supplied included “library books, computers, and 
computer software, and also slide and movie projectors, overhead projectors, television sets, 
tape recorders, VCR's, projection screens, laboratory equipment, maps, globes, filmstrips, 
slides, and cassette recordings.”620
 Justice Thomas, representing four of the Justices, delivered the opinion of the Court 
while the concurring opinion written by Justices O’Connor and Breyer agreed that the effect 
615 Id., Mitchell v. Helms (2000). 
616 Ibid., Pub. L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27, 55. 
617 Ibid., Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 469, as amended, 20 U.S.C. §§ 7301-7373. 
618 Ibid., 20 U.S.C. § 7351(b)(2). 
619 Ibid., § 7372(a)(1). 
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of the law should be determined based on whether government indoctrination could be 
established, whether the grant recipients were religiously affiliated, and if it could be 
determined that an excessive entanglement was created. The four person plurality comprised 
a very broad approach to the Establishment Clause. Thomas candidly admitted that the 
rulings handed down by the various Courts were incredibly confusing. “The case’s tortuous 
history over the next 15 years indicates well the degree to which our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence has shifted in recent times, while nevertheless retaining anomalies with which 
the lower courts have had to struggle.”621 The shift he referred to was the slightly different 
interpretations that culminated in the Agostini decision. Thomas continued the logic affirmed 
in Agostini and upheld the constitutionality of Chapter 2: 
Considering Chapter 2 in light of our more recent case law, we conclude that 
it neither results in religious indoctrination by the government nor defines its 
recipients by reference to religion. We therefore hold that Chapter 2 is not a 
‘law respecting an establishment of religion.’ In so holding, we acknowledge 
what both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits saw was inescapable -- Meek and 
Wolman are anomalies in our case law. We therefore conclude that they are 
no longer good law.622
Thomas relied on the principle of neutrality to establish whether indoctrination had 
occurred. “If the religious, irreligious, and a religious are all alike eligible for governmental 
aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has 
been done at the behest of the government.”623 The concept that parents of school age 
children made private choices ensured the principle of neutrality. “The private choices 
helped to ensure neutrality, and neutrality and private choices together eliminated any 
possible attribution to the government even when the interpreter translated classes on 
620 Ibid. 
621 Id., Helms v. Cody (1994). 
622 Id., Mitchell v. Helms (2000). 
623 Ibid. 
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Catholic doctrine.”624 The voucher program, held in check, by neutrality was determined to 
be constitutional. This concept is the key to current programs that allow federal grants to 
religiously affiliated organizations including President Bush’s faith-based initiatives and Save 
America’s Treasures. As the concept of aid changed over time, from Everson’s 
interpretation that focused on the benefit incurred by the parent not the institution, the 
concept of aid changed from one focused on the type of aid to one hat focused on the 
recipient of the aid. The neutrality principle has opened doors for the preservation of 
historic religious sites with active congregations.  
Mitchell v. Helms625 continued in the footsteps of Agostini626 and further leveled the 
playing field against the no-direct-aid sentiment. Two years later, the Court built on the 
recent precedents and concluded that the school vouchers at issue in the February 20, 2002 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris627case were constitutional. The adjusted focus from the nature of 
the recipient to the regulation criteria further opened the door for religious organizations to 
gain access to grants.
In 1995, Ohio created a voucher system that was intended to cure some of the inner-
city woes that the faltering Cleveland schools were experiencing.  Delivering the opinion of 
the Supreme Court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Thomas explained the 5-to-4 decision that declared the voucher program 
constitutional. The religion-neutral vouchers were given to parents of school aged children 
in participating schools and were used in part to pay for parochial school tuition. Susan Tave 
Zelman, representing a group of Ohio taxpayers brought suit against Doris Simmons-Harris 
624 Ibid. 
625 Ibid. 
626 Id., Agostini v. Felton (1997). 
627 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
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to enjoin the scholarship vouchers.  On appeal from the Court of Appeals from the Sixth 
Circuit,628 the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate decision and held that the scholarship 
vouchers did not violate the Establishment Clause.  
In the 1990’s, the Cleveland, Ohio school system was languishing. In 1995, 
Cleveland was described as having a “crisis of magnitude”629  and in 1996 as having a “crisis 
that is perhaps unprecedented in the history of American education.”630 The Pilot Project 
Scholarship Program was enacted to bolster the school system. “The program provides 
financial assistance to families in any Ohio school district that is or has been under federal 
court order requiring supervision and operational management of the district by the state 
superintendent.” 631 The program provided two kinds of assistance including tuition aid to be 
applied towards tuition at participating public or private schools and tutorial aid to be 
applied for those that chose to stay in the public school system. “The tuition aid portion of 
the program is designed to provide educational choices to parents who reside in a covered 
district. Any private school, whether religious or nonreligious, may participate in the 
program and accept program students so long as the school is located within the boundaries 
of a covered district and meets statewide educational standards.” 632 Public schools were 
eligible for $2,250 tuition grant for each student in addition to the full amount of per-pupil 
state funding and “families with incomes below 200% of the poverty line are given priority 
and are eligible to receive 90% of private school tuition up to $2,250.” 633 The tutorial aid 
inclusion ensured that students from low-income families receive a 90% reimbursement of 
628 Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (2000). 
629 Id., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002). Quoting from Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F. Supp. 2d 705, (1995). 
630 Ibid. Cleveland City School District Performance Audit 2-1 (Mar. 1996). 
631 Ibid. § 3313.975(A). 
632 Ibid. § 3313.976(A)(3). 
633 Ibid. §§ 3313.978(A) and (C)(1). 
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the expenditure up to $360 while students from moderate-income families received 75% of 
the expenditure.634
The 1999-2000 school year included 56 participating private schools of which 46 
were religiously affiliated. Approximately 96 percent of the 3,700 students participating in 
the scholarship program were enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Overlooking these 
statistics, Justice Rehnquist explained that the issue was the assessment of whether the 
program had the ‘effect’ of advancing or inhibiting religion. Though the Court did not 
question the secular intent of the program, the Court made a distinction between 
government programs that provide aid directly to religious schools and programs of true 
private choice. Programs of true private programs were characterized as programs in which 
government aid could be traced to religious schools via private choices. Justice Rehnquist 
stated that “while our jurisprudence with respect to the constitutionality of direct aid 
programs has ‘changed significantly’ over the past two decades, our jurisprudence with 
respect to true private choice programs has remained consistent and unbroken. Three times 
we have confronted Establishment Clause challenges to neutral government programs that 
provide aid directly to a broad class of individuals, who, in turn, direct the aid to religious 
schools or institutions of their own choosing. Three times we have rejected such 
challenges.”635 Rehnquist referred to Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest in which the advancement of 
a religious mission was found to be incidental because the program was accessible by many 
recipients and ensured that parents were able to make deliberate choices. Rehnquist stated 
that:
As was true in those cases, the Ohio program is neutral in all respects toward 
religion. It is part of a general and multifaceted undertaking by the State of 
Ohio to provide educational opportunities to the children  of a failed school 
634 Ibid. § 3313.978(B). 
635 Ibid. 
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district. It confers educational assistance directly to a broad class of 
individuals defined without reference to religion, i.e., any parent of a school-
age child who resides in the Cleveland City School District. The program 
permits the participation of all schools within the district, religious or 
nonreligious. Adjacent public schools also may participate and have a 
financial incentive to do so. Program benefits are available to participating 
families on neutral terms, with no reference to religion. The only preference 
stated anywhere in the program is a preference for low-income families, who 
receive greater assistance and are given priority for admission at participating 
schools.636
The Court determined that when choices were available and parents acted on their ability to 
privately choose, the Establishment Clause was not implicated. This choice enabled “the 
circuit between government and religion”637 to be broken and thus the Establishment Clause 
was not implicated. In a concurring opinion, Justices O’Conner and Thomas emphasized 
that the decision in Zelman should not be construed to depart from prior Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence. “Courts are instructed to consider two factors: first, whether the 
program administers aid in a neutral fashion, without differentiation based on the religious 
status of beneficiaries or providers of services; second, and more importantly, whether 
beneficiaries of indirect aid have a genuine choice among religious and nonreligious 
organizations when determining the organization to which they will direct that aid. If the 
answer to either query is ‘no,’ the program should be struck down under the Establishment 
Clause.”638 The Supreme Court concluded that the vouchers had neither the primary purpose 
nor primary effect of advancing religion while simultaneously upholding the validity of the 
Lemon test. 
636 Ibid. 
637 Ibid. 
638 Ibid. 
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VIII.      C   o   n   c   l   u   s   i   o  n
The concurrent development of the Religion Clauses has created an interesting 
tension between the prohibition against the establishment of religion on one hand and the 
interference with its free exercise on the other. The principal guiding force that has emerged 
from the Supreme Court jurisprudence to negotiate both Clauses is the principle of 
governmental neutrality. This neutrality, however, is precarious. There are always situations 
in which laws traverse boundaries and incidentally encroach on these rights. “Unfortunately, 
situations arise where government may have no choice but to incidentally help or hinder 
religious groups or practices. For example, Congress should not pay the salaries of ministers, 
priests, and rabbis, but if the military ships its soldiers to places with no easy access to 
churches, synagogues, or mosques, it may hire military chaplains who minister to the 
soldiers, so that the government will not interfere with their free exercise of religion.”639
These situations arise when the Courts make distinctions between competing interests. The 
delineation of the boundaries between the two Clauses is becoming more precise and 
influences a significant aspect of historic preservation, a field which some interpret as 
involving objectives that conflict with those of religious organizations.
Religious institutions are a significant part of this country’s foundation and have 
historically played an important role in the establishment of communities, cities and states.  
Many colonial communities gave churches prominent locations in the main square along 
with other government buildings and almost instantaneously became the area’s hub 
639 John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda. Principles of Constitutional Law. 2004. p.740-741. 
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representative of the community’s historical, social and cultural significance.  A few states 
even had established religions. Their spires in and of themselves became landmarks that 
were easily recognizable from great distances. Historic Preservation’s noble goal of 
preserving these religious structures in order to maintain their significance for future 
generations is significant and yet has been met with various obstacles. These obstacles 
include preservation ordinances that on one hand, provide the needed structure to ensure 
compliance with preservation goals and on the other, represent an infringement on the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.   
The conflicts that arise between the Religion Clauses and their subsequent 
interpretation by the Supreme Court dictates the place of preservation on the list of 
competing interests. Recently, the mantra that the government cannot fund that which it 
cannot not regulate has been dispelled as applied to the preservation of religious structures. 
On April 30, 2002, the OLC amended its position and released its official opinion regarding 
the status of the restoration of historic religious properties. The modified policy allowed for 
federally funded preservation of religious properties. Religious historic sites with active 
congregations have consequently gained access to federal funding for preservation projects.  
The historic preservation of religious sites is a consummate legal balancing act. The 
successful implementation of preservation ordinances intended to preserve historic religious 
properties requires the analysis of the Religion Clause jurisprudence even if only a handful of 
cases deal directly with preservation. The historical trends and the nuances on which cases 
either distinguish previous precedent or create new precedent are imperative for 
preservationists to appreciate. Though Save America’s Treasures is currently considered 
constitutional, future Supreme Court interpretations are difficult to predict and 
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preservationists need to be armed with the knowledge of the First Amendment 
considerations. For example, significant statutes such as RLUIPA at the federal level provide 
great obstacles for preservationists. While the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the 
constitutionality of RLUIPA, consistent federal court of appeal rulings have emphatically 
upheld RLUIPA. Many fields, including historic preservation, eagerly anticipate the pending 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of Cutter v. Wilkinson. Preservationists need to work with 
governments to establish strong compelling interests that are implemented by the least 
restrictive means. If preservation ordinances can prove a compelling governmental interest 
by the least intrusive means, religious landmarks will survive. Conversely, ignorance of what 
is appropriate as well as constitutional when confronted with a religious entity’s request to 
alter its historic property can lead to legal and financial heartaches.  
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Bill of Rights 
Amendment I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
Amendment II 
A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people 
to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.
Amendment III 
No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the 
owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.  
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.  
Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of 
counsel for his defense.
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Amendment VII 
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right 
of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined 
in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.  
Amendment VIII 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.  
Amendment IX 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.  
Amendment X 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.  
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Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
Public Law 103-141
November 16, 1993
103rd Congress
H.R.130
An Act
To protect the free exercise of religion.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in 
Congress assembled,
Sec. 1. Short Title.
This Act may be cited as the 'Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993'. 
 Sec. 2. Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purposes.
(a) Findings: The Congress finds that--
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable 
right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution;  
(2) laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to 
interfere with religious exercise; 
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling 
justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court virtually 
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise 
imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and 
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test 
for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental 
interests.
(b) Purposes: The purposes of this Act are--
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all 
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and  
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(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially 
burdened by government. 
Sec. 3. Free Exercise of Religion Protected.
(a) In General: Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion 
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in 
subsection (b).
(b) Exception: Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if 
it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-- 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and  
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
(c) Judicial Relief: A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this 
section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain 
appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this 
section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of the 
Constitution.
Sec. 4. Attorney's Fees.
(a) Judicial Proceedings: Section 722 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1988) is amended 
by inserting 'the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,' before 'or title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964'.
(b) Administrative Proceedings: Section 504(b)(1)(C) of title 5, United States Code, is 
amended--
(1) by striking 'and' at the end of clause (ii);  
(2) by striking the semicolon at the end of clause (iii) and inserting ', and'; and 
(3) by inserting '(iv) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993;' after clause (iii). 
Sec. 5. Definitions.
As used in this Act --
(1) the term 'government' includes a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official 
(or other person acting under color of law) of the United States, a State, or a subdivision of a 
State;
(2) the term 'State' includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
and each territory and possession of the United States; 
(3) the term 'demonstrates' means meets the burdens of going forward with the evidence and 
of persuasion; and 
(4) the term 'exercise of religion' means the exercise of religion under the First Amendment 
to the Constitution. 
Sec. 6. Applicability.
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(a) In General.--This Act applies to all Federal and State law, and the implementation of 
that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment 
of this Act .
(b) Rule of Construction.--Federal statutory law adopted after the date of the enactment of 
this Act is subject to this Act unless such law explicitly excludes such application by 
reference to this Act . 
(c) Religious Belief Unaffected.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize any 
government to burden any religious belief. 
Sec. 7. Establishment Clause Unaffected.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way address that portion 
of the First Amendment prohibiting laws respecting the establishment of religion (referred 
to in this section as the 'Establishment Clause'). Granting government funding, benefits, or 
exemptions, to the extent permissible under the Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a 
violation of this Act. As used in this section, the term 'granting', used with respect to 
government funding, benefits, or exemptions, does not include the denial of government 
funding, benefits, or exemptions. 
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RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS 
42 USCA § 2000cc
§ 2000cc. Protection of land use as religious exercise
(a) Substantial burdens 
(1) General rule  
     No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that 
imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious 
assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden 
on that person, assembly, or institution-- 
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
(2) Scope of application  
This subsection applies in any case in which-- 
(A) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial 
assistance, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability; 
(B) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect, 
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes, even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability; or 
(C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation or 
system of land use regulations, under which a government makes, or has in place formal or 
informal procedures or practices that permit the government to make, individualized 
assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved. 
(b) Discrimination and exclusion 
(1) Equal terms 
     No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a 
religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or 
institution.
(2) Nondiscrimination 
     No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that discriminates 
against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination. 
(3) Exclusions and limits 
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No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that-- 
(A) totally excludes religious assemblies from a jurisdiction; or 
(B) unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a jurisdiction. 
§ 2000cc-1. Protection of religious exercise of institutionalized persons
(a) General rule 
     No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person 
residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that 
imposition of the burden on that person-- 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
(b) Scope of application 
This section applies in any case in which-- 
(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial 
assistance; or 
(2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect, 
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes. 
§ 2000cc-2. Judicial relief
(a) Cause of action 
     A person may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial 
proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or 
defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under Article 
III of the Constitution. 
(b) Burden of persuasion 
     If a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence to support a claim alleging a violation of the 
Free Exercise Clause or a violation of section 2000cc of this title, the government shall bear 
the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim, except that the plaintiff shall bear the 
burden of persuasion on whether the law (including a regulation) or government practice 
that is challenged by the claim substantially burdens the plaintiff's exercise of religion. 
(c) Full faith and credit 
Adjudication of a claim of a violation of section 2000cc of this title in a non-Federal forum 
shall not be entitled to full faith and credit in a Federal court unless the claimant had a full 
and fair adjudication of that claim in the non-Federal forum. 
(d) Omitted 
(e) Prisoners 
     Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to amend or repeal the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (including provisions of law amended by that Act). 
(f) Authority of United States to enforce this chapter 
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     The United States may bring an action for injunctive or declaratory relief to enforce 
compliance with this chapter. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to deny, impair, 
or otherwise affect any right or authority of the Attorney General, the United States, or any 
agency, officer, or employee of the United States, acting under any law other than this 
subsection, to institute or intervene in any proceeding. 
(g) Limitation 
     If the only jurisdictional basis for applying a provision of this chapter is a claim that a 
substantial burden by a government on religious exercise affects, or that removal of that 
substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, 
or with Indian tribes, the provision shall not apply if the government demonstrates that all 
substantial burdens on, or the removal of all substantial burdens from, similar religious 
exercise throughout the Nation would not lead in the aggregate to a substantial effect on 
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes. 
§ 2000cc-3. Rules of construction
(a) Religious belief unaffected 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize any government to burden any 
religious belief. 
(b) Religious exercise not regulated 
Nothing in this chapter shall create any basis for restricting or burdening religious exercise or 
for claims against a religious organization including any religiously affiliated school or 
university, not acting under color of law. 
(c) Claims to funding unaffected 
Nothing in this chapter shall create or preclude a right of any religious organization to 
receive funding or other assistance from a government, or of any person to receive 
government funding for a religious activity, but this chapter may require a government to 
incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious 
exercise.
(d) Other authority to impose conditions on funding unaffected 
Nothing in this chapter shall-- 
(1) authorize a government to regulate or affect, directly or indirectly, the activities or 
policies of a person other than a government as a condition of receiving funding or other 
assistance; or 
(2) restrict any authority that may exist under other law to so regulate or affect, except as 
provided in this chapter. 
(e) Governmental discretion in alleviating burdens on religious exercise 
A government may avoid the preemptive force of any provision of this chapter by changing 
the policy or practice that results in a substantial burden on religious exercise, by retaining 
the policy or practice and exempting the substantially burdened religious exercise, by 
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providing exemptions from the policy or practice for applications that substantially burden 
religious exercise, or by any other means that eliminates the substantial burden. 
(f) Effect on other law 
With respect to a claim brought under this chapter, proof that a substantial burden on a 
person's religious exercise affects, or removal of that burden would affect, commerce with 
foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes, shall not establish any 
inference or presumption that Congress intends that any religious exercise is, or is not, 
subject to any law other than this chapter. 
(g) Broad construction 
This chapter shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the 
maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution. 
(h) No preemption or repeal 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to preempt State law, or repeal Federal law, that is 
equally as protective of religious exercise as, or more protective of religious exercise than, 
this chapter. 
(i) Severability 
If any provision of this chapter or of an amendment made by this chapter, or any application 
of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the 
remainder of this chapter, the amendments made by this chapter, and the application of the 
provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected. 
§ 2000cc-4. Establishment Clause unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way address that 
portion of the First Amendment to the Constitution prohibiting laws respecting an 
establishment of religion (referred to in this section as the "Establishment Clause"). Granting 
government funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the 
Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation of this chapter. In this section, the 
term "granting", used with respect to government funding, benefits, or exemptions, does not 
include the denial of government funding, benefits, or exemptions. 
§ 2000cc-5. Definitions
In this chapter: 
(1) Claimant 
The term "claimant" means a person raising a claim or defense under this chapter. 
(2) Demonstrates 
The term "demonstrates" means meets the burdens of going forward with the evidence and 
of persuasion. 
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(3) Free Exercise Clause 
The term "Free Exercise Clause " means that portion of the First Amendment to the 
Constitution that proscribes laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion. 
(4) Government 
The term "government"-- 
(A) means-- 
(i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the authority of 
a State; 
(ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in clause 
(i); and 
(iii) any other person acting under color of State law; and 
(B) for the purposes of sections 2000cc-2(b) and 2000cc-3 of this title, includes the United 
States, a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of the United States, and any 
other person acting under color of Federal law. 
(5) Land use regulation 
The term "land use regulation" means a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of 
such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant's use or development of land (including a 
structure affixed to land), if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or 
other property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an 
interest.
(6) Program or activity 
The term "program or activity" means all of the operations of any entity as described in 
paragraph (1) or (2) of section 2000d-4a of this title. 
(7) Religious exercise 
(A) In general 
The term "religious exercise" includes any exercise of religion, whether ornot compelled by, 
or central to, a system of religious belief. 
(B) Rule 
The use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall 
be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or intends to use the 
property for that purpose. 
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Appendix E:      R  L  U  I  P  A     C  a  s  e     H  i  s  t  o  r  y
Found at http://law.wustl.edu/landuselaw/COMPILATION_of_all_RLUIPA_Constitutional_Cases.html
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
RLUIPA Constitutional Decisions
I. Overview of Constitutionality Decisions 
A. Land-Use
1. Findings of Constitutionality 
a. United States v. Maui, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2003 WL 23148864, (D. Haw. Dec. 
29, 2003) (rejecting Enforcement, Commerce, Establishment Clause, and 
Tenth Amendment challenges) 
b. Guru Nanak Sikh Society v. County of Sutter, No. S-02-1785 (E.D.Cal. Nov. 19, 
2003) (rejects Enforcement challenge) NOTE:  Notice of appeal filed in 9th
Circuit.
c. Primera Iglesia Bautista v. Broward County, No. 01-6530 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2004) 
(adopting Nov. 7, 2003 Magistrate Report and Recommendation) (rejecting 
constitutionality challenge, adopting reasoning of Freedom Baptist Church).
d. Murphy v. Town of New Milford, 289 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D. Conn. 2003) (rejecting 
Enforcement and Establishment Clause challenges).   NOTE: on appeal to 
2nd Circuit. 
e. Westchester Day Sch. v. Village of Mamaroneck, 280 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (rejecting Enforcement, Commerce, and Establishment Clause, and 
Tenth Amendment challenges)  NOTE: on appeal to 2nd Circuit, oral 
argument date March 1, 2004. 
f. Life Teen, Inc. v. Yavapai County, No. Civ. 01-1490-PCT-RCB (D. Ariz. Mar. 
26, 2003) (rejecting Commerce Clause, Enforcement Clause, Separation-of-
Powers, Tenth Amendment, and Establishment Clause challenges). 
g. Christ Universal Mission Church v. City of Chicago, No. 01-C-1429, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 22917 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2002) (rejecting constitutionality 
challenge, adopting reasoning of Freedom Baptist Church).
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h. Freedom Baptist Church v. Tp. of Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Pa. 
2002) (rejecting Enforcement, Commerce, and Establishment Clause 
challenges).
2. Suggestions of Constitutionality 
a. Shepherd Montessori Center Milan v. Ann Arbor Charter Tp., Nos. 233484, 234300, 
___ N.W.2d ___, 2003 WL 22520439 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2003)
b. Hale O Kaula v. Maui Planning Comm’n, 223 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1072 (D. Haw. 
2002) (declining to address constitutionality of RLUIPA in detail, but 
concluding that “jurisdictional element” of § 2(a)(2)(B) precludes Commerce 
Clause challenge, and that § 2(a)(2)(C) “codifies the ‘individualized 
assessments’ doctrine”). 
c. Cottonwood Christian Center v. City of Cypress, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1221 n.7 
(C.D. Cal. 2002) (noting that “RLUIPA would appear to have avoided the 
flaws of its predecessor RFRA, and be within Congress’s constitutional 
authority,” citing Freedom Baptist Church).
3. Findings of Unconstitutionality 
a. Elsinore Christian Center v. City of Lake Elsinore, 2003 WL 22724539 (C.D. Cal. 
Aug. 21, 2003) (striking down Sections 2(a) as applied through 2(a)(2)(B)  and 
2(a)(2)(C) as exceeding Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and the 
Enforcement Clause) (per Wilson, J.).  NOTE:  request for certification to 
9th Circuit granted by the district court Dec. 17, 2003; unopposed petition for 
permission to appeal to 9th Circuit pending. 
b. Missionaries of Charity, Brothers v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV-01-8115-SVW 
(C.D. Cal. July 11, 2003) (incorporating Elsinore Enforcement Clause decision 
by reference, and requesting briefing on Commerce Clause constitutionality) 
(per Wilson, J.). NOTE:  Case has been stayed pending Ninth Circuit’s 
resolution of Elsinore.
B. Institutionalized Persons 
1. Findings of Constitutionality
 a.   Midrash Sephardi v. Town of Surfside (11th Cir.) 366 F.3d 1214 (2004).
b.   Open Homes Fellowship v. Orange County, No. 6:03-CV-943-ORL-31 (S.D.Fla.)
(amicus constitutionality brief filed Jan. 2, 2004) (land use case) 
 c.   Benning v. Georgia, No. 602CV139 (S.D.Ga. Jan. 9, 2004) (rejecting 
Establishment Clause challenge and rejecting magistrate report and 
recommendation) NOTE:  case certified for appeal to the 11th Circuit under 
FRCP 54(b).
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      d. Castle Hills First Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, No. SA-01-CA-1149-HG 
(W.D. Tex.) (oral argument on Oct. 22, 2003 on cross-motions for partial 
summary judgment, including constitutionality) (land use case). 
e. Madison v. Riter, No. 03-6362, __ F.3d __, 2003 WL 22883620 (4th Cir. Dec. 8, 
2003) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge) 
f. Charles v. Verhagen, No. 02-3572, ___ F.3d ___, 2003 WL 22455960 (7th Cir. 
Oct. 30, 2003) (rejecting Spending Clause, Establishment Clause, and Tenth 
Amendment challenges, but declining to reach Commerce Clause challenge). 
g. Williams v. Bitner, No. 1:CV-01-2271, 2003 WL 22272302, ___ F. Supp. 2d. 
___ (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2003) (rejecting Establishment Clause, Spending 
Clause, Tenth Amendment, and Eleventh Amendment challenges). 
h. Sanabria v. Brown, No. 99-4699 (D.N.J. June 5, 2003) (rejecting Spending 
Clause, Establishment Clause, Tenth Amendment, Eleventh Amendment, 
and Separation of Powers challenges, but declining to reach Commerce 
Clause challenge). 
i. Gordon v. Pepe, No. Civ. A-00-10453-RWZ, 2003 WL 1571712 (D. Mass. Mar. 
6, 2003) (rejecting constitutionality challenge based on Mayweathers district 
court decision) (still in discovery at district court level).
j. Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir 2002) (rejecting Spending 
Clause, Establishment Clause, Tenth Amendment, Eleventh Amendment, 
and Separation-of-Powers challenges), cert. denied sub nom. Alameida v.
Mayweathers, No. 02-1655, ___ U.S. ___, 2003 WL 21180348, 71 USLW 3725 
(U.S. Oct. 6, 2003). 
k. Johnson v. Martin, 223 F. Supp. 2d 820 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (rejecting 
Commerce, Spending, Establishment Clause, and Tenth Amendment 
challenges), overruled by Cutter v. Wilkinson, infra.
l.  Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (rejecting
Spending Clause, Establishment Clause, and Tenth Amendment challenges), 
overruled by Cutter v. Wilkinson, infra.
m. Taylor v. Cockrell, No. H-00-2809 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2002), vacated on 
mootness grounds, Taylor v. Groom, No. 02-21316 (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 2003).
n. Love v. Evans, No. 2:00-CV-91 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 8, 2001) (rejecting 
constitutionality challenge based on Mayweathers district court decision). 
2. Findings of Unconstitutionality 
a. Cutter v. Wilkinson, Nos. 02-3270, 02-3299, 02-3301  ___ F.3d ___, 2003 WL 
22513973 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 2003) (finding RLUIPA Section 3 violates 
Establishment Clause). NOTE:  certiorari granted October 12, 2004 by the 
United States Supreme Court. 
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b. Al Ghashiyah v. Wis. Dept. of Corrections, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 
4, 2003) (same), overruled by Charles v. Verhagen, supra.
c. Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566 (W.D. Va. 2003) (same) overruled by 
Madison v. Riter, supra.
d.  In re Rowland, No. HC4172 (Sup. Ct. Cal., Monterey Cy., July 31, 2002) 
(same) (appellate court affirmed trial court’s denial of habeas petition without 
opinion).
C. Pending
1. Terrero v. Watts, No. CV202-134 (S.D. Ga.) (appeal to district court from 
recommendation of magistrate judge that RLUIPA and RFRA violate the 
Establishment Clause) (prisoner case) 
II. Recent Decisions Applying the Act 
A. Shepherd Montessori Center Milan v. Ann Arbor Charter Tp., Nos. 233484, 234300, 
___ N.W.2d ___, 2003 WL 22520439 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2003) (finding 
genuine issues of material fact on “substantial burden” under RLUIPA Section 2(a), 
and on “similarly situated” under Equal Protection Clause).
B. C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003) (construing “substantial 
burden” narrowly – zoning law must render worship “effectively impracticable”). 
C. Pending
1. San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, No. 02-15693 (9th Cir.) (argument 
before Canby, Kleinfeld, & Rawlinson on May 14, 2003). 
2. Grace United Methodist v. Cheyenne (opening brief due end of January)
3. Lighthouse Institute v. City of Long Branch, No. 03-2343 (3d Cir.) (briefing complete, 
argument scheduled for either 2nd or 4th week February). 
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Appendix F:      T a b l e   o f   F i g u r e s
Figure 1 
Westchester Reform Temple in Scarsdale, New York. 
Provided by Hillary Fontana, WRTemple.org. 
Figure 2 
Exterior view of Society for Ethical Culture in New York City. 
Found at www.nysec.org/rental.htm. 
Figure 3 
View from Society for Ethical Culture in New York City. 
Found at www.nysec.org/rental.htm. 
Figure 4 
Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church in Lakewood, Colorado. 
Found at http://www.bethluth.net/. 
Figure 5 
Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church in Lakewood, Colorado. 
Found at http://www.bethluth.net/. 
Figure 6 
Interior view of Society of Jesus of New England in Boston, Massachusetts. 
Found at http://www.jucboston.org/history.html. 
Figure 7 
St. Bartholomew’s Church in New York City. 
Found at www.stbarts.org/lgdome.htm. 
Figure 8 
Sketch of First Covenant Church in Seattle, Washington. 
Found at http://www.seattlefirstcovenant.org/index.php.
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Figure 9 
St. Peter and Paul's Roman Catholic Church in Cumberland, Maryland. 
Found at www.ci.cumberland.md.us/cgi-bin/browse.pl?pic=1820. 
Figure 10 
First United Methodist Church in Seattle, Washington. 
Found at http://www.cityofseattle.net/commnty/histsea/advocacy/firstunitedmethodist.htm. 
Figure 11 
Interior view of St. Peter Catholic Church in Boerne, Texas. 
Found at http://davisrexrodearchitects.com/stpeteroutline.htm.
Figure 12 
Exterior view of St. Peter Catholic Church in Boerne, Texas. 
Found at http://davisrexrodearchitects.com/stpeteroutline.htm.
Figure 13 
First Presbyterian Church in Ypsilanti, Michigan. 
Found at http://www.fpcy.org/. 
Figure 14 
The Towner House pre-restoration in Ypsilanti, Michigan. 
Found at http://www.yhf.org/newsletters/2002mARCHyhfnews%20.pdf. 
Figure 15 
The Towner House post-restoration in Ypsilanti, Michigan. 
Found at http://www.yhf.org/newsletters/2002mARCHyhfnews%20.pdf. 
Figure 16 
Exterior view of First Church of Christ Scientist in Ridgefield, Connecticut. Found at 
http://www.christiansciencect.org/ridgefield/. 
Figure 17 
Interior view of First Church of Christ Scientist in Ridgefield, Connecticut. Found at 
http://www.christiansciencect.org/ridgefield/. 
Figure 18 
Saint Mary of the Angels Church in Chicago, Illinois. Found at 
http://archives.archchicago.org/museum1b.htm. 
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